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SUMMARY:
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Petrs challenge the CA2's finding that resps'

publication of excerpts from ~ resident Ford's~memoir ;}_did not
violate the copyright laws.
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FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

Petrs are the owners of the

publication rights to "A Time to Heal," the memoirs of former
President Ford.

The rights held by petrs gave them exclsuive

-------

_____

rights to publish
and sell the Ford memoirs in book form and to
____,
license the right to publish excerpts in newspapers or periodicals
prior to book publication.

The memoirs were informal, based upon

Ford's recollections without reliance on documents.

Petrs

licensed to Time magazine the exclusive right to publish excerpts
from Chapters I and III, which Time's editor described as the

l

"most interesting and moving parts of the entire manuscript."

The

excerpts were to appear in an issue of Time that was to go on sale
on April 16, 1979.

Time paid $12,500 upon signing the license

agreement and was to pay another $12,500 upon its publication of

(I

the excerpts.

The contract provided that Time could renegotiate

the second installment in the event there was any publication from
Chapters I and III before Time's.
In March 1979, resps received a copy of the manuscript from a
"clandestine source" who has never been identified.

t:.__--------

Resps took

excerpts from the book and rushed to print a 2,250-word cover
story entitled, "The Ford Memoirs

Behind the Nixon Pardon."

The DC determined that approximately 83% of the story was copied
or paraphrased from the unpublished manuscript.

rJ

~I

Resps received

$418 from newsstand sales of the edition containing the article.
Following the appearance of the article published by resps,
/

Time sought permission from petrs to publish its excerpts a week
earlier than origihally scheduled.

Because of a "careful program

coordinating the Time article and the book's release," petrs

s~

(.

-
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refused Time's request.

Time thereafter did not publish any of

the manuscript and refused to pay the second installment of
$12,500.
Petrs brought this suit in DC (S.D.N.Y.; Owen, J.) and were
awarded $12,500 plus interest.

On appeal, the CA2 reversed, with

Judge Meskill dissenting.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Petrs:

Petrs contend that the CA2, in

conflict with the holdings of other CAs, redefined and severely
I

lim} ed the scope of what is protectible under the copyright laws
in a work of nonfiction.

The CA2 held (a) that in works

..._. · ~ -~,

concerning news and history, the "troublesome" concept of
expression must be limited to "its barest elements -- the ordering
and choice of the words themselves"

P.A. A19;

(b) that facts

coupled with expression cannot constitute a copyrightable
totality, P.A. A21; and (3) that almost unlimited paraphrasing
from a work of nonfiction is permissible, unless the copier has

r

l

"borrowed virtually an entire work,"

P.A. Al7.

No other circuit has attempted to limit expression to its

\ barest elements.

In Miller v. Universal Studios, 650 F.2d 1365

(CA5 1981), the CA5 upheld an instruction to a jury that stated
that while a general theme cannot be copyrighted, "its expression
throughout the pattern of the work, the sequence of its events,
the development of the interplay of its characters and its choice
of detail and dialogue can be copyrighted."

Id., at 1368.

In

United States v. Hamilton, 583 F.2d 448, 450 (CA9 1978), the CA9
accorded protection to a mapmaker's "selection, arrangement and
presentation" of terrain features.

Prior decisions of the CA2

-

-

4 -

-

~

l

have rejected the narrow definition of protectible expression now
espoused by the majority.

In Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall

Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (CA2 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1014 (1978), a unanimous court stated, "What is protected is
the manner of expression, the author's analysis or interpretation
of events, the way he structures his material and marshals facts,
his choice of words, and the emphasis he gives to particular
developments."

Id., at 95.

The ruling that fact coupled with expression cannot
constitute a copyrightable totality conflicts with the holdings of
other circuits on two counts.

First, the unauthorized copying of

works consisting primarily of factual material has been held to be
an infringement by a number of circuits.
(.

Flick-Reedy Corp. v.

Hydro-Line Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 546 (CA7 1965), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 958 (1966)

(mathematical data and formulae concerning

hydraulic cylinders); Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d
3 (CA7 1977)

(selection, ordering, and arrangement of the names

and addresses of suppliers of gardening materials); Leon v.
Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co., 91 F.2d 484 (CA9 1937)
(telephone directory).

Second, the majority's rejection of the

totality concept is in direct conflict with a line of cases in the
CA9.

See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 583 F.2d 448, 451 (CA9

1978)

("when a work displays a significant element of

compilation,that element is protectible even though the individual
components of the work may not be, for originality may be found in
taking the commonplace and making it into a new combination or
arrangement").

(,
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-

The holding that paraphrasing from a work of nonfiction
J

constitutes infringement ony if the copier "borrowed virtually an
entire work" is in conflict with the holdings of several circuits.
See, e.g., Flick-Reedy Corp. v. Hydro-Line Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 546
(CA7 1965)

(finding infringement where dfdt had paraphrased 2

pages of a 32-page booklet containing mathematical data and
formulae); Meccano v. Wagner, 246 F. 603 (CA6 1916), aff'g 234 F.
912

(S.D. Oh. 1916)

(upholding finding of infringement based upon

paraphrasing of some statements and descriptions in an instrument
manual for mechanical toys).
Underlying the majority's three holdings limiting
copyrightability was its perceived need to "construe the
copyrightability in accord with First Amendment freedoms."

The

majority feared that unless it limited the scope of copyright
protection in the manner outlined above, an "individual could
become the owner of an important political event merely by being
the first to depict the event in words" and a public official
could "take private possession of the most important details of a
nation's historical and political life by adding language here and
there on the perceptions or sentiments he experienced while in
office and insisting that the work's entire contents are thereby
made his alone by virtue of copyright."
fears are unfounded.

P.A. Al9, A21.

But these

The individual would not become the "owner"

of the event by being the first to depict it in words.

He would

become only the owner of his own description of the event.

And

even that ownership is subject to the limitation of the doctrine
of fair use.

l

-

-

6 -

The majority's fair use analysis did not strike the proper
balance between the constitutionally-based policy of encouraging
authorship and the First Amendment.

The majority referred

frequently to the "monopoly" of the author, but nowhere
acknowledged the important public policy -- motivating the
creative activity of authors and inventors, see Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, 104
the monopoly.

s.

Ct. 774, 782 (1984) -- underlying

In addition, the majority downplayed authorship by

defining what is protectible in such a way as to eliminate
important elements of authorship.

By reason of its arbitrary

definition of authorship, the majority saw the case as involving
only a "very limited use of copyrighted words" and the taking of a
"meager, indeed infinitesimal amount of Ford's original language."

(

P.A. A29, A30.

On the free speech side of the balancing, the

majority's analysis was equally defective.

In the majority's

view, application of the copyright laws to this use would "impede
that harvest of knowledge so necessary to a democratic state."
P.A. A4.

The actions of resps did not facilitate the harvesting

of knowledge.

The material was about to be published in Time and,

shortly thereafter, in book form.
The CA2 holding significantly impairs a publisher's ability
to license the publication of excerpts in advance of book
publication.

Publishers will know that if they circulate a

manuscript to ascertain third-party interest in acquiring such
rights, there is a real risk that someone will take for free what
is being offered for sale.
will be adversely affected.

Thus, the dissemination of information
As the dissenting judge stated, the

•

-

-

-
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only freedom the majority has advanced is the freedom to "chisel[]
for personal profit."

P.A. A48.

The majority gave no weight to the facts that (a) the use was
nonproductive and (b) the manuscript was unpublished.

Apart from

an introduction, which told of the publication plans for the book,
and a conclusion, which promised a future article dealing with the
ethics of what it had done, resps added only transition sentences
and phrases to what they had lifted from the manuscript.

The

majority openly acknowledged that it gave no weight to the fact
that the use was nonproductive.
the Court's decision in Sony.

This holding is inconsistent with
The entire Court in Sony believed

that whether or not a use is productive is an important factor in
determining fair use.

Indeed, the four dissenters believed that

that factor was controlling.

104

s.

Ct., at 807-808.

The

majority in Sony disagreed only as to whether the factor was
determinative.

Id., at 795, n. 40.

There is no suggestion, in

either opinion, that the nonproductive nature of the use is
entitled to no weight at all.
The majority also erred in ignoring the fact that the
manuscript was unpublished.

The legislative history of the

Copyright Act of 1976 makes it clear that Congress intended that
the distinction between published and unpublished works be a
factor weighed in the fair use analysis.

Thus, the Senate report

states:

"The applicability of the fair use doctrine to
unpublished works is narrowly limited since, although
the work is unavailable, this is the result of a
deliberate choice on the part of of the copyright owner.

•

-

-

-
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Under ordinary circumstances, the copyright owner's
right of first publication would outweigh any needs of
reproduction for classroom purposes." S. Rep. No. 94473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1975).
Resps:

The CA2 first reviewed the challenged article to

determine to what extent the material petrs claimed had been
copied was subject to copyright protection.

In so doing, the CA2

followed a long line of cases that have held that facts, material
in the public domain, and material not original to an author are
not copyrightable and that copyright liability consequently cannot
flow from publishing such material.

Adhering to the guidelines in

the case law that distinguish between fact and expression, the CA2
first concluded that, in addition to an author's language,
protectible expression "exists, in part, in [an author's] overall
(.

arrangement of facts" and in the "structure he chooses for the
work as

whole."

P.A. Al6.

Applying that principle of law to the

facts of this case, the CA2 concluded, "In this case, there can be
no concern that this mode of expression was usurped; the article
drew upon only scattered parts and not the total entity with its
unique and protected mosaic."

Ibid.

Petrs disagree not with the

CA2's statement of the law, but with the application of the law to
the facts of this case.
The decision of the CA2 is grounded in the least
controversial and most clearly established of all propositions of
copyright law:

facts may not receive copyright protection.

The

CA2 did not hold that the totality of the manuscript was not
copyrightable.

It merely held that the presence of copyrightable

"reflections" did not transform noncopyrightable fact into

-

-

copyrightable expression.

9 -

-

Nor did the CA2 hold, as petrs assert,

that "the almost unlimited paraphrasing from a work of nonfiction
is permissible, unless the copier has 'borrowed virtually an
entire work.'"

Pet. 10.

What the CA2 did hold is that if

"paraphrasing" means reporting facts revealed in a book without
using the author's expression, then, indeed, paraphrasing does not
violate any copyright rights held by the author.

The CA2 stated,

Here, The Nation drew on scattered pieces of information
from different pages and different chapters, and then
descibed that information in its own words." P.A. Al8.
The purported conflict presented by petrs is fanciful.

In the

cases cited by petrs, the courts found for the pltffs because the
dfdts had copied the entirety of the pltffs' manuals, with only
minor alterations, and had passed the manuals off as their own.
Petrs advance the argument that the article did not
contribute sufficiently to society or was not sufficiently
productive to justify the invocation of the privilege of fair use.
The statute itself, however, includes news reporting as a
presumptively fair use.

17

u.s.c.

§ 107.

The CA2 panel was

unanimous in holding that the DC's decision that the article was
not news reporting was clearly erroneous.

Nor was the CA2

incorrect in deciding that it was error for the DC to hold that,
in order that a use be fair, news must be "hot" enough to overcome
a copyright violation.

If that were the law, courts would be

obliged to enter the thicket of determining how much benefit
publishing a particular article conferred on the public.
properly refrained from basing its decision upon its own

The CA2

-

- 10 -

-

subjective views of whether the journalism in the article was good
or poor.

See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc.,

366 F.2d 303, 304, 307 (CA2 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009
(1967); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 191 (CA2 1981)
(Mansfield, J. dissenting): cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 346 (1974).
Petrs' reliance on Sony is misplaced.

Even the dissent in

Sony states that news reporting is a presumptively productive use.
104 S. Ct., at 807 (JUSTICE BLACKMUN dissenting).

Similarly,

petrs take a statement from the legislative history of§ 107 out
of context.

Petrs contend that the legislative history shows that

fair use should be limited with respect to unpublished works.

A

closer look at the legislative history shows that the statement
was made in the course of explaining that if a work is out of
print, "the user may have more justification for reproducing it,"
but that this presumption that a use is fair will not apply if the
work is purposely unpublished.
1st Sess. 64 (1975).

s.

Rep. No. 94-473, 94th Cong.,

Because the CA2 did not rely upon the

unavailability of the memoirs as a factor in favor of a finding of
fair use, this passage is not even relevant.
--n....O

4.
conflict.

DISCUSSION:

Petrs have not presented any square

Both the majority and the dissent in the CA2 point out

that the requisite analysis in this case is fact-specific and is
of the sort that must be done on a case-by-case basis.

Although I

am not convinced that the result here is correct, I do not see a
clear-cut issue of law that the Court should address if it were to
I
grant cert in this case.

5.
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I recommend denial.

There is a response.

May 14, 1984

Durand

Opn in petn •

-

-
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.Memorandum for the File
No. 83-1632, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. and Readers Digest v.
Nation Enterprises
This is a summary memorandum on the basis of a preliminary
reading of the briefs.
This is the copyright/First Amendment case involving the
memoirs of former President Ford published in book form as
"A Time to Heal".

Shortly before publication of the book, respon-

dents - actually the Nation magazine - received a copy of the
manuscript from a clandestine source (the source has not been
identified).

On a crash basis, the Nation used the book manu-

script to write and publish the substance of a portion of the
book.
The book - 655 pages long - contained about 200,000 words.
The Nation's summary was 2,250 words entitled "The Ford Memoirs:
Behind the Nixon Pardon".

The book had been copyrighted, and

Ford had assigned the publication rights to petitioners.

/ oc

The

held that the Nation's article quoted and paraphrased material

from the book that was properly copyrighted, and that the
fair use doctrine was not applicable. v CA 2 reversed (2 to 1)
in an opinion by Judge Kaufman.

It held that most of the

material quoted and paraphrased by the Nation was not properly
protected under the copyright laws, and that the portion of the
book - found to be relatively minor portions - subject to being
copyrighted could be ~eproduced by the Nation under the "fair
use doctrine".

•

No.

2.

83-1632

The opinion by Judge Kaufman and Judge Meskill's dissent
alby present the arguments "pro and con".

Also the briefs of

the parties are by competent counsel, including Floy d Abrams
for respondents (conceded by Mr. Abrams himself to be the best
First Amendment lawyer in the country ).
The arguments based on the Copyright Act and decisions
under it, are not readily summarized.

The First Amendment is

not emphasized by the courts below, although the public policies
underlying freedom of the press are central to respondents'
position.
I will want my clerk's views.

But confess that - at least

as of now - I have a rather strong bias in favor of petitioners'
position.

Respondents, relying on Judge Kaufman's opinion, say

that the critical ~

inction in applying the Copyright Act is

between "expression" and "information".

Respondents argue that

publication of "facts, information or news" is not copyrightable,
and that what Ford says are newsworthy facts.

To the extent that

some portions of the article may have been within the Copyright
Law, respondents argue its publication was permissable under the
"fair use" doctrine.

It seems to me that Judge Meskill satisfac-

torily answers these arguments.

No. 83-1632

-

•

3.

In terms of the broader social and public policies implicated in this important case, if CA 2's decision is affirmed
it is doubtful whether the memoirs of any public figure could
be protected under the copyright laws.
writing of memoirs.

This would deter the

This would not invariably be a detriment

to history (too many self-serving memoirs are published of
little historic value), but there are memoirs of enormous historic significance (e.g. those of Winston Churchill).

Nor,

certainly in this case, was the public deprived of any "hard
news'' as the Nation had full knowledge that the book was forthcoming, and it rushed its own publication out to achieve a

•

"scoop."
Nor in my view does the Nation come into Court with
entirely "clean hands".

I have never been persuaded by the

media's claim of total entitlement to publish stolen information, and often to encourage the thieving.

In this case,

I also agree with Judge Meskill's final sentence to the effect
that the only "chill" of information was respondents'
"chiseling for personal profit".

But I suppose the copy-

right laws are not designed to regulate ethics, and so I
will be interested in my clerk's view as to which of the
contending positions would constitute the basis for a
principled opinion.

k 1-f.
L.F.P.

-

-

,/
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:
From:
No.

October 29, 1984

Mr. Justice Powell
Lynda
83-1632

Harper

&

Row

Publishers,

Inc.

v.

Nation

Enterprises

Question Presented

To what extent does the fair use doctrine protect
copying,

for purposes of news reporting,

work

nonfiction,

of

when

unpublished manuscript

the

material

that was

the copying was unauthorized?

of portions of a

was

taken

from

an

soon to be published, and

-

-

2.

I. Background

A. Statutory Background
Although
("Act"), 17

1976

for

"original

§102

u.s.c.

works

of

the

Copyright

Revision

Act

of

§102, provides copyright protection

of

authorship

fixed

---@§,

in

any

tangible

medium of expression," it also provides that that protection /J. ~,1
-- ·
does

not

extend_ to_ any

"regardless

which it is described, explained,
in

a

work.

This

exclusion

of

the

form

in

illustrated, or embodied"

from

copyright

----------

protection

of

~

0,,t,f -

~i.h
~
a-+-{_

ideas f j i jgenera l ly2.,_been h_eld applicable to [facts,] as well.
Section 106 of the Act provides for the copyright

·-~

owner's exclusive rights to use or authorize the use of the
copyright

in reproductions,

Section

ways.

derivative works,

provides

107

that

and in other

notwithstanding

these

exclusive rights, "the fair use of a copyrighted work
for

purposes

such

teaching,

as

er i tic ism,

scholarship,

infringement of copyright."

~ factor~

to

be

comment,
or

news

research,

reporting,
is

not

The section lists the following

considered

in

deciding

---- ----

whether

unauthorized use of a c-;pyr ig h tis "fair use":

1

l

~
?

/}1_,?/~L,)

1-'
J,A ~
,4,,t,VV-.....

t he
purpose
and
character
of
the
use, \l
including whether such use is of a ' commercial
nature or is for nonpror i t educational purposes;
-:::-(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(1)

~,

) the amount and ~ubstantiality of the portion
used in relation to tfi e copy'r ighted work as a
whole; and

• 11~1-.,._

(4) the effect of the use upon the ~ential
market ~fo r or v alue of the copyr ighte d wor •

~~r

an

an

~

~~~v'
~

1-o

1,(~

~

",'

-

-

3.

The fair use doctrine B ° 9enerallyA been considered to be a
means of accommodating
owners

to

exclusive

the conflicting rights of copyright

use

of

copyrighted

material,

and

the

public interest in access to the material.

B. Facts and Decisions Below
In

1977,

former

President

Ford

entered

into

a

publishing contract with petrs, granting them the exclusive

----

rights to publish and sell his memoirs, yet to be written,
in book form and to license the right to publish excerpts in (
~---

--===---

-------------

newspapers or periodicals _1>rior to the book's publication.

p-µ- -

) ~~
~

A manuscript was prepared, excerpts of which were scheduled
for publication in Time magazine the week of April 23, 1979,
with

the book

March

1979,

editor of
Ford's

an

to be

released

undisclosed

Nation magazine,

manuscript.

shortly thereafter.

source put Victor

In late

Navasky,

the

into unauthorized possession of

Navasky

hurriedly

prepared

an

article

based on the manuscript, which appeared on the newstands on
April 3, 1979.

-;i, 0

~

1-

~~

~,.,v;_ts
1'"'~

As a result of the Nation

~

contract to publish excerpts of the book and refused to

pay $12,500 it still owed petrs.
(SONY-Owen)
certain

charging

state

law

Petrs brought suit in DC

resps with copyright
violations,

the

infringement and

latter

dismissed and are not at issue in this Court.
for

•

petrs,

finding

the

manuscript

to

be

of

which

were

The DC ruled
protected

by

LY(_

-

-

copyright and the Nation's article not a

4.

"fair use" within

the meaning of §107 of the Act.
(Kaufman

CA2

~
/.,.V1.-,-<-

Pierce)

&

1uvl-

reversed.

Dissecting

the

Nation article into its component parts and finding much of

C___,,
JL/ -z_

what was copied to be "facts," it concluded that only about

1

r;y-o

300

words

~k..l~_ small

~~
~

concluded

Ford's

of

portion
that

the

work

Nation

the

Finding

copyrightable.

were

to

be

use of

insubstantial,

constituted

article

such a
it
use.

fair

'

§
was

e Meskill dissented/ on the ground that Ford's expression
copyrightable,

copyright

by

the

that

copying

expression.
manuscript

and

Viewing
as

the

or

was

the

soon

had

paraphrasing
Nation's

unauthorized,

manuscript

Nation

and

to

be

infringed
much

emphasizing
published,

that

of

acquisition
the

the

of

the

fact

that

Judge

"
~

Meskill

concluded that the use was not fair because its only purpose
was to "chisel[] for personal profit."

II. Discussion

Judge Kaufman viewed
classic

conflict

Amendment:

copyright

law

and

the

First

the copyright owner's right under the statute to

exclusive
access.

between

this case as presenting the

use

of

Judge

his

Kaufman

work

versus

the

public's

right

to

considered

the

public's

right

to ~ ,

access to be even greater than usual in this case, where a
nonfiction

•

important

work
to

our

concerning

political

nation were

involved.

figures

and

issues

These views go a

/Y"l-j).J-/

-

long

way

toward

opinion

explaining

below.

As

the

the

5.

result CA2

following

reached

in

its
will

discussion

demonstrate, however, CA2 misconstrued the copyright law and
overestimated

the

extent

to

which

the

First

Amendment

~

concerns are implicated.

A. What Constitutes Infringement
There
manuscript,

is

no

a

whole,

as

dispute

about

is

a

the

that

fact

Ford's

work.

copyrightable

The

question is whether the portion that the Nation used in its
article

constituted

"copying"

sufficient

infringement of the copyright.
the

•
"11 1

copy

and

Nimmer,

the

J~

. :

~~

~

source

On Copyright

.

"(d] uplication or
establish

w~

Productions,

,...
~
~

' \

also

paraphrasing

~~

Jl

of

depends

"substantially

§13. 03,

to ~

Professor Nimmer states that

infringement
are

amount

at 13-18.

on

whether

similar."

3

the
M.

Literal word-for-

word copying is not required for a finding of infringement;

~

Inc.

identity is not necessary to

Sid

Marty

&

F. 2d

9 0 5,

913

mind

the

exclusion

Krofft

Television

562 F. 2d 115 7, 1167

See Durham Industries, Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630

•.uV'v

solely

~

near

thus,

and

sufficient,

v. McDonald's Corp. ,

1977).

protection for

~~

[even]

(CA9

on

be

may

infringement."

H~

~
.,~.,,.
•

determination

to

the

( CA2 19 8 0) •
in

facts or

On

the other

§102(b)
ideas,

duplication

of

of
a

the

hand,
Act

bearing in

of

similarity that

facts

or

copyright
is based

abstract

ideas,

without duplication of · the structure of the original work or
the manner of expression,

is not prohibited.

~.

Atari,

th.~
~
vt~
-

LI-,~

-

v.

Inc.

6.

North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp.,

672 F.2d 607, 615
decisions

(CA7

about

infringement

1982) .
degree

what

"must

A~
of

invariably

be

dge Learned Hand notei)
constitutes

similarity
ad

Peter

hoc."

Pan

Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (CA2
1960) • 1
The degree of substantial similarity sufficient to
constitute infringement traditionally has been more narrowly
viewed

in

the case of

instead

facts,

of

nonfiction,

a

copyrightable

primarily involved.

This is

which

historical

a

topic

of

because uncopyr ightable
fiction

plot,

are

particularly true in cases in
or

political

interest

is

concerned, because of the perceived greater public interest

•

in access to such matters.

v.

Random

House,

Inc.,

See Rosemont Enterprises,
366

F.2d

303,

309

Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment,

(CA2

Inc •

1966);

70 Colum.

L.

Rev. 983, 1012 (1970).
CA2 acknowledged the existence of these principles

-

but,

~

JI

(Y"lA

ff'!
,~
~✓
;~

~ ·

•

I

protect

believe,
the

erred

public's

in

applying

right

of

them.

access,

In
which,

its
as

zeal
I

to

will

discuss below, is not even in danger in this case, the court
misapplied the law and gave insufficient weight to President

1 cA2 has held that the rules for determining substantial
similarity are the same under both the 1909 and the 1976
Copyright Acts. Durham Industries, Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630
F.2d 905, 912 note 10 (CA 1980). Hence, citations to
opinions prior to the the 1976 Act are relevant on this
point.

~

-

-

7.

1

Ford's rights to ~ xclusive use of his ' manner of expressing

(cl/--:;-~ - ~ n " - u f _ t . : f ft)

hist~ rical facts. "'First,

CA2

improperly

ruled

that

facts

coupled

with expression cannot constitute a copyrightable totality.
CA2

reasoned

that

permitting

President

Ford

to

have

copyright protection for his impressions of historical facts
would permit him to have a private monopoly on fact at the
expense.

public's

If

historical

fears

CA2's

are

\)

facts

about

which

Ford

wrote

ungrounded.

~ }~

are,

have

always

-------------

Nothing

~
i-0

ng about the

~

been, and always will be, accessible to the public.
p~

nted the Nation or anyone else from ~

same

historical

facts.

Likewise,

nothing

would

have

prevented the Nation from writing about the fact that Ford

•~

recorded his impressions of those facts.
also

have

been

free

to describe,

Ford's impressions were.
what

the

:----

Nation did

-- - = :::::

historical fact ~
-

The Nation would

its

own words,

what

What the copyright laws forbid is

here:

paraphrasing
Ford's own
,,..
-....---.:._..~

in

literally copying and slightly

-

,

expressi:on

of

his

---

views

on

the
~

That expression is explicitly protected by

,_Jo

§102(b)

of the Act.

between

the

Ford

A close examination of the comparison
manuscript

and

the

Nation

article

in

Appendix E to the petn for cert leaves me in no doubt that

~

§"::

tw~ a__r e

substantially simil ~

and

that

the

Nation has

infringed Ford's copyright.
CA2 seeks to overcome this conclusion by engaging
in

•

a

word-by-word

dissection

of

the

Ford

a-,,-,,{.

manuscript

to

determine which parts are copyrightable and which parts are

-

-

not.

Its analysis resulted

words

of

the

Nation

8.

in a conclusion that only 300

article

were

copyrightable

by

Ford.

CA2's approach is artificial, however, and contrary to the
more

logical

view of

most

circuits

that

the

only way

to

determine substantial similarity is to consider the J ota li±y
of

o_r_k

the

Barrel

in

Productions,

(CA5 1984): Sid

Inc.

v.

----the

COillQa

Beard,

two.

730

~-,

F.2d

384,

~

~
~{~

Apple
387-388

Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc.

&

v. McDonald's Corp., supra, 562 F.2d, at 1169. Even CA2 had
previously

espoused

this

view.

See

Jeweler's

Circular

Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 83 (CA2),
cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922).
As
improperly

I

part
ruled

of
that

its

dissection,

paraphrasing

the

may

court

only

also

constitute

infringement where virtually the entire work was used.
this case,

only scattered portions and a relatively small

percentage

of

concluded,
conclusion
~

In

the

the
is

whole

was

paraphrasing

contrary,

used:
was

however,

therefore,
not

to

the

This

infringing.

settled

law

court

in other

circuits that has never required that the majority of a work
be

paraphrased

befo

Flick-Reedy Corp.

v.

may

be

~-,

found.

Hydro-Line Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 546

(CA7

(2 pages of a 32-page booklet paraphrased constitutes
The testimony at trial demonstrated that the
Nation

article

drew

from

the r:ear t

of

Ford's

reproducing only the most interesting parts.

•

manuscript

l

~

i J ~c.,,,,,-/-'
-1,
1-vvz(;

~~,

-

Aside

from

being

circuits, CA2 's rule

contrary

to

9.

the

law

in

other

is contrary to logic and good sense.

That rule would provide holders of copyrights in nonfiction
works

IL
~

almost

duplications
uses.

no
of

protection,

since

those works would

Although CA2 states that

but

all

be deemed

this rule

noninfr ing ing

is necessary to

. . , , ~rotect the First Amendment interests at stake,

~ ~
~

complete

ultimately

the public would be harmed because authors would no longer
have the incentive of exclusive economic rights to spur them
to produce

nonfiction works

for

the public

to read.

See

Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implications for Copyright, 29 J.
Copy. 560, 586 (1982).
In
expression

in

sum,

CA2's

a

nonfiction

"barest elements"

fails

conclusion
work

to give

author's work and creativity.
more

reasonable

balance

by

that

must

be

proper

copyrightable
limited

to

its

protection

to

the

It is ~ ssible to strike a
protecting

the

author

-------------------_._)

---------

wholesale

paraphrasing

historical facts.

of

his

original

from

thoughts

on

This approach leaves intact the public's

access to the facts contained in a work of nonfiction and to
original description of what the copyrighted work contains.
At the same time, it protects the author's right to reap the
economic rewards of his creative work.

This more reasonable

---------

b ~ e will, as noted above, ultimately benefit the public
more

than

CA2's

rule,

which

might

have

the

effect

discouraging nonfiction writers from future creative work.

•

of

~

-

-

contend
ordinarily

be

an

that

even

infringement,

if

it

10.

their

article
11

constitutes

would
use 11

fair
~~

I (

under §107 of the Act because it is news reporting.

It is

,,______

true that that section specifically mentions news reporting
as an example of a use that might be fair, and hence, not an
,

. .A

pl ~
p .

r

" ~ ->,

fringement.

The DC had found that the Nation article was

an infringement beca: s-::--;;--:as not "news."

this

finding

revealed
was

was

that

news

clearly

Navasky' s

reporting,

essentially

erroneous

purpose

and

substituted

it

its

because

I

that

labeling

it

the
as

Nation

such

does

concluded

own

view

article
not

that

of

--------four

factors,

listed

above

testimony

the

article

the

DC

what

was

had

good

Even if we assume,

was

news

result

determination that the use is fair,
the

the

in publishing

journalism for this undisputed evidence.
however,

CA2 ruled that

in

an

because

in Part

reporting,
automatic

§107 provides

I.A,

supra,

which

considered in making that determination.
CA? gave short shrift to these factors.

ruled

that

the

fact

that

the

article

was

First, it

published

for

profit was legally irrelevant because the use offered some
benefit to the public.

Second, CA2 ruled that the nature of
I

the copyrighted work was primarily factual,
subject
earlier

•

to copyright protection for
in

its

opinion.

insubstantial part of
its conclusion

Third,

the
CA2

and hence,

reasons discussed
ruled

the manuscript was used,

that only

not

that

an

relying on

300 copyrightable words had been

~

-

-

•

used

by

economic
"the

the

Nation.

impact of

Finally,

such

copyright owner's

a

CA2

concluded

small use

monopoly

11.

must

that

the

was dubious and

that

not

be

permitted

to

prevail over a journalist's communication" where "important
(CA2's opinion, Petn App.

matters of state" are concerned.
at A-29.)
)

CA2 's

~

consideration of

~Cit- / been '1taint~ d i by

what

I

the

believe

fair
to

use

be

factors

its

~ , , \ ~conclusion about what constitutes infringement.

has

erroneous
Considering

~~

the use by the Nation to have been an infringement, for the

~

reasons

k

discussed

analysis

to

is

above

employ

in

Part

the

II.A,

use

fair

the

supra,

factors

proper

to determine

whether that infringement should nonetheless be tolerated to
strike

the

balance

necessary

copyright's

between

restrictions on public access and the First Amendment.
Under

this analysis,

it must be acknowledged for

purposes of the first factor that the nature of the use was
commercial,

not

for

nonprofit

educational

uses

or

other

(!)

similarly purely altiuistic desi r es to expose the public to
the information.

Navasky admitted at t r ial that his purpose

and haste in publishing the article was to "scoop" Harper &
Row and Time.
Second, the nature of the copyrighted work is, as
noted,

biographical
is

•

access.
third

considered

nonfiction,
to

have

the

in

which

greatest

the

public

interest

in

Countervailing this second factor, however, is the
criterion--the

amount

and

substantiality

of

the

@

-

-

~
· ~ ~ ~:J

portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
As

discussed

above,

the

testimony

---

at

trial

was,

and

L
- - - - - - - - - - -comparison of the works reveals, that the Nation effectively

~

3Jie ~

s ~n~! ~

~

rd~ s= ~

,

uscripi) -

Fi;;;ily,

3

the

effect of the Nation's use upon the potential market for or
value

of

the

copyrighted

work

was

to

~

l

the

author's

right of first publication and his ability to license that
right, and consequently to decrease the copyright's value as
a

view

first-hand

undisclosed

hitherto

important

of

historical events.
CA2's argument that uses such as the Nation's must
be permitted to protect the public's right of access to such
an

important

manuscript

circumstances,

where

carries

no

weight

in

i-------------

the ~Time article was scheduled

published within two weeks of the Nation article,
book

was

sc fl eauled

Moreover, CA2
use

is

Cong.,

an
1st

these

~

failed

be

released

shortly

and

the

thereafter.

to give effect to the fact that fair

equitable

doctrine.

Sess.

(1975);

62

s.

Rep.

H.R.

Rep.

No.
No.

94-473,

94th

94-1476,

94th

Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976). Nation knew that it received the

, ( ) ~ , manuscript from an unauthorized sou~

\ 1/vO .
~

,

1

in

h as t'l
i y

copyright

.
preparing
holders.

t he

These

.
article
facts

.

Its stated purpose

was

must

to
be

"scoop"
considered

t he
in

deciding whether its use was fair.
Finally, CA2 failed

•

fact

that

the

Nation used

it.

manuscript was
The

to give proper weight to the
unpublished at

the

time

legislative history makes clear

the
that

a.. ~ t

-

the
work

fair

use

is

unpublished

unavailable,
the

defense must

part

this

publication'

the
would

be construed narrowly when

because

"although

copyright
copyright

outweigh

owner.

only

exclusive

because
right

work

is

any needs of

the

to

statute

first

ordinary

Under
'right

owner's

Rep. No. 94-473, supra, at 64. 2
not

the

the

the result of a deliberate choice on

the

of

circumstances

is

13.

first

of

[fair use]."

S.

This approach is reasonable
recognizes

publication,

see

the

author's

§106(3),

but

because it protects the author's right to publish only his
finished

Permitting another

product.

to publish

first

an

unauthorized unpublished manuscript carries with it the risk
that the author has not finished the work.

•

case,

there

was

no

danger

that

the

Finally, in this

public

would

not

permitted access to important historical information.

be

Most

of the facts were already public, and Ford's impressions of
those facts as revealed in the manuscript were shortly to be
published, as the Nation well knew.

Therefore,

the First

Amendment interests with which CA2 was so ardently concerned
were not even at risk.

2 Resps and one amicus contend that because the Senate
Report's statement does not appear in the House Report, in
fact the fair use doctrine should not be applied more
narrowly in the case of unpublished works. As petrs point
out in their reply brief, however, the House had endorsed
this concept in two prior reports, and in the 1976 Report,
referred to the prior reports's analysis of the fair use
doctrine as still applicable. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, supra,
at 67 •

•

-

-

14.

Conclusion

CA2 is surely right that a balance must be struck
between

the

author's

interest

in

exclusive

rights

to

his

copyright and the public's right to access guaranteed by the
First Amendment.

But in a case in which the First Amendment

t---------it makes

concerns are not at risk,

author of the r ~ ~~~~
and

creativity,

when

---------

no sense to deprive the

publication of his hard work

that work

is copyrightable.

BecauseJ

CA2 misconstrued the requirements of the copyright law and
misperceived the nature of the balance that must be struck
in this case, I recommend that you vote to reverse •
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No. 83-1632

HARPER & ROW, PUBLISHERS, INC. AND THE READER'S DIGEST ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONERS
v. NATION ENTERPRISES AND THE NATION
ASSOCIATES, INC.
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ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[January -

, 1985]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to consider to what extent the "fair
use" provision of the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 17
U. S. C. § 107 (hereinafter the Copyright Act) , sanctions the
unauthorized use of quotations from a public figure's unpublished manuscript. In April 1977, an undisclosed source provided The Nation magazine with the unpublished manuscript
of "A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford."
Working directly from the :e_urloined manu~
t, an editor of
The Nation produced a short piece entitled "The Ford Memoirs-Behind the Nixon Pardon." The piece was timed to
"scoop" an article scheduled shortly to appear in Time magazine. Time had agreed to purchase the exclusive right to
print prepublication excerpts from the copyright holders,
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. (hereinafter Harper & Row)
and Reader's Digest Association, Inc. (hereinafter Reader's
Digest). As a result of The Nation article, Time cancelled its
agreement. Petitioners brought a successful copyright action against The Nation. ~ ~ ~ ~ SP~o~ Circuit reversed the lower court'sf"pn
olding that
The Nation's act was sanctioned as a "fair use' of the copyrighted material. We granted certiorari, - - U. S. - (1984), and we now reverse.
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I
In February 1977, shortly after leaving the White House,
former President Gerald R. Ford contracted with petitioners
Harper & Row and The Reader's Digest, to publish his as yet
unwritten memoirs. The memoirs were to contain "significant hitherto unpublished material" concerning the Watergate crisis, Mr. Ford's pardon of former President Nixon and
"Mr. Ford's reflections on this period of history, and the morality and personalities involved. " App. to Petn for Cert.
C-14 - C-15. In addition to the right to publish the Ford
memoirs in book form, the agreement gave petitioners the
exclusive right to license prepublication excerpts, known in
the trade as "first serial rights." Two years later, as the
memoirs were nearing completion, petitioners ·negotiated a
prepublication licensing agreement with Time, a weekly
news magazine. Time agreed to pay $25,000, $12,500 in advance .and an additional $12,500 at publication, in exchange
for the right to excerpt 7,500 words from Mr. Ford's account
of the Nixon pardon. The issue featuring the excerpts was
timed to appear approximately one week before shipment of
the full length book version to bookstores. Exclusivity was
an important consideration; Harper & Row instituted procedures designed to maintain the confidentiality of the manuscript, and Time retained the right to renegotiate the second
payment should the material appear in print prior to its release of the excerpts.
Two to three weeks before the Time article's scheduled release, an unidentified person secretly brought a copy of the
Ford manuscript to Victor Navasky, editor of The Nation, a
political commentary magazine. Mr. Navasky knew that his
possession of the manuscript was not authorized and that the
manuscript must be returned quickly to his "source" to avoid
discovery. 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1069 (SDNY 1983). He hastily put together what he believed was "a real hot news story''
composed of quotes , paraphrases and facts drawn exclusively
from the manuscript. Ibid. Mr. Navasky attempted no in-

-
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dependent commentary, research or criticism, in part because of the need for speed if he was to "make news" by "publish[ing] in advance of the publication of the Ford book."
App. 416-417. The 2,250 word article, reprinted in the Appendix to this opinion, appeared on April 3, 1979. As a result of The Nation's article, Time cancelled its piece and refused to pay the remaining $12,500.
Petitioners brought suit in the District Court for the
Southern District of New York, alleging conversion, tortious
interference with contract and violations of the Copyright
Act. After a six day bench trial, the District Judge found
that "A Time to Heal" was protected by copyright at the time
of The Nation publication and that respondent's use of the
copyrighted material constituted an infringement under the
Copyright Act, § 106 (1),(2)/and (3), protecting respectively
the right to reproduce the work, the right to license preparation of derivative works, and the right of first distribution of
the copyrighted work to·the public. App. to Petn for Cert.
C-29-C-30. The District Court rejected respondent's argument that The Nation's piece was a "fair use" sanctioned by
§ 107 of the Act. Though billed as "hot news," the article
contained no new facts. The magazine had "published its article for profit," taking "the heart" of "a soon-to-be-published" work. This unauthorized use "caused the agreement
with Time to be aborted and thus diminished the value of the
copyright." 557 F. Supp., at 1072. Although certain elements of the Ford memoir, such as historical facts and memoranda, were not per se copyrightable, the District Court held
that it was "the totality of these facts and memoranda collected together with Ford's reflections that made them of
value to The Nation, [and] this totality ... is protected by
the copyright laws." Id., at 1072-1073. The court awarded
actual damages of $12,500.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. The majority recognized that Mr. Ford's verbatim "reflections" were original "expression" protected
by
.

--~---:.___
~
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C2Pyright. ~ it held that the District Court had erred in
assuimng the coupling [of these reflections] with
uncopyrightable facttransformed that information into a
copyrighted 'totality."' 723 F. 2d 195, 205 (1983). The majority noted that copyright attaches to expression, not facts
or ideas. It concluded that, to avoid granting a copyright
monopoly over the facts underlying history and news, "'expression' [in such works must be confined] to its barest elements-the ordering and choice of the words themselves."
Id., at 204. Thus similarities between the original and the
challenged work traceable to the copying or paraphrasing of
uncopyrightable material, such as historical facts, memoranda and other public documents, and quoted remarks of
third parties, must be disregarded in evaluating whether the
second author's use was fair or infringing.
"When the uncopyrighted material is stripped away, the
article in The Nation contains, at most, approximately
. 300 words that are copyrighted. · These remaining paragraphs and scattered phrases are all verbatim quotations
from the memoirs which had not appeared previously in
other publications. They include a short segment of
Ford's conversations with Henry Kissinger and several
other individuals. Ford's impressionistic depictions of
Nixon, ill with phlebitis after the resignation and pardon
and of Nixon's character, constitute the major portion of
this material. It is these parts of the magazine piece on
which [the court] must focus in [its] examination of the
question whether there was a 'fair use' of the copyrighted matter." Id., at 206.
Examining the four factors enumerated in§ 107, see infra, at
- - , the majority found the purpose of the article was "news
reporting," the original work was essentially factual in nature, the 300 words appropriated were insubstantial in relation to the 2,250 word piece, and the impact on the market for
the original was minimal as "the evidence [did] not support a
finding that it was the very limited use of expression per se

-
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which led to Time's decision not to print the excerpt." The
Nation's borrowing of verbatim quotations merely "len[t]
authenticity to this politically significant material . . . complementing the reporting of the facts." Id. , at 208. The
Court of Appeals was especially influenced by the "politically
significant" nature of the subject matter and its conviction
that it is not "the purpose of the Copyright Act to impede
that harvest of knowledge so necessary to a democratic
state" or "chill the activities of the press by forbidding a circumscribed use of copyrighted words." Id., at 197, 208.

II
A
We agree with the Court of Appeals that copm ght is intended to increase and not to impede the harvest of knowledge. But we believe ,the S~cond Circuit gave insufficient
deference to the'~cheme established by the Copyright Act for
fosterin the original works that provide the seed ana s bstance of this harvest. The rights conferred y copyright
are designed to assure contributors to the store of knowledge
a fair return for their labors. Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 156 (1976). In using generous verbatim excerpts of Mr. Ford's unpublished manuscript
to lend authenticity to its account of the forthcoming memoirs, The Nation~ ffectiv~.11,rrogated to itself the rig1it of
firs~
on, an important marketable subsidiary right.
Dimer the ~crrcumstances of this case, we find that The Nation's use of the copyrighted manuscript, even stripped to the
verbatim quotes conceded by The Nation to be copyrightable
expression, W
§_neitber aiair use of the copyrightable material nor necessary to advance the public interest in dissemination of informat10n.
.Alticle I, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that:
"The Congress shall have the power ... to Promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for lim-

-
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ited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries."

J1'l

As we noted last Term, "[this] limited grant is a means by
which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the
public access to the products of their gen~ after the limited
period of exclusive control has expired." Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., - - U.S. - - , - - (1984).
"The monopoly created by copyright thus rewards the indi-.
vidual author in order to benefit the public." Id., at - (dissenting opinion). This principle applies equally to works
of fiction and non-fiction. The book at issue here, for example, was two years in the making, and began with a contract
giving the author's copyright to the publishers in exchange
for their services in producing and marketing the work. In
preparing the book, Mr. Ford drafted essays and word portraits of public figures and participated in hundreds of taped
interviews that were later distilled to chronicle his personal
viewpoint. It is evident that the_monopoly granted by cq_pyri ht actively served its inte
d urpose of inducing ' '
ation of new material of otential historical va ue.
ec 10n
o e opyright Act confers a bundle of exclusive rights to the owner of the copyright. 1 Under the Copyright Act, these rights-to publish, copy, and distribute the
author's work-vest in the author of an original work from
the time of its creation. ..1.d- § 106. In practice, the author
commonly sells his rights to publishers who offer royalties in
exchange for their services in producing and marketing the
author's work. The copyright owner's rights, however, are
' Section 106 provides in pertinent part:
"Subject to section 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this title
has the exclusive rights to do and authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies ... ;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted work to the public . . . . "

-
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subject to L£t.,rtain statutoE{_ !l_Xce~ ns. Jfrt:"- §§ 107-118.
Among these is § 107 wliich codifies the traditional privilege
of other authors to make "fair use" of an earlier writer's
work. 2 In addition, no author may copyright facts or ideas.
~ § 102. The copyright is limited to those aspects
of the work-termed "expression"-that display the stamp of
the author's originality.
The statutory formulation of thf defense of fair us in the
Copyright Act of 1976 reflects the intent o ongress to codify the common law doctrine. 3 M. Nimmer on Copyright
§ 13.05 (1984 ed.) (hereinafter Nimmer).
Section 107 requires a case-by-case determination whether a particular use
is fair, an
e s a u no es our non-exclusive ac ors o be
considered. This approach was "intended to restate the
[pre-existing] judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476,
p 66 (1976) (4ereinafter House Report). .
-~
was traditionally defined as "a privilege in others
t~
wner of the copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent." H. Ball,
The Law of Copyright 260 (1944). "[T]he author's consent to
a reasonable use of his copyrighted works ha[d] always been
implied by the courts as a necessary i_ncident of the constitu:-Osection 107 states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work .. . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the
use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. "

/]
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tional policy of promoting sciences and the useful arts, since a
prohibition of such use would inhibit subsequent writers from
attempting to improve upon prior works and thus . . . frustrate the very ends sought to be attained." Ibid. Professor
Latman, in a study of the doctrine of fair use commissioned
by Congress for the revision effort, see Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., supra, at - - , n. 9 (dissenting
opinion), summarized prior law as turning on "the importance
of the material copied or performed from the point of view of
the reasonable copyright owner. In other words, would the
reasonable copyright owner have consented to the use?"
Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works (1958), reprinted as
Study No. 14 in Copyright Law Revision Studies Nos. 1-19,
Prepared for the Senate Committee on the Judiciaryr 86th
Cong., 2d Sess., p. 15 (1960). 3 °('
As early as 1841, Justice Story/ gave judicial recognition to
the doctrine in a case that concerned the letters of another
former President, George Washington.
"[A] reviewer may fairly cite largely from the original
work, if his design be really and truly to use the passages
for the purposes of fair and reasonable criticism. On the
other hand, it is as clear, that if he thus cites the most
important parts of the work, with a view, not to criticise,
but to supersede the use of the original work, and substitute the review for it, such a use will be deemed in law a
3

/7

Professor Nimmer notes, "[perhaps] no more precise guide can be
stated than Joseph McDonald's clever paraphrase of the Golden Rule:
'Take not from others to such an extent and in such a manner that you
would be resentful if they so took from you."' 3 Nimmer § 13.05(A],
/P· 13-66, quoting McDonald, "Non-infringing Uses," 9 Bull. Cr. · Soc'y
466, 467 No.355 (1962). This equitable "rule of reason," Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc. , - - U. S., at--, "permits courts to avoid
rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle
the very creativity which that law is designed to foster." Iowa State University v. American Broadcasting Co., 621 F . 2d 57, 60 (CA2 1980). See
generally, L. Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in Copyright 18-48 (1978).

7
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piracy." Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 342, No. 4,901,
at 344-345 (C. C. D. Mass.)
As Justice Story's hypothetical illustrates, the fair use doc- \
trine has always precluded a use that "supersede[s] the object of the original." Ibid. Accord S. Rep. No. 94-473,
p. 65 (1975) (hereinafter Senate Report).
Perhaps because the fair use doctrine was predicated on
the author's implied consent to "reasonable and customary''
use when he released his work for public consumption, fair
use traditionally was not recognized as a defense to charges
of copying from an author's as yet unpublished works. 4
Under common law copyright, "[t]he property of the author
... in his intellectual creation [was] absolute until he voluntarily part[ed] with the same." American Tobacco Co. v.
Werckmeister, 207 U. S. 284, 299 (1907); 2 Nimmer§ 8.23, at
8-273. This absolute rule, however, was tempered in practice by the equitable nature of the fair use doctrine. In a
given case, factors such as implied consent through de facto
publication on performance or dissemination of a work may
tip the balance of equities in favor of prepublication use. See
Copyright Law Revision-Part 2: Discussion and Comments
on Report of the Registrar of Copyrights on General Revi-

,YJ

' See Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works (1958), reprinted as
Study No. 14 in Copyright Law Revision Studies Nos. 1-19, Prepared for
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 7 (1960);
Strauss, Protection of Unpublished Works (1957 re rinted as Stud N
29 in Copyright Law Revision Studies Nos 20-35, Prepared for the Senate
Sess., p. 4, n. 32 (1960) (citing
Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong.,
cases); R. Shaw, Literary Property in the United States 67 (1950) ("there
can be no 0fair use~ of unpublished material); H. Ball, Law of Copyright
and Literary Property § 125, n. 5 (1944) ("the doctrine of fair use does not
apply to unpublished works"); A. Weil, American Copyright Law. § 276
(1917) (the aqthor of an unpublished work "has, probably, the right to prevent even a ('Jfair usE0 of the work by others"). Cf.QM. Flint, A User's
Guide to [United Kingdom] Copyright ,r 10.05 (1979) r1no fair dealing with
unpublished works"); Beloff v. Pressman Ltd., [1973] All E. R. 241, 263
(ch. 1972) (same).

T
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sion of the U. S. Copyright Law at 27 (H. R. Comm. Print,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. Feb. 1963) (discm€m suggesting works
disseminated to the public in a form not constituting a technical "publication" should nevertheless be subject to fair use);
3 Nimmer§ 13.05, p. 13-62, n. 2. But it has never been seriously disputed that "the fact that the plaintiff's work is unpublished . . . is a factor tending to negate the defense of fair
use." Ibid. Publication of an author's expression before he
has authorized its dissemination seriously infringes the author's right to decide when and whether it will be made public, a factor not present in fair use of published works. 5 Respondents contend, however, that Congress, in including
first publication among the rights enumerated in § 106, which
are expressly subject to fair use under § 107, intended that
fair use would apply in pari materia to published and unpublished works. The Copyright Revision Act does not support
this proposition.
The Copyright Revision Act of_J].76 represents the culmination'or a major legislative reexamination of copyright
doctrine. See Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, ante, at - - ;
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., supra, at--,
n. 9 (dissenting opinion). Among its other innovations, it
eliminated publication "as a dividing line between common
law and statutory protection," House Report, at 129, extend5
See, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 657 (1834) (distinguishing the author's common law right "to obtain redress against anyone
who . . . by improperly obtaining a copy [of his unpublished work] endeavors to realize a profit by its publication" from rights in a published work,
which are prescribed by statute); Pres f}_J!ub. Co. v. Monroe, 73 Fed. 196,
199 (CA2), aff'd, 164 U. S. 105 (1896); '(Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, 221 P. 2d 73, 77-78 (Cal. 1950) (en bane); Golding v. RKO Radio
Pictures, Inc., 193 P. 2d 153, 162 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948), ("An ·unauthorized appropriation of [an unpublished work] is not to be neutralized on
the plea that 'it is such a little one.'"), aff'd 221 P. 2d 95 (Cal. 1950);
Fendler v. Morosco, 253 N. Y. 281, 171 N. E. 56, reh'g denied 254 N. Y.
563, 173 N. E. 867 (N. Y. 1930) ("Since plaintiff has not published or produced her play, perhaps any use that others made ofit might be unfair.").

-©
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ing statutory protection to all works from the time of their
creation. It also recognized for the first time a distinct statutory right of first publication, which had previously been an
element of the common law protections afforded unpublished
works. The Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary confirms that "Clause (3) of section 106, establishes the
exclusive right of publication.... Under this provision the
copyright owner would have the right to control the first pub- .
lie distribution of an authorized copy . . . of his work."
House Report, at 62.
Though the right o
t ublication, like the other rights
enumerated in 106;-is expressly made subject to the fair use
provision of§ 107, fair use analysis must alwa s be tailored to
the --i_ndividual ca~.
ouse eport, at 65; 3 1mmer
§ 13.05[A]. The nature of the interest at stake is highly relevant to whether a given use is fair. From the beginning,
those entrusted with the task of revision recognized the
"overbalancing reasons to preserve the common law protection of undisseminated works until the author or his successor chooses to disclose them." Register of Copyrights, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess., General Revision of the U. S. Copyright
Law 41 (Comm. Print 1961). The right of first publication
implicates a threshold decision by the author whether and in
what form to release his work. First publication is inherently different from other § 106 rights in that only one person
can be the first publisher; as the contract with Time illustrates, the commercial value of the right lies primarily in
exclusivity. Because the potential damage to the author
from judicially enforced "sharing" of the first publication
right with unauthorized users of his manuscript is substantial, the balance of equities in evaluating such a claim of fair
use inevitably shifts.
The Senate Report confirms that Congress intended the
unpublished nature of the work to figure prominently in fair
use analysis. In discussing fair use of photocopied materials
in the classroom the Committee Report states:

/;-)
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"A key, though not necessarily determinative, factor in
fair use is whether or not the work is available to the potential user. If the work is "out of print" and unavailable for purchase through normal channels, the user may
have more justification for reproducing it . . . . The applicability of the fair use doctrine to unpublished works
is narrowly limited since, although the work is unavailable, this is the result of a deliberate choice on the part
of the copyright owner. Under ordinary circumstances,
the copyright owner's 'right of first publication' would
outweigh any needs of reproduction for classroom purposes. " Senate Report, at 64.
Although the Committee selected photocopying of classroom
materials to illustrate fair use, it emphasized that "the same
general standards of fair use are applicable to all kinds of uses
of copyrighted material." Id., at 65. We find unconvincing
respondent's contention that the absence of the quoted passage from the House Report indic~tes an intent to abandon
the traditional distinction between fair use of published and
unpublished works. It appears instead that the the fair use
discussion of photocopying of classroom materials was omitted from the final report be.cause educators and publishers in
the interim had negotiated a set of guidleines that rendered
the discussion obsolete. House Report, at 67. The House
Report nevertheless incorporates the discussion by reference, citing to the Senate Report and stating, "[T]he Committee has reviewed this discussion, and considers it still has
value as an analysis of various aspects of the [fair use] problem." Ibid.
Even if the legislative history were entirely silent, we
would be bound to conclude from Congress's characterization
of section 107 as a "restatement" that its effect was to preserve existing law concerning fair use of unpublished works
as of other types of protected works and not to "change, narrow, or enlarge it." House Report, at 66. We conclude that
the unpublished nature of a work is "a key, though not neces-

A
Vt
}
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sarily determinative factor" tending to negate a defense of
fair use. Senate Report, at 64. See 3 Nimmer§ 13.05, n. 2.
We also find unpersuasive respondent's argument that fair
use may be made of a soon-to-be-published manuscript on the
ground that the author has demonstrated he has no interest
in nonpublication. This argument assumes that the unpublished nature of copyrighted material is only relevant to letters or other confidential writings not intended for dissemination. It is true that common law copyright was often
enlisted in the service of personal privacy. See Brandeis
and Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193,
198-199 (1890). In its commercial guise, however, an author's right to choose when he will publish is no less deserving of protection. The period encompassing the work's initiation, its preparation, and its grooming for public
dissemination is a crucial one for any literary endeavor. The
Copyrig}:lt Act, which accords the copyright owner the "right
to control the first public distribution" of his work, House Report, at 62, echcl the common law's concern that the author
or copyright owner retain control throughout this critical
stage. See generally Comment, The Stage of Publication as
a "Fair Use" Factor: Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation
Enterprises, 58 St. John's L. Rev. 583 (1984). The obvious
benefit to author and public alike of assuring authors the leisure to develop their ideas free from fear of expropriation
outweighs any short term "news value" to be gained from
premature publication of the author's expression. See
Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 Colum L.
Rev. 983, 1004-1006 (1970) (The absolute protection the common law accorded to soon-to-be published works "[was] justified by its brevity and expedienc~~ - The author's control of
first public distribution implicate: ot only his personal interest in creative control but his property interest in exploitation of prepublication rights, which are valuable in themselves and serve as a valuable adjunct to publicity and
marketing. See Belushi v. Woodward, 10 Media L. Rep.

@
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(BNA) 1870 (D DC 1984) (successful marketing depends on
coordination of serialization and release to public); Marks,
Subsidiary Rights and Permissions, from C. Grannis (ed.),
What Happens in Book Publishing 230 (1967) (exploitation of
subsidiary rights is necessary to financial success of new
books). Under ordinary circumstances, the author's right to
control the first ublic a pearance of his undisseminateclexpress10n will outweig a claim of fair use.

B
Respondent, however, contends that First Amendment
values require a different rule under the circumstances of
this case. The thrust of the decision below is that "the scope
of [fair use] is undoubtedly wider when the information conveyed relates to matters of high public concern." Consumers Union of the United States , Inc. v. General Signal Corp. ,
724 F. 2d 1044, 1050 (CA2 1983) (construing Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 723 F . 2d 195 (1983),
as allowing advertiser to quote Consumer Reports), cert. denied, - - U. S. - - (1984). Respondent advances the substantial public import of the subject matter of the Ford memoirs as grounds for excusing a use that would ordinarily not
pass muster as a fair use-the piracy of verbatim quotations
for the purpose of "scooping" the authorized first serialization. Respondent explains its copying of Mr. Ford's expression as essential to reporting the news story it claims the
book itself represents. In respondent's view, not only the
facts contained in Mr. Ford's memoirs, but "the precise manner in which he expressed himself was as newsworthy as
what he had to say." Brief for Respondent 39. Respondent
argues that the public's interest in learning this news as fast
as possible outweighs the right of the author to control its
first publication.
The Second Circuit noted, correctly, that copyright's
idea/expression a 1cnot omy "strikes a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by per-

77 ·
t
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mitting free communication of facts while still protecting an
author's expression." 723 F. 2d, at 203. No author may
copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates. 17 U. S. C.
§ 102 (b). See, e. g., New York Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713, 726, n.* (1971) (BRENNAN, J., concurring)
(Copyright laws are not restrictions on freedom of speech as
copyright protects only form of expression and not the ideas
expressed); 1 Nimmer § 1.10[B][2]. As this Court long ago
observed, "[T]he news element-the information respecting
current events contained in the literary production-is not
the creation of the writer, but is a report of matters that ordinarily are publici juris; it is the history of the day." International News Service v. Associated Pres3/248 U. S. 215, 234
(1918). But copyright assures those who write and publish
factual narratives such as "A' Time to Heal" that that they
may at least enjoy the right to market-the original expression
contained therein as just compensation for their investment.
Respondent'~ heory, however, would expand fair usej o
effectively destroy any expectation of copyright protec~ion in
the work of a public figure. Absent such prot ection, there
would be little1 ncentive to create or profit in financing such
memoirs and the public would be denied an important source
of significant historical information. The promise of copyright would be an empty one if it could be avoided merely by
dubbing the infringement a fair use "news report" of the
book. See Wainwright Securities Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp. , 558 F . 2d 91(CA21977), cert. denied, 434 U. S.
1014 (1978).
Nor does respondent assert any actual necessity for
circumventing the copyright scheme with respect to the
types of works and users at issue here. 6 Where an author
• It bears noting that Congress in the Copyright Act recognized a public
interest warranting specific exemptions in a number of areas not within
traditional fair use, see, e. g. , 17 U. S. C. § 115 (compulsory license for
records); § 105 (no copyright in government works). No such exemption

n;,
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and publisher have invested extensive resources in creating
an original work and are poised to release it to the public, no
· legi~ate aim is served by preempting the right of first publication. The fact that the words the author has chosen to
clothe his narrative may of themselves be "newsworthy'' is
not an independent justification for unauthorized copying of
the author's expression prior to publication. To paraphrase
another recent Second Circuit decision:
"[Respondent] possessed an unfettered right to use any
factual information revealed in [the memoirs] for the
purpose of enlightening its audience, but it can claim no
need to 'bodily appropriate' [Mr. Ford's] 'expression' of
that information by utilizing portions of the actual
[manuscript] .... The public interest in the free flow of
information is assured by the law's refusal to recognize a
valid copyright in facts. The fair use doctrine is not a
license for corporate theft, empowering a court to ignore
copyright whenever it determines the underlying work
contains material of possible public importance." Iowa
State University v. American Broadcasting Company,
Inc., 621 F . 2d 57, 61(CA21980) (citations omitted).

a

Accord Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, 503 F. Supp. 1137 (SDNY 1980)
("newsworthiness" of material copied does not justify copying), aff'd 672 F. 2d 1095 (CA2), cert. denied 459 U. S. 826
(1982); Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc. , 506 F.
Supp. 554 (D DC 1981) (same).
In our haste to disseminate news, it should not be forgotten that the Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right
to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas. This Court
stated in Mazer v. Stein:
limits copyright in personal narratives written by public servants after
they leave government service.

-

83-1632--0PINION

HARPER & ROW v. NATION ENTERPRISES

17

"The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual efforts by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through
the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and the
useful Arts."' 347 U. S. 201 , 219 (1954).
And again in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken:
"The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a
fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate [the creation
of useful works] for the general public good." 422 U. S.
151, 156 (1976).

It is fundamentally at odds with the scheme of copyright to
accord lesser rights in those works that are of greatest importance tp the public. Such a notion ignores the major
premise of copyright and injures author and public alike.
"[T]o propose that fair use be imposed whe.n ever the 'social
value [of dissemination] ... outweighs any detriment to the
artist,' would be to propose depriving copyright owners of
their right in their property precisely when they encounter
those users who could afford to pay for it." Gordon, Fair
Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis
of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L.
Rev. 1600, 1615 (1982). And as one commentator has noted ,
"If every volume that was in the public interest could be pirated away by a competing publisher, ... the public [soon]
would have nothing worth reading." Sobel, Copyright and
the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm?, 19 ASCAP
Copyright Law Symp. 43, at 78 (1971). See generally Comment, Copyright and the First Amendment; Where Lie~ the
Public Interest?, 59 Tul. L. Rev. 133 (1985).
Moreover, freedom of thought and expression "includes
both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from
speaking at all." Wooley v. Maynard , 430 U. S. 705, 714
(1977) (BURGER, C. J. ). We do not suggest this right not to
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speak would sanction abuse of the copyright owner's monopoly as an instrument to suppress facts. But in the words of
New York's Chief Judge Fuld:
"The essential thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints on the voluntary public expression of ideas; it shields the man who wants to speak or
publish when others wish him to be quiet. There is necessarily, and within suitably defined areas, a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the
same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative
aspect." Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, 23
N. Y. 2d 341, 348 (1968).
Courts and commentators have recognized that copyright,
and the right of first publication in particular, serve this
countervailing First Amendment value. See Schnapper v.
Foley, 667 F. 2d 102 (CADC 1981), cert. denied U. S.
(1982); 1 Nimmer§ l.lO[B], p. 1-70, n. ~4.
In view of the First Amendment protections already embodied in the Copyright Act's distinction between
copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and
ideas, and the latitide for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use, we see no warrant for expanding the
doctrine of fair use to create what amounts to a public figure
exception to copyright. Whether verbatim copying from a
public figure's manuscript in a given case is or is not fair must
be judged according to the traditional equities of fair use.

/:f

III
(YJ,ir use} is a mi~
estion of law and fac; . Pacific
Southern Co./nc. v. Duncan, 744 F'. 2d 1490, 1495, n. 8
(CAll 1984). Where the District Court has found facts sufficient to evaluate each of the statutory factors, an appellate
court "need not remand for further factfinding ... [but] may
conclude as a matter of law that [the challenegd use] do[es]
not qualify as a fair use of the copyrighted work." Id., at
1495. Thus whether The Nation article constitutes fair U§e

•
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under § 107 must be reviewed in light of the principles discussed above. The factors enumerated in the section are not
meant to be exclusive: "[S]ince the doctrine is an equitable
rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible,
and each case raising the question must be decided on its own
facts." House Report, at 65. The four factors identified by
Congress as especially relevant in determining whether the
use was fair are: (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2)
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; (4) the effect on the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work. We address each one separately.
Purpose of the Use. The Second Circuit correctly identified news reporting as the general purpose of The Nation's
use. News reporting is one of the enumerated purposes
sanctioned by § 107 as presumptively advancing the public interest in dissemination of information through fair use. We
agree with the Second Circuit that the trial court erred in fixing on whether the information contained in the memoir was
actually new to the public. As Judge Meskill wisely noted,
"[c]ourts should be chary of deciding what is and what is not
news." 723 F. 2d, at 215 (Meskill, J ., dissenting). Cf.,
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. , 418 U. S. 323, 345-346 (1974).
The fact that an article arguably is "news" and therefore is
presumed to be a productive use is simply one factor in a fair
use analysis.
The fact that a publication was commercial as opposed to
non-profit is a separate factor that tends to weigh against a
finding of fair use. "[E]very commercial use of copyrighted
material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright."
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. , supra, at--.
In arguing that the purpose of news reporting is not purely
commercial, The Nation misses the point entirely. The crux
of the profit/non-profit distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands

-
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to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the customary price. See Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, 503 F. Supp.
1137, 1144 (SDNY 1980), aff'd 672 F. 2d 1095 (CA2 1980),
cert. denied 459 U. S. 826 (1982); 3 Nimmer § 13.05[A][l],
n. 25.3.
In evaluating character and purpose we cannot ignore The
Nation's stated purpose of scooping the forthcoming hardcover and Time abstracts, thereby "mak[ing] news" or creating a "news event." App. to Petn for Cert. C-27. The Nation's use had not merely the incidental effect but the
intended purpose of supplanting the copyright holder's commercially valuable right of first publication. See Meredith
Corp. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686,
690 (SDNY), (purpose of text was to compete with original),
aff'd 500 F. 2d 1221 (CA2 1974). Also relevant to the "character" of the use is "the propriety of the defendant's conduct." 3 Nimmer § 13.05[A], at 63-72. "Fair use presupposes 'good faith' and 'fair dealing."' Time, Inc. v. Bernard
Geis Associates, 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (SDNY 1968), quoting
Schulman, Fair Use and the Revision of the Copyright Act,
53 Iowa L. Rev. 832 (1968). The Nation knowingly exploited a purloined manuscript. Unlike the typical claim of
fair use, The Nation cannot offer up even the fiction of consent as justification. Like its competitor newsweekly, it was
free to bid for the right of abstracting excerpts from
"A
Time to Heal." Fair use "distinguishes between a true
scholar and a chiseler who infringes a work for personal
profit."' Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., supra, at 97, quoting from Hearings on Bills for
t~heneral Revision of the Copyright Law Before House
Co m. on Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 8, pt. _3, at
1 6 (1966) (Statement of John Schulman).
Nature of the Copyrighted Work. Second, the Act directs
attention to the nature of the copyrighted work. "A Time to
Heal" may be characterized as an unpublished historical nar-

r:
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rative or autobiography. The law generally recognizes a
greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy. See Gorman, Fact or Fancy: Implications
for Copyright, 29 J. Cop. Soc. 560, 561 (1981-1982).
"[E]ven within the field of fact works, there are gradations as to the relative proportion of fact and fancy.
One may move from sparsely embellished maps and directories to elegantly written biography. The extent to
which one must permit expressive language to be copied,
in order to assure dissemination of the underlying facts,
will thus vary from case to case." Id. , at 563.
Some of the briefer quotes from the memoir are arguably
necessary adequately to convey the facts; for example, Mr.
Ford's characterization of the White House tapes as the
"smoking gun" is perhaps so integral to the idea expressed as
to be inseparable from it. Cf. 1 Nimmer§ 1.l0[C]. But The
Nation did not stop. at isolated phrases and instead .excerpted
subjective descriptions and portraits of public figures whose
power lies in the author's individualized expression. Such
use, focusing on the most expressive elements of the work,
exceeds that necessary to disseminate the facts.
The fact that a work is unpublished is a critical element of
its "nature." 3 Nimmer § 13. 05[A]; Comment, supra, 58 St.
John's L. Rev., at 613. Our prior discussion establishes that
the scope of fair use is narrower with respect to unpublished
works. While even substantial quotations might qualify as
fair use in a review of a published work or a news account of a
speech that had been delivered to the public or disseminated
to the press, see House Report, at 65, the author's right to
choose when and how he will first make public his expression
weighs against such use of the work before its release.
Amount and Su bstantiality of the Portion Used. Next,
the Act directs us to examine the amount and substantiality
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole. In absolute terms, the words actually quoted were
an insubstantial portion of "A Time to Heal." The district
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court, however, found that "[T]he Nation took what was essentially the heart of the book." 557 F. Supp., at 1072. We
believe the Court of Appeals erred in overruling the district
judge's evaluation of the qualitative nature of the taking.
See, e. g., Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1145 (taking of 55
seconds out of one hour and twenty-nine minute film deemed
qualitatively substantial). A Time editor described the
chapters on the pardon as "the most interesting and moving
parts of the whole manuscript." Petrs' Reply Br. 16, n. 8.
The portions actually quoted were selected by Mr. Navasky
as among the most powerful passages in those chapters.
Stripped to the verbatim quotes, 7 the direct takings from the
unpublished manuscript constitute at least 13% of the infringing article. See M eeropol v. Nizer, 560 F. 2d 1061, 1071
(CA2 1977) (copyrighted letters constituted less than 1% of
infringing work but were prominently featured). The Nation article is structured around the quoted excerpts which
serve as its dramatic focal points. See Appendix, infra. In
view of the expressive value of the excerpts and their key
role in the infringing work, we cannot agree with the Second
Circuit that the "magazine took a meager, indeed an infinitesimal amount of Ford's original language." 723 F. 2d, at 209.
7
See Appendix, infra, at - -. The Court of Appeals found that only
"approximately 300 words" were copyrightable but did not specify which
words. The court's discussion, however, indicates it excluded from consideration those portions of The Nation's piece that, although copied verbatim from Ford's manuscript, were quotes attributed by Ford to third persons and quotations from government documents. At oral argument,
counsel for The Nation did not dispute that direct quotes and very close
paraphrase could constitute infringement. Tr. 24-25. Thus the Appendix identifies as potentially infringing only verbatim quotes or extr"emely
close paraphrase and excludes from consideration government documents
and words attributed to third persons. The Appendix is not intended to
endorse any particular rule of copyrightability but is intended merely as an
aid to facilitate our discussion.
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Efj_ect on !!!e M ~
. Finally, the Act focuses on "the effect of the use on the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work." This last factor is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use. 8 See 3 Nimmer
§ 13.05[A] p. 13-76, and cases cited therein.
"Fair use,
when properly applied, is limited to copying by others which
does not materially impair the marketability of the work
which is copied." 1 Nimmer § 1,l0[D], p. 1-87. The trial
court found not merely a potential but an actual effect on the
market. Time's cancellation of its projected serialization and
its refusal to pay the $12,500 were the direct effect of the infringement. The Court of Appeals rejected this fact finding
as clearly erroneous, noting that the record did not establish
a causal relation between Time's nonperformance and respondent's unauthorized publication of Mr. Ford's expression
as opposed to the facts taken from the memoirs. We disagree. Rarely will a case of copyright infringement present
such clear cut evidence of actual damage. Petitioners assured Time that there would be no other authorized publication of any portion of the unpublished manuscript prior to
April 23, 1979. Any publication of material from chapters 1
and 3 would permit Time to renegotiate its final payment.
Time cited The Nation's article, which contained verbatim
quotes from the unpublished manuscript, as a reason for its
nonperformance. Petitioners established a prima facie case
Economists who have addressed the issue believe the fair use exception should come into play only in those situations in which the market fails
or the price the copyright holder would ask is near zero. See, e. g., Brennan, Harper & Row v. The Nation , Copyrightability and Fair Use, Dept.
of Justice Economic Policy Office Discussion Paper, 13-17 (1984); Gordon,
Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis _of the
Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1615 (1982).
As the facts here demonstrate, there is a fully functioning market that encourages the creation and dissemination of memoirs of public figures. In
the economists' view, permitting "fair use" to displace normal copyright
channels disrupts the copyright market without a commensurate public
benefit.
8
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of actual damage thatt:e pondent failed to rebut. See Stevens Linen Association nc. v. Mastercraft Corp., 656 F. 2d
11, 15 (CA2 1981). T e trial court properly awarded actual
damages and profits. See 17 U. S. C. § 505.
More important, to negate fair use one need only show that
if the challenged use "should become widespread, it would
adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted
work." Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., supra,
at - - (emphasis added); id., at--, and n. 36 (collecting
cases) (dissenting opinion). This inquiry must take account
not only of harm to the original but also of harm to the market for derivative works. See Iowa State University Research Foundation v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.
2d 57 (CA2 1980); Meeropol v. Nizer, supra, at 1070; Roy Export v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 503 F. Supp. 1137,
1146. "If the defendant's work adversely affects the value of
any of the rights in the copyrighted work (in this case the adaptation [and serialization] right) the use is not fair." 3
Nimmer§ 13.05[B], pp. 13-77-13-78.
It is undisputed that the factual material in the balance of
The Nation's article, besides the verbatim quotes at issue
here, was drawn exclusively from the chapters on the pardon. The excerpts were employed as featured episodes in a
story about the Nixon pardon-precisely the use petiy{ners
had licensed to Time. The borrowing of these verbatim
quotes from the unpublished manuscript lent The Nation's
piece a special air of authenticity-as Navasky expressed it,
the reader would know it was Ford speaking and not The Nation. App. 300c. Thus it directly competed for a share of
the market for prepublication excerpts. The Senate Report
states:
''With certain special exceptions . . . a use that supplants
any part of the normal market for a copyrighted wor'would ordinarily be considered an infringement." I d./t
65.

1f
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Placed in a broader perspective, a fair use doctrine that permits extensive prepublication quotations from an unreleased
manuscript without the copyright owner's consent poses substantial potential for damage to the marketability of first
serialization rights in general. "Isolated instances of minor
infringements, when multiplied many times , become in the
aggregate a major inroad on copyright that must be prevented." Senate Report, at 65.
The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that The Nation's
use of the copyrighted material was excused by the public's
interest in the subject matter. It erred, as well, in overlooking the unpublis_hed nature of the work and the resulting impact on the potential market for first serial rights of permitting unauthorized prepublication excerpts under the rubric of
fair use. Finally, in finding the taking "infinitesimal," the
Court of Appeals accorded too little weight to the qualitative
importance of the quoted passages of original expression. In
sum, the traditional doctrine of fair use, as embodied in the
Copyright Act, does not sanction the use made by The Nation
of these copyrighted materials. Any copyright infringer
may claim to benefit the public by increasing public access to
the copyrighted work. See Pacific and Southern Co. v.
Duncan, 744 F. 2d 1490, 1499-1500 (CAll 1984). But Con- ·)
gress has not designed, and we see no warrant for judicially
imposing, a "compulsory license" permitting unfettered
access to the unpublished copyrighted expression of public
figures.
IV
The Nation conceded that its verbatim co · g of some 300
words o 1rect quo at10n om the Ford manuscript would
constitute an.infringement unless excused as a fair use. 1 ecause we nncftlnit-Tne"Nat1on7s use orurese verbatim excerpts from the unpublished manuscript w·as ~
se,
we do not address the appellate court's conclusions concerning various issues of copyrightability. We observe, howual
ever, that the law concerning the copyrightability ~
'-------
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narrative and its component parts is currently unsettled and
we believe these issues of copyri ht ility are best left to further developmen y e courts, on full ac ua recor sand in
cases at turn on the such issues and not, as
the co ex
do~
ne, on t4e doct~
use.
The judgment of theeourt of Appeals is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
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APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT
The portions of The Nation article which were copied verbatim from "A
Time to Heal," excepting quotes from government documents and quotes
attributed by Ford to third persons, are identified in bold face in the text.
Seen. 7, ante, at--. The corresponding passages in the Ford manuscript are footnoted.

THE FORD MEMOIRS
BEHIND THE NIXON PARDON
In his memoirs, A Time To Heal , which Harper & Row will
publish in late May or early June, former President Gerald R.
Ford says that the idea of giving a blanket pardon to Richard
M. Nixon was raised before Nixon resigned from the Presidency by Gen. Alexander Haig, who was then the White
House chief of staff.
Ford also writes that, but for a misunderstanding, he
might have selected Ronald Reagan as his 1976 running
mate, that Washington lawyer Edward Bennett Williams, a
Democrat, was his choice for head of the Central Intelligence
Agency, that Nixon was the one who first proposed Rockefeller for Vice President, and that he regretted his "cowardice" 1 in allowing Rockefeller to remove himself from Vice
Presidential contention. Ford also describes his often
prickly relations with Henry Kissinger.
The Nation obtained the 655-page typescript before publication. Advance excerpts from the book will appear in Time
in mid-April and in The R eader's Digest thereafter. Although the initial print order has not been decided, the figure
is tentatively set at 50,000; it could change, depending upon
the public reaction to the serialization.
Ford's account of the Nixon pardon contains significant
new detail on the negotiations and considerations that surrounded it. According to Ford's version, the subject was
I was angry at myself for showing cowardice in not saying to the ultraconservatives, "It's going to be Ford and Rockefeller, whatever t he consequences. " p. 496.
1
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first broached to him by General Haig on August 1, 1974, a
week before Nixon resigned. General Haig revealed that
the newly transcribed White House tapes were the equivalent of the "smoking gun" 2 and that Ford should prepare
himself to become President.
Ford was deeply hurt by Haig's revelation: "Over the past
several months Nixon had repeatedly assured me that he
was not involved in Watergate, that the evidence would
prove his innocence, that the matter would fade from
view." 3 Ford had believed him, but he let Haig explain the
President's alternatives.
He could "ride it out" 4 or he could resign, Haig said. He
then listed the different ways Nixon might resign and concluded by pointing out that Nixon could agree to leave in return for an agreement that the new President, Ford,
would pardon him. 5 Although Ford said it would be improper for him to make any recommendation, he basically
agreed with Haig's assessment and adds, "Because of his
references to the pardon authority, I did ask Haig about
the extent of a President's pardon power." 6
"It's my understanding from a White House lawyer," Haig
replied, "That a President does have authority to grant a pardon even before criminal action has been taken against an
individual."
' [I]t contained the so-called smoking gun. p. 3.
Over the past several months Nixon had repeatedly assured me that he
was not involved in Watergate, that the evidence would prove his innocence, that the matter would fade from view. p. 7.
•The first [option] was that he could try to "ride it out" by letting impeachment take its natural course through the House and the Senate trial,
fighting against conviction all the way. p. 4.
5
Finally, Haig said that according to some on Nixon's White House
staff, Nixon could agree to leave in return for an agreement that the new
President-Gerald Ford-would pardon him. p. 5.
' Because of his references to pardon authority, I did ask Haig about the
extent of a President's pardon power. pp. 5-6.
3
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But because Ford had neglected to tell Haig he thought the
idea of a resignation conditioned on a pardon was improper,
his press aide, Bob Hartmann, suggested that Haig might
well have returned to the White House and told President
Nixon that he had mentioned the idea and Ford seemed comfortable with it. "Silence implies assent."
Ford then consulted with White House special counsel
James St. Clair, who had no advice one way or the other on
the matter more than pointing out that he was not the lawyer
who had given Haig the opinion on the pardon. Ford also
discussed the matter with Jack Marsh, who felt that the mention of a pardon in this context was a "time bomb," and with
Bryce Harlow, who had served six Presidents and who
agreed that the mere mention of a pardon "could cause a
lot of trouble." 7
As a result of these various conversations, Vice President
Ford called Haig and read him a written statement: "I want
you to understand that I have no intention of recommending
what the President should do about resigning or not resigning and that nothing we talked about yesterday afternoon
should be given any consideration in whatever decision the
President may wish to make."
Despite what Haig had told him about the "smoking gun"
tapes, Ford told a Jackson, Mich., luncheon audience later
in the day that the President was not guilty of an impeachable offense. "Had I said otherwise at the moment," he writes, "the whole house of cards might have
collapsed." 8
In justifying the pardon, Ford goes out of his way to assure
the reader that "compassion for Nixon as an individual
7

Only after I had finished did [Bryce Harlow] let me know in no uncertain terms that he agreed with Bob and Jack, that the mere mention of the
pardon option could cause a lot of trouble in the days ahead. p. 18.
8
During the luncheon I repeated my assertion that the President was
not guilty of an impeachable offense. Had I said otherwise at that moment, the whole house of cards might have collapsed. p. 21.
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hadn't prompted my decision at all." 9 Rather, he did it
because he had "to get the monkey off my back one way or
the other." 10
The precipitating factor in his decision was a series of
secret meetings his general counsel, Phil Buchen, held with
Watergate Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski in the Jefferson
Hotel, where they were both staying at the time. Ford attributes Jaworski with providing some "crucial" information 11-i. e., that Nixon was under investigation in ten
separate areas·, and that the court process could "take
years." 12 Ford cites a memorandum from J aworski's assistant, Henry S. Ruth Jr., as being especially persuasive.
Ruth had written:
"If you decide to recommend indictment I think it is fair
and proper to notify Jack Miller and the White House sufficiently in advance so that pardon action could be taken before
the indictment." He went on to say: "One can make a strong
argument for leniency and if President Ford is so inclined, I
think he ought to do it early rather than late."
Ford decided that court proceedings against Nixon might
take six years, that Nixon "would not spend time quietly in
San Clemente," 13 and "it would be virtually impossible
for me to direct public attention on anything else." 14
Buchen, Haig and Henry Kissinger agreed with him.
Hartmann was not so sure.
9

But compassion for Nixon as an individual hadn't prompted my decision
at all. p. 266.
10
I had to get the monkey off my back one way or another. p. 236.
"Jaworski gave Phil several crucial pieces of information. p. 246.
12
And if the verdict was Guilty, one had to assume that Nixon would appeal. That process would take years. p. 248.
13
The entire process would no doubt require years: a minimum of two, a
maximum of six. And Nixon would not spend time quietly in San Clemente. p. 238.
1
• It would be virtually impossible for me to direct public attention on
anything else. p. 239.
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Buchen wanted to condition the pardon on Nixon agreeing
to settle the question of who would retain custody and control
over the tapes and Presidential papers that might be relevant
to various Watergate proceedings, but Ford was reluctant to
do that:
At one point a plan was considered whereby the Presidential materials would be kept in a vault at a Federal facility
near San Clemente, but the vault would require two keys to
open it. One would be retained by the General Services Administration, the other by Richard Nixon.
The White House did, however, want Nixon to make a full
confession on the occasion of his pardon or, at a minimum, express true contrition. Ford tells of the negotiation with Jack
Miller, Nixon's lawyer, over the wording of Nixon's statement. But as Ford reports Miller's response. Nixon was
not likely to yield. "His few meetings with his client had
shown him that the former President's ability to discuss
Watergate objectively was almost nonexistent." 15
The statement they really wanted was never forthcoming.
As soon as Ford's emissary arrived in San Clemente, he was
confronted with an ultimatum by Ron Zeigler, Nixon's former press secretary. "Lets get one thing straight immediately," Zeigler said. "President Nixon is not issuing any
statement whatsoever regarding Watergate, whether Jerry
Ford pardons him or not." Zeigler proposed a draft, which
was turned down on the ground that "no statement would
be better than that." 16 They went through three more
drafts before they agreed on the statement Nixon finally
made, which stopped far short of a full confession.
When Ford aide Benton Becker tried to explain to Nixon
that acceptance of a pardon was an admission of guilt, he felt
15
But [Miller] wasn't optimistic about getting such a statement. His few
meetings with his client had shown him that the former President's ability
to discuss Watergate objectively was almost nonexistent. p. 246.
16
When Zeigler asked Becker what he thought of it, Becker replied that
no statement would be better than that. p. 251.
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the President wasn't really listening.
Instead, Nixon
wanted to talk about the Washington Redskins. And when
Becker left, Nixon pressed on him some cuff links and a tie pin
"out of my own jewelry box."
Ultimately, Ford sums up the philosophy underlying his
decision as one he picked up as a student at Yale Law School
many years before. "I learned that public policy often
took precedence over a rule oflaw. Although I respected
the tenet that no man should be above the law, public policy demanded that I put Nixon-and Watergate-behind
us as quickly as possible." 11
Later, when Ford learned that Nixon's phlebitis had acted
up and his health was seriously impaired, he debated
whether to pay the ailing former President a visit. "If I
made the trip it would remind everybody of Watergate and
the pardon. If I didn't, people would say I lacked compassion." 18 Ford went:
He was stretched out flat on his back. There were
tubes in his nose and mouth, and wires led from his arms,
chest and legs to machines with orange lights that blinked
on and off. His face was ashen, and I thought I had never
seen anyone closer to death. 19
The manuscript made available to The Nation includes
many references to Henry Kissinger and other personalities
who played a major role during the Ford years.
Years before, at Yale Law School, I'd learned that public policy often
took precedence over a rule of law. Although I respected the tenet that
no man should be above the law, public policy demanded that I put Nixonand Watergate-behind us as quickly as possible. p. 256.
18
My staff debated whether or not I ought to visit Nixon at the Long
Beach Hospital, only half an hour away. If I made the trip, it would remind everyone of Watergate and the pardon. If I didn't, people would say
I lacked compassion. I ended their debate as soon as I found out it had
begun. Of course I would go. p. 298.
19
He was stretched out flat on his back. There were tubes in his nose
and mouth, and wires led from his arms, chest and legs to machines with
11
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On Kissinger. Immediately after being informed by
Nixon of his intention to resign, Ford returned to the Executive Office Building and phoned Henry Kissinger to let him
know how he felt. "Henry," he said, "I need you. The
country needs you. I want you to stay. I'll do everything I can to work with you." 20
"Sir," Kissinger replied, "it is my job to get along with you
and not yours to get along with me."
"We'll get along," Ford said. "I know we'll get along."
Referring to Kissinger's joint jobs as Secretary of State and
National Security Adviser to the President, Ford said, "I
don't want to make any change. I think it's worked out
well, so let's keep it that way." 21
Later Ford did make the change and relieved Kissinger of
his responsibilities as National Security Adviser at the same
time that he fired James Schlesinger as Secretary of Defense.
Shortly thereafter, he reports, Kissinger presented him with
a "draft" letter of resignation, which he said Ford could call
upon at will if he felt he needed it to quiet dissent from conservatives who objected to Kissinger's role in the firing of
Schlesinger.
On John Connally. When Ford was informed that Nixon
wanted him to replace Agnew, he told the President he had
"no ambition to hold office after January 1977." 22 Nixon
replied that that was good since his own choice for his runorange lights that blinked on and off. His face was ashen, and I thought I
had never seen anyone cloer to death. p. 299.
20
"Henry," I said when he came on the line, "I need you. The country
needs you. I want you to stay. I'll do everything I can to work with
you." p. 46.
21
We'll get along," I said. "I know we can get along." We talked about
the two hats he wore, as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor
to the President. "I don't want to make any change," I said. "I think it's
worked out well, so let's keep it that way." p. 46.
22
I told him about my promise to Betty and said that I had no ambitions
to hold office after January 1977. p. 155.

-

•

34

-

HARPER & ROW v. NATION ENTERPRISES
Appendix to Opinion of the Court

ning mate in 1976 was John Connally. "He'd be excellent,"
observed Nixon. Ford says he had "no problem with that."
On the Decision to Run Again. Ford was, he tells us, so
sincere in his intention not to run again that he thought he
would announce it and enhance his credibility in the country
and the Congress, as well as keep the promise he had made to
his wife, Betty.
Kissinger talked him out of it. "You can't do that. It
would be disastrous from a foreign policy point of view. For
the next two and a half years foreign governments would
know that they were dealing with a lame-duck President.
All our initiatives would be dead in the water, and I wouldn't
be able to implement your foreign policy. It would probably
have the same consequences in dealing with the Congress on
domestic issues. You can't reassert the authority of the
Presidency if you leave yourself hanging out on a dead limb.
You've got to be an affirmative President."
On David Kennerly, the White House photographer.
Schlesinger was arguing with Kissinger and Ford over the
appropriate response to the seizure of the M ayaguez. At
issue was whether airstrikes against the Cambodians were
desirable; Schlesinger was opposed to bombings. Following
a lull in the conversation, Ford reports, up spoke the 30-yearold White House photographer, David Kennerly, who had
been taking pictures for the last hour.
"Has anyone considered," Kennerly asked, "that this might
be the act of a local Cambodian commander who has just
taken it into his own hands to stop any ship that comes by?"
Nobody, apparently, had considered it, but following several
seconds of silence, Ford tells us, the view carried the day.
"Massive airstrikes would constitute overkill," Ford
decided. "It would be far better to have Navy jets from
the Coral Sea make surgical strikes against specific
targets." 23
23

Subjectively, I felt that what Kennerly had said made a lot of sense.
Massive airstrikes would constitute overkill. It would be far better to
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On Nixon's Character. Nixon's flaw, according to Ford,
was "pride." "A terribly proud man," writes Ford, "he
detested weakness in other people. I'd often heard him
speak disparagingly of those whom he felt to be soft and
expedient. (Curiously, he didn't feel that the press was
weak. Reporters, he sensed, were his adversaries. He
knew they didn't like him, and he responded with reciprocal disdain.)" 24
Nixon felt disdain for the Democratic leadership of the
House, whom he also regarded as weak. According to Ford,
"His pride and personal contempt for weakness had overcome his ability to tell the difference between right and
wrong," 25 all of which leads Ford to wonder whether Nixon
had known in advance about Watergate.
On hearing Nixon's resignation speech, which Ford felt
lacked an adequate plea for forgiveness, he was persuaded
that "Nixon was out of touch with reality." 26
In February of last year, when The Washington Post obtained and printed advance excerpts from H. R. H.aldeman's
memoir, The Ends of Power, on the eve of its publication by
Times Books, The New York Times called The Post's feat "a
second-rate burglary."
The Post disagreed, claiming that its coup represented
"first-rate enterprise" and arguing that it had burglarized
nothing, that publication of the Haldeman memoir came
have Navy jets from the Coral Sea make surgical strikes against specific
targets in the vicinity of Kompong Som. p. 416.
24
In Nixon's case, that flaw was pride. A terribly proud man, he detested weakness in other people. I'd often heard him speak disparagingly
of those whom he felt to be soft and expedient. (Curiously, he didn't feel
that the press was weak. Reporters , he sensed, were his adversaries.
He knew they didn't like him, and he responded with reciprocal disdain. )
p. 53.
25

His pride and personal contempt for weakness had overcome his ability
to tell the difference between right and wrong. p. 54.
26
The speech lasted fifteen minutes , and at the end I was convinced
Nixon was out of touch with reality. p. 57.
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under the Fair Comment doctrine long recognized by the
courts, and that "There is a fundamental journalistic principle
here-a First Amendment principle that was central to the
Pentagon Papers case."
In the issue of The Nation dated May 5, 1979, our special
Spring Books number, we will discuss some of the ethical
problems raised by the issue of disclosure.
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JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to consider to what extent the "fair ~
use" provision of the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 17
U. S. C. § 107 (hereinafter the Copyright Act), sanctions the
unauthorized use of quotations from a public figure's unpublished manuscript. In April 1977, an undisclosed source provided The Nation magazine with the unpublished manuscript
of "A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford."
Working directly from the purloined manuscript, an editor of
The Nation produced a short piece entitled "The Ford Memoirs-Behind the Nixon Pardon. " The piece was timed to
"scoop" an article scheduled shortly to appear in Time magazine. Time had agreed t o purchase the exclusive right to
print prepublication excerpts from the copyright holders,
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. (hereinafter Harper & Row)
and Reader's Digest Association, Inc. (hereinafter Reader's
Digest). As a result of The Nation article, Time cancelled its
agreement. Petitioners brought a successful copyright ac- \
tion against The Nation. On appeal, the Second Circuit re- ~
versed the lower court's finding of infringement, holding that
The Nation's act was sanctioned as a "fair use" of the copyrighted material. We granted certiorari, - - U. S. - (1984), and we now reverse.
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I
In February 1977, shortly after leaving the White House,
former President Gerald R. Ford contracted with petitioners
Harper & Row and The Reader's Digest, to publish his as yet
unwritten memoirs. The memoirs were to contain "significant hitherto unpublished material" concerning the Watergate crisis, Mr. Ford's pardon of former President Nixon and
"Mr. Ford's reflections on this period of history, a.nd the morality and personalities involved." App. to Petn for Cert.
C-14 - C-15. In addition to the right to publish the Ford
memoirs in book form, the agreement gave petitioners the
exclusive right to license prepublication excerpts, known in
the trade as "first serial rights." Two years later, as the
memoirs were nearing completion, petitioners negotiated a
prepublication licensing agreement with Time, a weekly
news magazine. Time agreed to pay $25,000, $12,500 in advance and an additional $12,500 at publication, in exchange
for the right to excerpt 7,500 words from Mr. Ford's account
of the Nixon pardon. The issue featuring the excerpts was
timed to appear approximately one week before shipment of
the full length book version to bookstores. Exclusivity was
an important consideration; Harper & Row instituted procedures designed to maintain the confidentiality of the manuscript, and Time retained the right to renegotiate the second
payment should the material appear in print prior to its release of the excerpts.
Two to three weeks before the Time article's scheduled release, an unidentified person secretly brought a copy of the
Ford manuscript to Victor Navasky, editor of The Nation, a
political commentary magazine. Mr. Navasky knew that his
possession of the manuscript was not authorized and that the
manuscript must be returned quickly to his "source" to avoid
discovery. 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1069 (SDNY 1983). He hastily put together what he believed was "a real hot news story"
composed of quotes, paraphrases and facts drawn exclusively
from the manuscript. Ibid. Mr. N avasky attempted no in-
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dependent commentary, research or criticism, in part because of the need for speed if he was to "make news" by "publish[ing] in advance of the publication of the Ford book."
App. 416-417. The 2,250 word article, reprinted in the Appendix to this opinion, appeared on April 3, 1979. As a result of The Nation's article, Time cancelled its piece and refused to pay the remaining $12,500.
Petitioners brought suit in the District Court for the
Southern District of New York, alleging conversion, tortious
interference with contract and violations of the Copyright
Act. After a six day bench trial, the District Judge found
that "A Time to Heal" was protected by copyright at the time
of The Nation publication and that respondent's use of the
copyrighted material constituted an infringement under the
Copyright Act, § 106 (1),(2)}md (3), protecting respectively
the right to reproduce the work, the right to license preparation of derivative works, and the right of first distribution of
the copyrighted work to the public. . App. to Petn for Cert:
C-29-C-30. The District Court rejected respondent's argument that The Nation's piece was a "fair use" sanctioned by
§ 107 of the Act. Though billed as "hot news," the article
contained no new facts. The magazine had "published its article for profit," taking "the heart" of "a soon-to-be-published" work. This unauthorized use "caused the agreement
with Time to be aborted and thus diminished the value of the
copyright." 557 F. Supp., at 1072. Although certain elements of the Ford memoir, such as historical facts and memoranda, were not per se copyrightable, the District Court held
that it was "the totality of these facts and memoranda collected together with Ford's reflections that made them of
value to The Nation, [and] this totality ... is protected by
the copyright laws." Id., at 1072-1073. The court awarded
actual damages of $12,500.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed: The .majority recognized that Mr. Ford's verbatim "reflections" were original "expression" protected by
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copyright. But it held that the District Court had erred in
assuming "the coupling [of these reflections] with
uncopyrightable fact transformed that information into a
copyrighted 'totality."' 723 F. 2d 195, 205 (1983). The majority noted that copyright attaches to expression, not facts
or ideas. It concluded that, to avoid granting a copyright
monopoly over the facts underlying history and news, "'expression' [in such works must be confined] to its barest elements-the ordering and choice of the words themselves."
Id., at 204. Thus similarities between the original and the
challenged work traceable to the copying or paraphrasing of
uncopyrightable material, such as historical facts, memoranda and other public documents, and quoted remarks of
third parties, must be disregarded in evaluating whether the
second author's use was fair or infringing.
"When the uncopyrighted material is stripped away, the
article in The Nation contains, at most, approximately
300 words that are copyrighted. These remaining paragraphs and scattered phrases are all verbatim quotations
from the memoirs which had not appeared previously in
other publications. They include a short segment of
Ford's conversations with Henry Kissinger and several
other individuals. Ford's impressionistic depictions of
Nixon, ill with phlebitis after the resignation and pardon
and of Nixon's character, constitute the major portion of
this material. It is these parts of the magazine piece on
which [the court] must focus in [its] examination of the
question whether there was a 'fair use' of the copyrighted matter." Id. , at 206.
Examining the four factors enumerated in § 107, see infra, at
- - , the majority found the purpose of the article was "news
reporting," the original work was essentially factual in nature, the 300 words appropriated were insubstantial in relation to the 2,250 word piece, and the impact on the market for
the original was minimal as "the evidence [did] not support a
finding that it was the very limited use of expression per se
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which led to Time's decision not to print the excerpt." The
Nation's borrowing of verbatim quotations merely "len[t]
authenticity to this politically significant material . . . complementing the reporting of the facts." Id., at 208. The
Court of Appeals was especially influenced by the "politically
significant" nature of the subject matter and its conviction
that it is not "the purpose of the Copyright Act to impede
that harvest of knowledge so necessary to a democratic
state" or "chill the activities of the press by forbidding a circumscribed use of copyrighted words." Id., at 197, 208.

II
A

We agree with the Court of Appeals that copyright is intended to increase and not to impede the harvest of knowledge. But we believe the Second Circuit gave insufficient
deferenc~ to the scheme established by the Copyright Act for
fostering the original works that provide the seed and substance of this harvest. The rights conferred by copyright
are designed to assure contributors to the store of knowledge
a fair return for their labors. Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 156 (1976). In using generous verbatim excerpts of Mr. Ford's unpublished manuscript
to lend authenticity to its account of the forthcoming memoirs, The Nation effectively arrogated to itself the right of
first publication, an important marketable subsidiary right.
Under the circumstances of this case, we find that The Nation's use of the copyrighted manuscript, even stripped to the
verbatim quotes conceded by The Nation to be copyrightable
expression, was neither a fair use of the copyrightable material nor necessary to advance the public interest in dissemination of information.
Article I, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that:
"The Congress shall have the power . . . to Promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for lim-
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ited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
As we noted last Term, "[this] limited grant is a means by
which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the
public access to the products of their genius after the limited
period of exclusive control has expired." Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios , Inc., - - U. S. - -, - - (1984).
"The monopoly created by copyright thus rewards the individual author in order to benefit the public. " Id., at - (dissenting opinion). This principle applies equally to works
of fiction and non-fiction. The book at issue here, for example, was two years in the making, and began with a contract
giving the author's copyright to the publishers in exchange
for their services in producing and marketing the work. In
preparing the book, Mr. Ford drafted essays and word portraits of public figures and participated in hundreds of taped
interviews that were later distilled to chronicle his personal
viewpoint. It is evident that the monopoly granted by copyright actively served its intended purpose of inducing the creation of new material of potential historical value.
Section 106 of the Copyright Act confers a bundle of exclusive rights to the owner of the copyright. 1 Under the Copyright Act, these rights-to publish, copy, and distribute the
author's work-vest in the author of an original work from
the time of its creation. rI-4r-§ 106. In practice, the author
commonly sells his rights to publishers who offer royalties in
exchange for their services in producing and marketing the
author's work. The copyright owner's rights, however, are
Section.106 provides in pertinent part:
"Subject to section 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this title
has the exclusive rights to do and authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies . . . ;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies ... of the copyrighted work to the public .... "
1

~
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subject to certain statutory exceptions. -fd:: §§ 107-118.
Among these is § 107 which codifies the traditional privilege
of other authors to make "fair use" of an earlier writer's
work. 2 In addition, no author may copyright facts or ideas.
-- 17 U. S. G. § 102. The copyright is limited to those aspects
of the work-termed "expression"- that display the stamp of
the author's originality.
The statutory formulation of the defense of fair use in the
Copyright Act of 1976 reflects the intent of Congress to codify the common law doctrine. 3 M. Nimmer on Copyright
§ 13.05 (1984 ed.) (hereinafter Nimmer). Section 107 requires a case-by-case determination whether a particular use
is fair, and the statute notes four non-exclusive factors to be
considered. This approach was "intended to restate the
[pre-existing] judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476,
p. 66 (1976) (hereinafter House Report).
Fair use was traditionally defined as "a privilege in others
than the owner of the copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent." H. Ball,
The Law of Copyright 260 (1944). "[T]he author's consent to
a reasonable use of his copyrighted works ha[d] always been
implied by the courts as a necessary incident of the constitu-

/7

~ection 107 states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work ... for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the
use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purpos~s;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. "
2

I
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tional policy of promoting sciences and the useful arts, since a
prohibition of such use would inhibit subsequent writers from
attempting to improve upon prior works and· thus . . . frustrate the very ends sought to be attained." Ibid. Professor
Latman, in a study of the doctrine of fair use commissioned
by Congress for the revision effort, see Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., supra, at - - , n. 9 (dissenting
opinion), summarized prior law as turning on "the importance
of the material copied or performed from the point of view of
the reasonable copyright owner. In other words, would the
reasonable copyright owner have consented to the use?"
Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works (1958), reprinted as
Study No. 14 in Copyright Law Revision Studies Nos. 1-19,
Prepared for the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess., p. 15 (1960). 3
As early as 1841, Justice Story, gave judicial recognition to
the doctrine in a case that concerned the letters of another
former President, George Washington.
"[A] reviewer may fairly cite largely from the original
work, if his design be really and truly to use the passages
for the purposes of fair and reasonable criticism. On the
other hand, it is as clear, that if he thus cites the most
important parts of the work, with a view, not to criticise,
but to supersede the use of the original work, and substitute the review for it, such a use will be deemed in law a
3

r;

Professor Nimmer notes, "[perhaps] no more precise guide can be
stated than Joseph McDonald's clever paraphrase of the Golden Rule:
'Take not from others to such an extent and in such a manner that you
would be resentful if they so took from you."' 3 Nimmer § 13.05[A],
0P· 13-66, quoting McDonald, "Non-infringing Uses," 9 Bull. Cr. · Soc'y
466, 467 No.355 (1962). This equitable "rule of reason," Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., - - U. S., at--, "permits courts to avoid
rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle
the very creativity which that law is designed to foster." Iowa State University v. American Broadcasting Co., 621 F . 2d 57, 60 (CA2 1980). See
generally, L. Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in Copyright 18-48 (1978).
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piracy." Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 342, No. 4,901,
at 344-345 (C. C. D. Mass.)
As Justice Story's hypothetical illustrates, the fair use doctrine has always precluded a use that "supersede[s] the object of the original." Ibid. Accord S. Rep. No. 94-473,
p. 65 (1975) (hereinafter Senate Report).
Perhaps because the fair use doctrine was predicated on
the author's implied consent to "reasonable and customary''
use when he released his work for public consumption, fair
use traditionally was not recognized as a defense to charges
of copying from an author's as yet unpublished works. 4
Under common law copyright, "[t]he property of the author
.. . in his intellectual creation [was] absolute until he voluntarily part[ed] with the same." American Tobacco Co. v.
Werckmeister, 207 U. S. 284, 299 (1907); 2 Nimmer§ 8.23, at
8-273. This absolute rule, however, was tempered in practice by the equitable nature of the fair use doctrine. In a
given case, factors such as implied consent through de facto
publication on performance or dissemination of a work may
tip the balance of equities in favor of prepublication use. See
Copyright Law Revision-Part 2: Discussion and Comments
on Report of the Registrar of Copyrights on General Revi-

~

~

' See Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works (1958), reprinted as
Study No. 14 in Copyright Law Revision Studies Nos. 1-19, Prepared for
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. , p. 7 (1960);
Strauss, Protection of Unpublished Works (1957), reprinted as Study No.
29 in Copyright Law Revision Studies Nos 20-35, Prepared for the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4, n. 32 (1960) (citing
cases); R. Shaw, Literary Property in the United States 67 (1950) ("there
can be no '"fair usP of unpublished material); H. Ball, Law of Copyright
and Literary Property § 125, n. 5 (1944) ("the doctrine of fair use does not
apply to unpublished works"); A. Weil, American Copyright Law. § 276
(1917) (the author of an unpublished work "has, probably, the right to prevent even aG!air use!l>of the work by others"). Cf. , M. Flint, A User's
Guide to [United Kingdom] Copyright ,r 10.05 (1979) ("no fair dealing with
unpublished works"); Beloff v. Pressman Ltd. , (1973] All E. R. 241, 263
(ch. 1972) (same).
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sion of the U. S. Copyright Law at 27 (H. R. Comm. Print,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. Feb. 1963) (discusion suggesting works
disseminated to the public in a form not constituting a technical "publication" should nevertheless be subject to fair use);
3 Nimmer§ 13.05, p. 13-62, n. 2. But it has never been seriously disputed that "the fact that the plaintiff's work is unpublished . . . is a factor tending to negate the defense of fair
use." Ibid. Publication of an author's expression before he
has authorized its dissemination seriously infringes the author's right to decide when and whether it will be made public, a factor not present in fair use of published works. 5 Respondents contend, however, that Congress, in including
first publication among the rights enumerated in § 106, which
are expressly subject to fair use under § 107, intended that
fair use would apply in pari materia to published and unpublished works. The Copyright Revision Act does not support
this proposition.
The Copyright Revision Act of 1976 represents the culmination of a major legislative reexamination of copyright
doctrine. See Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, ante, at--;
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., supra, at--,
n. 9 (dissenting opinion). Among its other innovations, it
eliminated publication "as a dividing line between common
law and statutory protection," House Report, at 129, extendSee, e. g. , Wheaton v. Peters , 33 U. S. (8 Pet. ) 591, 657 (1834) (distinguishing the author's common law r ight "to obtain redress against anyone
who . . . by improperly obtaining a copy [of his unpublished work] endeavors to realize a profit by its publication" from rights in a published work,
which are prescribed by statute); Press Pu b. Co. v. Monroe, 73 Fed. 196,
199 (CA2), aff'd, 164 U. S. 105 (1896); (St,a,nley v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, 221 P . 2d 73, 77-78 (Cal. 1950) (en bane); Golding v. RKO Radio
Pictures, Inc ., 193 P. 2d 153, 162 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948), ("An ·unauthorized appropriation of [an unpublished work] is not to be neutralized on
the plea that 'it is such a little one.' "), aff 'd 221 P. 2d 95 (Cal. 1950);
Fen dler v. Morosco, 253 N. Y. 281 , 171 N. E. 56, reh'g denied 254 N. Y.
563, 173 N. E . 867 (N. Y. 1930) ("Since plaintiff has not published or produced her play, perhaps any use that others made of it might be unfair.").
5

-
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ing statutory protection to all works from the time of their
creation. It also recognized for the first time a distinct statutory right of first publication, which had previously been an
element of the common law protections afforded unpublished
works. The Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary confirms that "Clause (3) of section 106, establishes the
exclusive right of publication.... Under this provision the
copyright owner would have the right to control the first public distribution of an authorized copy . . . of his work."
House Report, at 62.
Though the right of first publication, like the other rights
enumerated in § 106 is expressly made subject to the fair use
provision of§ 107, fair use analysis must always be tailored to
the individual case. House Report, at 65; 3 Nimmer
§ 13.05(A]. The nature of the interest at stake is highly relevant to whether a given use is fair. From the beginning,
those entrusted with the task of revision recognized the
"overbalancing reasons to preserve the common law protection of undisseminated works until the author or his successor chooses to disclose them." Register of Copyrights, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess., General Revision of the U. S. Copyright
Law 41 (Comm. Print 1961). The right of first publication
implicates a threshold decision by the author whether and in
what form to release his work. First publication is inherently different from other § 106 rights in that only one person
can be the first publisher; as the contract with Time illustrates , the commercial value of the right lies primarily in
exclusivity. Because the potential damage to the author
from judicially enforced "sharing" of the first publication
right with unauthorized users of his manuscript is substantial, the balance of equities in evaluating such a claim of fair
use inevitably shifts.
The Senate Report confirms that Congress intended the
unpublished nature of the work to figure prominently in fair
use analysis. In discussing fair use of photocopied materials
in the classroom the Committee Report states:

-
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"A key, though not necessarily determinative, factor in
fair use is whether or not the work is available to the potential user. If the work is "out of print" and unavailable for purchase through normal channels, the user may
have more justification for reproducing it . . . . The applicability of the fair use doctrine to unpublished works
is narrowly limited since, although the work is unavailable, this is the result of a deliberate choice on the part
of the copyright owner. Under ordinary circumstances,
the copyright owner's 'right of first publication' would
outweigh any needs of reproduction for classroom purposes." Senate Report, at 64.
Although the Committee selected photocopying of classroom
materials to illustrate fair use, it emphasized that "the same
general standards of fair use lre applicable to all kinds of uses
of copyrighted material." Id., at 65. We find unconvincing
respondent's contention that the absence of the quoted passage from the House Report indicates an intent to abandon
the traditional distinction between fair use of published and
unpublished works. It appears instead that the the fair use
discussion of photocopying of classroom materials was omitted from the final report because educators and publishers in
the interim had negotiated a set of guidleines that rendered
the discussion obsolete. House Report, at 67. The House
Report nevertheless incorporates the discussion by reference, citing to the Senate Report and stating, "[T]he Committee has reviewed this discussion, and considers it still has
value as an analysis of various aspects of the [fair use] problem." Ibid.
Even if the legislative history were entirely silent, we
would be bound to conclude from Congress's characterization
of section 107 as a "restatement" that its effect was to preserve existing law concerning fair use of unpublished works
as of other types of protected works and not to "change, narrow, or enlarge it." House Report, at 66. We conclude that
the unpublished nature of a work is "a key, though not neces-
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sarily determinative factor" tending to negate a defense of
fair use. Senate Report, at 64. See 3 Nimmer§ 13.05, n. 2.
We also find unpersuasive respondent's argument that fair
use may be made of a soon-to-be-published manuscript on the
ground that the author has demonstrated he has no interest
in nonpublication. This argument assumes that the unpublished nature of copyrighted material is only relevant to letters or other confidential writings not intended for dissemina. tion. It is true that common law copyright was often
enlisted in the service of personal privacy. See Brandeis
and Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193,
198-199 (1890). In its commercial guise, however, an author's right to choose when he will publish is no less deserving of protection. The period encompassing the work's initiation, its preparation, and its grooming for public
dissemination is a crucial one for any literary endeavor. The
Copyright Act, which accords the copyright owner the "right
to control the first public distribution" of his work, House Report, at 62, echos the common law's concern that the author
or copyright owner retain control throughout this critical
stage. See generally Comment, The Stage of Publication as
a "Fair Use" Factor: Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation
E nterprises, 58 St. John's L. Rev. 583 (1984). The obvious
benefit to author and public alike of assuring authors the leisure to develop their ideas free from fear of expropriation
outweighs any short term "news value" to be gained from
premature publication of the author's expression. See
Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 Colum L.
Rev. 983, 1004-1006 (1970) (The absolute protection the common law accorded to soon-to-be published works "[was] justified by its brevity and expedience"). The author's control of
first public distribution implicates not only his personal interest in creative control but his property interest in exploitation of prepublication rights, which are valuable in themselves and serve as a valuable adjunct to publicity and
marketing. See Belushi v. Woodward, 10 Media L. Rep.

. ·.
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(BNA) 1870 (D DC 1984) (successful marketing depends on
coordination of serialization and release to public); Marks,
Subsidiary Rights and Permissions, from C. Grannis (ed.),
What Happens in Book Publishing 230 (1967) (exploitation of
subsidiary rights is necessary to financial success of new
books). Under ordinary circumstances, the author's right to
control the first public appearance of his undisseminated expression will outweigh a claim of fair use.

B
Respondent, however, contends that First Amendment
values require a different rule under the circumstances of
this case. The thrust of the decision below is that "the scope
of[fair use] is undoubtedly wider when the information conveyed relates to matters of high public concern." Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp.,
724 F. 2d 1044, 1950 (CA2 1983) (construing Harper & Row
Pu blishers, Inc. v. Nation E nterprises , 723 F. 2d 195 (1983),
as allowing advertiser to quote Consumer Reports), cert. denied, - - U. S. - - (1984). Respondent advances the substantial public import of the subject matter of the Ford memoirs as grounds for excusing a use that would ordinarily not
pass muster as a fair use-the piracy of verbatim quotations
for the purpose of "scooping" the authorized first serialization. Respondent explains its copying of Mr. Ford's expression as essential to reporting the news story it claims the
book itself represents. In respondent's view, not only the
facts contained in Mr. Ford's memoirs, but "the precise manner in which he expressed himself was as newsworthy as
what he had to say." Brief for Respondent 39. Respondent
argues that the public's interest in learning this news as fast
as possible outweighs the right of the author to control its
first publication.
The Second Circuit noted, correctly, that copyright's
idea/expression dichotomy "strikes a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by per-

-
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mitting free communication of facts while still protecting an
author's expression." 723 F. 2d, at 203. No author may
copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates. 17 U. S. C.
§ 102 (b). See, e. g., New York Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713, 726, n.* (1971) (BRENNAN, J., concurring)
(Copyright laws are not restrictions on freedom of speech as
copyright protects only form of expression and not the ideas
expressed); 1 Nimmer § l.10[B][2]. As this Court long ago
observed, "[T]he news element-the information respecting
current events contained in the literary ·production-is not
the creation of the writer, but is a report of matters that ordinarily are publici juris; it is the history of the day." International News Service v. Associated Pres~48 U. S. 215, 234
(1918). But copyright assures those who write and publish
factual narratives such as "A Time to Heal" that that they
may at least enjoy the right to market the original expression
contained therein as just compensation for their investment.
Respondent's theory, however, would expand fair use to
effectively destroy any expectation of copyright protection in
the work of a public figure. Absent such protection, there
would be little incentive to create or profit in financing such
memoirs and the public would be denied an important source
of significant historical information. The promise of copyright would be an empty one if it could be avoided merely by
dubbing the infringement a fair use "news report" of the
book. See Wainwright Securities Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F. 2d 91 (CA21977), cert. denied, 434 U. S.
1014 (1978).
Nor does respondent assert any actual necessity for
circumventing the copyright scheme with respect to the
types of works and users at issue here. 6 Where an author
It bears noting that Congress in the Copyright Act recognized a public
interest warranting specific exemptions in a number of areas not within
traditional fair use, see, e. g. , 17 U. S. C. § 115 (compulsory license for
records); § 105 (no copyright in government works). No such exemption
6

/\
)
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and publisher have invested extensive resources in creating
an original work and are poised to release it to the public, no
legi~ate aim is served by preempting the right of first publication. The fact that the words the author has chosen to
clothe his narrative may of themselves be "newsworthy'' is
not an independent justification for unauthorized copying of
the author's expression prior to publication. To paraphrase
another recent Second Circuit decision:
"[Respondent] possessed an unfettered right to use any
factual information revealed in [the memoirs] for the
purpose of enlightening its audience, but it can claim no
need to 'bodily appropriate' [Mr. Ford's] 'expression' of
that information by utilizing portions of the actual
[manuscript]. . . . The public interest in the free flow of
information is assured by the law's refusal to recognize a
valid copyright in facts. The fair use doctrine is not a
license for corporate theft, empowering a court to ignore
a copyright whenever it determines the underlying work
contains material of possible public importance." Iowa
State University v. American Broadcasting Company,
Inc., 621 F. 2d 57, 61 (CA2 1980) (citations omitted).
Accord Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, 503 F. Supp. 1137 (SDNY 1980)
("newsworthiness" of material copied does not justify copying), aff'd 672 F. 2d 1095 (CA2), cert. denied 459 U. S. 826
(1982); Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., 506 F.
Supp. 554 (D DC 1981) (same).
In our haste to disseminate news, it should not be forgotten that the Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right
to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas. This Court
stated in Mazer v. Stein:
limits copyright in personal narratives written by public servants after
they leave government service.

,.
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"The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual efforts by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through
the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and the
useful Arts.'" 347 U. S. 201, 219 (1954).
And again in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken:
"The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a
fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate [the creation
of useful works] for the general public good." 422 U. S.
151, 156 (1976).

It is fundamentally at odds with the scheme of copyright to
accord lesser rights in those works that are of greatest importance to the public. Such a notion ignores the major
premise of copyright and injures author and public alike.
"[T]o propose that fair use be imposed whe.n ever the 'social
value [of dissemination] ... outweighs any detriment to the
artist,' would be to propose depriving copyright owners of
their right in their property precisely when they encounter
those users who could afford to pay for it." Gordon, Fair
Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis
of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L.
Rev. 1600, 1615 (1982). And as one commentator has noted,
"If every volume that was in the public interest could be pirated away by a competing publisher, ... the public [soon]
would have nothing worth reading." Sobel, Copyright and
the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm?, 19 ASCAP
Copyright Law Symp. 43, at 78 (1971). See generally Comment, Copyright and the First Amendment; Where Lie~ the
Public Interest?, 59 Tul. L. Rev. 133 (1985).
Moreover, freedom of thought and expression "includes
both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from
speaking at all." Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 714
(1977) (BURGER, C. J. ). We do not suggest this right not to
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speak would sanction abuse of the copyright owner's monopoly as an instrument to suppress facts . But in the words of
New York's Chief Judge Fuld:
"The essential thrust of the First Amendment is t o prohibit improper restraints on the voluntary public expression of ideas; it shields the man who wants to speak or
publish when others wish him to be quiet. There is necessarily, and within suitably defined areas, a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the
same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative
aspect. " Estate of Hemingway v. Random Hou se, 23
N. Y. 2d 341, 348 (1968).
Courts and commentators have recognized that copyright,
and the right of first publication in particular, serve this
countervailing First Amendment value. See Schnapper v.
Foley , 667 F . 2d 102 (CADC 1981), cert. denied U. S.
(1982); 1 Nimmer § 1. lO[B], p. 1-70, n. 24. In view of the First Amendment protections already embodied in the Copyright Act's distinction between
copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and
ideas, and the latitide for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use, we see no warrant for expanding the
doctrine of fair use to create what amounts to a public figure
exception to copyright. Whether verbatim copying from a
public figure's manuscript in a given case is or is not fair must
be judged according to the traditional equities of fair use.

qi

III
Fair use is l. mixed question of law and fact. Pacific
Southern Co f ~:c. v. Duncan, 744 F . 2d 1490, 1495, n. 8
(CAll 1984). Where the District Court has found facts sufficient to evaluate each of the statutory factors , an appellate
court "need not remand for further factfinding .. . [but] may
conclude as a matter of law that [the challenegd use] do[es]
not qualify as a fair use of the copyrighted work. " Id. , at
1495. Thus whether The Nation article constitutes fair use

-
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under § 107 must be reviewed in light of the principles discussed above. The factors enumerated in the section are not
meant to be exclusive: "[S]ince the doctrine is an equitable
rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible,
and each case raising the question must be decided on its own
facts." House Report, at 65. The four factors identified by
Congress as especially relevant in determining whether the
use was fair are: (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2)
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; (4) the effect on the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work. We address each one separately.
Purpose of the Use. The Second Circuit correctly identified news reporting as the general purpose of The Nation's
use. News reporting is one of the enumerateq purposes
sanctioned by § 107 as presumptively advancing the public interest in disseminatio~ of information through fair use. We
agree with the Second Circuit that the trial court erred in fixing on whether the information contained in the memoir was
actually new to the public. As Judge Meskill wisely noted,
"[c]ourts should be chary of deciding what is and what is not
news. " 723 F. 2d, at 215 (Meskill, J. , dissenting). Cf.,
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 345-346 (1974).
The fact that an article arguably is "news" and therefore is
presumed to be a productive use is simply one factor in a fair
use analysis.
The fact that a publication was commercial as opposed to
non-profit is a separate factor that tends to weigh against a
finding of fair use. "[E]very commercial use of copyrighted
material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright. "
Son y Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., su pra, at--.
In arguing that the purpose of news reporting is not purely
commercial, The Nation misses the point entirely. The crux
of the profit/non-profit distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands
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to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the customary price. See Roy E xport Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, 503 F. Supp.
1137, 1144 (SDNY 1980), aff'd 672 F. 2d 1095 (CA2 1980),
cert. denied 459 U. S. 826 (1982); 3 Nimmer § 13.05[A][l],
n. 25.3.
In evaluating character and purpose we cannot ignore The
Nation's stated purpose of scooping the forthcoming hardcover and Time abstracts, thereby "mak[ing] news" or creating a "news event." App. to Petn for Cert. C-27. The Nation's use had not merely the incidental effect but the
intended purpose of supplanting the copyright holder's commercially valuable right of first publication. See Meredith
Corp. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686,
690 (SDNY), (purpose of text was to compete with original),
aff'd 500 F. 2d 1221 (CA21974). Also relevant to the "character" of the use is "the propriety of the defendant's conduct." 3 Nimmer § 13.05[AJ, at 63-72. "Fair use presupposes 'good faith' and 'fair dealing."' Time , Inc. v. Bernard
Geis Associates, 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (SDNY 1968), quoting
Schulman, Fair Use and the Revision of the Copyright Act,
53 Iowa L. Rev. 832 (1968). The Nation knowingly exploited a purloined manuscript. Unlike the typical claim of
fair use, The Nation cannot offer up even the fiction of consent as justification. Like its competitor newsweekly, it was
free to bid for the right of abstracting excerpts from~ "A
Time to Heal." Fair use "distinguishes between a true
scholar and a chiseler who infringes a work for personal
profit."' Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp ., supra, at 97, quoting from Hearings on Bills for
the General Revision of the Copyright Law Before House
Comm. on Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 8, pt . .3, at
1706 (1966) (Statement of John Schulman).
Nature of the Copyrighted Work. Second, the Act directs
attention to the nature of the copyrighted work. "A Time to
Heal" may be characterized as an unpublished historical nar-

/;
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rative or autobiography. The law generally recognizes a
greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy. See Gorman, Fact or Fancy: Implications
for Copyright, 29 J. Cop. Soc. 560, 561 (1981-1982).
"[E]ven within the field of fact works, there are gradations as to the relative proportion of fact and fancy.
One may move from sparsely embellished maps and directories to elegantly written biography. The extent to
which one must permit expressive language to be copied,
in order to assure dissemination of the underlying facts,
will thus vary from case to case." Id., at 563.
Some of the briefer quotes from the memoir are arguably
necessary adequately to convey the facts; for example, Mr.
Ford's characterization of the White 'House tapes as the
"smoking gun" is perhaps so integral to the idea expressed as
to be inseparable from it. Cf. 1 Nimmer§ l. l0[C]. But The
Nation did not stop at isolated phrases and instead excerpted
subjective descriptions and portraits of public figures whose
power lies in the author's individualized expression. Such
use, focusing on the most expressive elements of the work,
exceeds that necessary to disseminate the facts.
The fact that a work is unpublished is a critical element of
its "nature." 3 Nimmer§ 13.05[AJ; Comment, supra, 58 St.
John's L. Rev., at 613. Our prior discussion establishes that
the scope of fair use is narrower with respect to unpublished
works. While even substantial quotations might qualify as
fair use in a review of a published work or a news account of a
speech that had been delivered to the public or disseminated
to the press, see House Report, at 65, the author's right to
choose when and how he will first make public his expression
weighs against such use of the work before its release.
Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used. Next,
the Act directs us to examine the amount and substantiality
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole. In absolute terms, the words actually quoted were
an insubstantial portion of "A Time to Heal." The district
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court, however, found that "[T]he Nation took what was essentially the heart of the book." 557 F. Supp., at 1072. We
believe the Court of Appeals erred in overruling the district
judge's evaluation of the qualitative nature of the taking.
See, e. g., Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1145 (taking of 55
seconds out of one hour and twenty-nine minute film deemed
qualitatively substantial). A Time editor described the
chapters on the pardon as "the most interesting and moving
parts of the whole manuscript." Petrs' Reply Br. 16, n. 8.
The portions actually quoted were selected by Mr. Navasky
as among the most powerful passages in those chapters.
Stripped to the verbatim quotes, 7 the direct takings from the
unpublished manuscript constitute at least 13% of the infringing article. See Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F. 2d 1061, 1071
(CA2 1977) (copyrighted letters constituted less than 1% of
infringing work but were prominently featured). The Nation article is structured around the quoted excerpts which
serve ·as its dramatic focal points. See Appendix, infra. In
view of the expressive value of the excerpts and their key
role in the infringing work, we cannot agree with the Second
Circuit that the "magazine took a meager, indeed an infinitesimal amount of Ford's original language." 723 F. 2d, at 209.
See Appendix, infra, at - - . The Court of Appeals found that only
"approximately 300 words" were copyrightable but did not specify which
words. The court's discussion, however, indicates it excluded from consideration those portions of The Nation's piece that, although copied verbatim from Ford's manuscript, were quotes attributed by Ford to third persons and quotations from government documents. At oral argument,
counsel for The Nation did not dispute that direct quotes and very close
paraphrase could constitute infringement. Tr. 24-25. Thus the Appendix identifies as potentially infringing only verbatim quotes or extremely
close paraphrase and excludes from consideration government documents
and words attributed to third persons. The Appendix is not intended to
endorse any particular rule of copyrightability but is intended merely as an
aid to facilitate our discussion.
1
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Effect on the Market. Finally, the Act focuses on "the effect of the use on the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work." This last factor is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use. 8 See 3 Nimmer
§ 13.05[A] p. 13-76, and cases cited therein.
"Fair use,
when properly applied, is limited to copying by others which
does not materially impair the marketability of the work
which is copied." 1 Nimmer § 1,l0[D], p. 1-87. The trial
court found not merely a potential but an actual effect on the
market. Time's cancellation of its projected serialization and
its refusal to pay the $12,500 were the direct effect of the infringement. The Court of Appeals rejected this fact finding
as clearly erroneous, noting that the record did not establish
a causal relation between Time's nonperformance and respondent's unauthorized publication of Mr. Ford's expression
as opposed to the facts taken from the memoirs. We disagree. Rarely will a case of copyright infringement present
such clear cut evidence of actual damage. Petitioners assured Time that there would be no other authorized publication of any portion of the unpublished manuscript prior to
April 23, 1979. Any publication of material from chapters 1
and 3 would permit Time to renegotiate its final payment.
Time cited The Nation's article, which contained verbatim
quotes from the unpublished manuscript, as a reason for its
nonperformance. Petitioners established a prima facie case
Economists who have addressed the issue believe the fair use exception should come into play only in those situations in which the market fails
or the price the copyright holder would ask is near zero. See, e. g., Brennan, Harper & Row v. The Nation, Copyrightability and Fair Use, Dept.
of Justice Economic Policy Office Discussion Paper, 13-17 (1984); Gordon,
Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1615 (1982).
As the facts here demonstrate, there is a fully functioning market that encourages the creation and dissemination of memoirs of public figures. In
the economists' view, permitting "fair use" to displace normal copyright
channels disrupts the copyright market without a commensurate public
benefit.
8
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of actual damage that respondent failed to rebut. See Stevens Linen Association.inc. v. Mastercraft Corp., 656 F. 2d
11, 15 (CA2 1981). Ttie trial court properly awarded actual
damages and profits. See 17 U. S. C. § 505.
More important, to negate fair use one need only show that
if the challenged use "should become widespread, it would
adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted
work." Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., supra,
at - - (emphasis added); id., at--, and n. 36 (collecting
cases) (dissenting opinion). This inquiry must take account
not only of harm to the original but also of harm to the market for derivative works. See Iowa State University Research Foundation v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.
2d 57 (CA2 1980); Meeropol v. Nizer, supra, at 1070; Roy Export v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 503 F. Supp. 1137,
1146. "If the defendant's work adversely affects the value of
any of the rights in the copyrighted work (in this case the adaptation [and serialization] right) the use is not fair." 3
Nimmer§ 13.05[B], pp. 13-77-13-78.
It is undisputed that the factual material in the balance of
The Nation's article, besides the verbatim quotes at issue
here, was drawn exclusively from the chapters on the pardon. The excerpts were employed as featured episodes in a
story about the Nixon pardon-precisely the use petit6ners
had licensed to Time. The borrowing of these vlrbatim
quotes from the unpublished manuscript lent The Nation's
piece a special air of authenticity-as N avasky expressed it,
the reader would know it was Ford speaking and not The Nation. App. 300c. Thus it directly competed for a share of
the market for prepublication excerpts. The Senate Report
states:
"With certain special exceptions ... a use that supplants
any part of the normal market for a copyrighted work
would ordinarily be considered an infringement." Id /at
65.
.
.
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Placed in a broader perspective, a fair use doctrine that permits extensive prepublication quotations from an unreleased
manuscript without the copyright owner's consent poses substantial potential for damage to the marketability of first
serialization rights in general. "Isolated instances of minor
infringements, when multiplied many times, become in the
aggregate a major inroad on copyright that must be prevented." Senate Report, at 65.
The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that The Nation's
use of the copyrighted material was excused by the public's
interest in the subject matter. It erred, as well, in overlooking the unpublished nature of the work and the resulting impact on the potential market for first serial rights of permitting unauthorized prepublication excerpts under the rubric of
fair use. Finally, in finding the taking "infinitesimal," the
Court of Appeals accorded too little weight to the qualitative
importance of the quoted passages of original expression. In
sum, the traditional doctrine of fair use, as embodied in the
Copyright Act, does not sanction the use made by The Nation
or these copyrighted materials. Any copyright infringer
may claim to benefit the public by increasing public access to
the copyrighted work. See Pacific and Southern Co. v.
Duncan, 744 F. 2d 1490, 1499-1500 (CAll 1984). But Congress has not designed, and we see no warrant for judicially
imposing, a "compulsory license" permitting unfettered
access to the unpublished copyrighted expression of public
figures.
IV
The Nation conceded that its verbatim copying of some 300
words of direct quotation from the Ford manuscript would
constitute an infringement unless excused as a fair use. Because we find that The Nation's use of these verbatim excerpts from the unpublished manuscript was not a fair use,
we do not address the appellate court's conclusions concerning various issues of copyrightability. We observe, however, that the law concerning the copyrightability of factual
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narrative and its component parts is currently unsettled and
we believe these issues of copyrightability are best left to further development by the courts, on full factual records and in
the context of cases that turn on the such issues and not, as
does this one, on the doctrine of fair use.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT
The portions of The Nation article which were copied verbatim from "A
Time to Heal," excepting quotes from government documents and quotes
attributed by Ford to third persons, are identified in bold face in the text.
Seen. 7, ante, at--. The corresponding passages in the Ford manuscript are footnoted.

THE FORD MEMOIRS
•
BEHIND THE NIXON PARDON
In his memoirs, A Time To Heal, which Harper & Row will
publish in late May or early June, former President Gerald R.
Ford says that the idea of giving a blanket pardon to Richard
M. Nixon was raised before Nixon resigned from the Presidency by Gen. Alexander Haig, who was then the White
House chief of staff.
Ford also writes that, but for a misunderstanding, he
might have selected Ronald Reagan as his 1976 running
mate, that Washington lawyer Edward Bennett Williams, a
Democrat, was his choice for head of the Central Intelligence
Agency, that Nixon was the one who first proposed Rockefeller for Vice President, and that he regretted his "cowardice" 1 in allowing Rockefeller to remove himself from Vice
Presidential contention. Ford also describes his often
prickly relations with Henry Kissinger.
The Nation obtained the 655-page typescript before publication. Advance excerpts from the book will appear in Time
in mid-April and in The Reader's Digest thereafter. Although the initial print order has not been decided, the figure
is tentatively set at 50,000; it could change, depending upon
the public reaction to the serialization.
Ford's account of the Nixon pardon contains significant
new detail on the negotiations and considerations that surrounded it. According to Ford's version, the subject was
I was angry at myself for showing cowardice in not saying to the ultraconservatives, "It's going to be Ford and Rockefeller, whatever the consequences." p. 496.
1
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first broached to him by General Haig on August 1, 1974, a
week before Nixon resigned. General Haig revealed that
the newly transcribed White House tapes were the equivalent of the "smoking gun" 2 and that Ford should prepare
himself to become President.
Ford was deeply hurt by Haig's revelation: "Over the past
several months Nixon had repeatedly assured me that he
was not involved in Watergate, that the evidence would
prove his innocence, that the matter would fade from
view." 3 Ford had believed him, but he let Haig explain the
President's alternatives.
He could "ride it out" 4 or he could resign, Haig said. He
then listed the different ways Nixon might resign and concluded by pointing out that Nixon could agree to leave in return for an agreement that the new President, Ford,
would pardon him. 5 Although Ford said it would be improper for him to make any recommendation, he basically
agreed with Haig's assessment and adds, "Because of his
references to the pardon authority, I did ask Haig about
the extent of a President's pardon power." 6
"It's my understanding from a White House lawyer," Haig
replied, "That a President does have authority to grant a pardon even before criminal action has been taken against an
individual."
[l]t contained the so-called smoking gun. p. 3.
Over the past several months Nixon had repeatedly assured me that he
was not involved in Watergate, that the evidence would prove his innocence, that the matter would fade from view. p. 7.
4
The first [option] was that he could try to "ride it out" by letting impeachment take its natural course through the House and the Senate trial,
fighting against conviction all the way. p. 4.
5
Finally, Haig said that according to some on Nixon's White House
staff, Nixon could agree to leave in return for an agreement that the new
President-Gerald Ford-would pardon him. p. 5.
• Because of his references to pardon authority, I did ask Haig about the
extent of a President's pardon po.wer. pp. 5-6.
2

3
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But because Ford had neglected to tell Haig he thought the
idea of a resignation conditioned on a pardon was improper,
his press aide, Bob Hartmann, suggested that Haig might
well have returned to the White House and told President
Nixon that he had mentioned the idea and Ford seemed comfortable with it. "Silence implies assent."
Ford then consulted with White House special counsel
James St. Clair, who had no advice one way or the other on
the matter more than pointing out that he was not the lawyer
who had given Haig the opinion on the pardon. Ford also
discussed the matter with Jack Marsh, who felt that the mention of a pardon in this context was a "time bomb," and with
Bryce Harlow, who had served six Presidents and who
agreed that the mere mention of a pardon "could cause a
lot of trouble." 7
As a result of these various conversations, Vice President
Ford called Haig and read him a written statement: "I want
you to understand that I have no intention of recommending
what the President should do about resigning or not resigning and that nothing we talked about yesterday afternoon
should be given any consideration in whatever decision the
President may wish to make."
Despite what Haig had told him about the "smoking gun"
tapes, Ford told a Jackson, Mich., luncheon audience later
in the day that the President was not guilty of an impeachable offense. "Had I said otherwise at the moment," he writes, "the whole house of cards might have
collapsed." 8
In justifying the pardon, Ford goes out of his way to assure
the reader that "compassion for Nixon as an individual
7
Only after I had finished did [Bryce Harlow] let me know in no uncertain terms that he agreed with Bob and Jack, that the mere mention of the
pardon option could cause a lot of trouble in the days ahead. p. 18.
8
During the luncheon I repeated my assertion that the President was
not guilty of an impeachable offense. Had I said otherwise at that moment, the whole house of cards might have collapsed. p. 21.
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hadn't prompted my decision at all." 9 Rather, he did it
because he had "to get the monkey off my back one way or
the other." 10
The precipitating factor in his decision was a series of
secret meetings his general counsel, Phil Buchen, held with
Watergate Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski in the Jefferson
Hotel, where they were both staying at the time. Ford attributes Jaworski with providing some "crucial" information 11-i. e., that Nixon was under investigation in ten
separate areas, and that the court process could "take
years." 12 Ford cites a memorandum from J aworski's assistant, Henry S. Ruth Jr., as being especially persuasive.
Ruth had written:
"If you decide to recommend indictment I think it is fair
and proper to notify Jack Miller and the White House sufficiently in advance so that pardon action could be taken before
the indictment." He went on to say: "One can make a strong
argument for leniency and if President Ford is so ~nclined, I
think he ought to do it early rather than late."
Ford decided that court proceedings against Nixon might
take six years, that Nixon "would not spend time quietly in
San Clemente," 13 and "it would be virtually impossible
for me to direct public attention on anything else." 14
Buchen, Haig and Henry Kissinger agreed with him.
Hartmann was not so sure.
But compassion for Nixon as an individual ha<ln't prompted my decision
at all. p. 266.
10
I had to get the monkey off my back one way or another. p. 236.
11
Jaworski gave Phil several crucial pieces of information. p. 246.
12
And if the verdict was Guilty, one had to assume that Nixon would appeal. That process would take years. p. 248.
13
The entire process would no doubt require years: a minimum of two, a
maximum of six. And Nixon would not spend time quietly in San Clemente. p. 238.
1
• It would be virtually impossible for me to direct public attention on
~nything else. p. 239.
9
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Buchen wanted to condition the pardon on Nixon agreeing
to settle the question of who would retain custody and control
over the tapes and Presidential papers that might be relevant
to various Watergate proceedings, but Ford was reluctant to
do that.
At one point a plan was considered whereby the Presidential materials would be kept in a vault at a Federal facility
near San Clemente, but the vault would require two keys to
open it. One would be retained by the General Services Administration, the other by Richard Nixon.
The White House did, however, want Nixon to make a full
confession on the occasion of his pardon or, at a minimum, express true contrition. Ford tells of the negotiation with Jack
Miller, Nixon's lawyer, over the wording of Nixon's statement. But as Ford reports Miller's response. Nixon was
not likely to yield. "His few meetings with his client had
shown him that the former President's ability to discuss
Watergate objectively was almo.st nonexistent." 15
The statement they really wanted was never forthcoming.
As scion as Ford's emissary arrived in San Clemente, he was
confronted with an ultimatum by Ron Zeigler, Nixon's former press secretary. "Lets get one thing straight immediately," Zeigler said. "President Nixon is not issuing any
statement whatsoever regarding Watergate, whether Jerry
Ford pardons him or not." Zeigler proposed a draft, which
was turned down on the ground that "no statement would
be better than that." 16 They went through three more
drafts before they agreed on the statement Nixon finally
made, which stopped far short of a full confession.
When Ford aide Benton Becker tried to explain to Nixon
that acceptance of a pardon was an admission of guilt, he felt
15
But [Miller] wasn't optimistic about getting such a statement. His few
meetings with his client had shown him that the former President's ability
to discuss Watergate objectively was almost nonexistent. p. 246.
16
When Zeigler asked Becker what he thought of it, Becker replied that
no statement would be better than that. p. 251.
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the President wasn't really listening.
Instead, Nixon
wanted to talk about the Washington Redskins. And when
Becker left, Nixon pressed on him some cuff links and a tiepin
"out of my own jewelry box."
Ultimately, Ford sums up the philosophy underlying his
decision as one he picked up as a student at Yale Law School
many years before. "I learned that public policy often
took precedence over a rule of law. Although I respected
the tenet that no man should be above the law, public policy demanded that I put Nixon-and Watergate-behind
us as quickly as possible." 17
Later, when Ford learned that Nixon's phlebitis had acted
up and his health was seriously impaired, he debated
whether to pay the ailing former President a visit. "If I
made the trip it would remind everybody of Watergate and
the pardon. If I didn't, people would say I lacked compassion." 18 Ford went:
He was stretched out flat on his back. There were
tubes in his nose and mouth, and wires led from his arms,
chest and legs to machines with orange lights that blinked
on and off. His face was ashen, and I thought I had never
seen anyone closer to death. 19
The manuscript made available to The Nation includes
many references to Henry Kissinger and other personalities
who played a major role during the Ford years.
Years before, at Yale Law School, I'd learned that public policy often
took precedence over a rule of law. Although I respected the tenet that
no man should be above the law, public policy demanded that I put Nixonand Watergate-behind us as quickly as possible. p. 256.
1
• My staff debated whether or not I ought to visit Nixon at the Long
Beach Hospital, only half an hour away. If I made the trip, it would remind everyone of Watergate and the pardon. If I didn't , people would say
I lacked compassion. I ended their debate as soon as I found out it had
begun. Of course I would go. p. 298.
1
There were tubes in his nose
• He was stretched out flat on his back.
and mouth, and wires led from his arms, chest and legs to machines with
11
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On Kissinger. Immediately after being informed by
Nixon of his intention to resign, Ford returned to the Executive Office Building and phoned Henry Kissinger to let him
know how he felt. "Henry," he said, "I need you. The
country needs you. I want you to stay. I'll do everything I can to work with you." 20
"Sir," Kissinger replied, "it is my job to get along with you
and not yours to get along with me."
"We'll get along," Ford said. "I know we'll get along."
Referring to Kissinger's joint jobs as Secretary of State and
National Security Adviser to the President, Ford said, "I
don't want to make any change. I think it's worked out
well, so let's keep it that way." 21
Later Ford did make the change and relieved Kissinger of
his responsibilities as National Security Adviser at the same
time that he fired James Schlesinger as Secretary of Defense.
Shortly thereafter, he reports, Kissinger presented him with
a "draft" letter of resignation, which he said Ford could call
upon at will if he felt he needed it to quiet dissent from conservatives who objected to Kissinger's role in the firing of
Schlesinger.
On John Connally. When Ford was informed that Nixon
wanted him to replace Agnew, he told the President he had
"no ambition to hold office after January 1977." 22 Nixon
replied that that was good since his own choice for his runorange lights that blinked on and off. His face was ashen, and I thought I
had never seen anyone cloer to death. p. 299.
20
"Henry," I said when he came on the line, "I need you. The country
needs you. I want you to stay. I'll do everything I can to work with
you." p. 46.
21
We'll get along," I said. "I know we can get along." We talked about
the two hats he wore, as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor
to the President. "I don't want to make any change," I said. "I think it's
worked out well, so let's keep it that way." p. 46.
22
I told him about my promise to Betty and said that I had no ambitions
to hold office after January 1977. p. 155.
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ning mate in 1976 was John Connally. "He'd be excellent,"
observed Nixon. Ford says he had "no problem with that."
On the Decision to Run Again. Ford was, he tells us, so
sincere in his intention not to run again that he thought he
would announce it and enhance his credibility in the country
and the Congress, as well as keep the promise he had made to
his wife, Betty.
Kissinger talked him out of it. "You can't do that. It
would be disastrous from a foreign policy point of view. For
the next two and a half years foreign governments would
know that they were dealing with a lame-duck President.
All our initiatives would be dead in the water, and I wouldn't
be able to implement your foreign policy. It would probably
have the same consequences in dealing with the Congress on
domestic issues. You can't reassert the authority of the
Presidency if you leave yourself hanging out on a dead limb.
You've got to be an affirmative President."
On David Kennerly, the White House photographer.
Schlesinger was arguing with Kissinger and Ford over the
appropriate response to the seizure of the Mayaguez . At
issue was whether airstrikes against the Cambodians were
desirable; Schlesinger was opposed to bombings. Following
a lull in the conversation, Ford reports, up spoke the 30-yearold White House photographer, David Kennerly, who had
been taking pictures for the last hour.
"Has anyone considered," Kennerly asked, "that this might
be the act of a local Cambodian commander who has just
taken it into his own hands to stop any ship that comes by?"
Nobody, apparently, had considered it, but following several
seconds of silence, Ford tells us, the view carried the day.
"Massive airstrikes would constitute overkill," Ford
decided. "It would be far better to have Navy' jets from
the Coral Sea make surgical strikes against specific
targets." 23'
Subjectively, I felt that what Kennerly had said made a lot of sense.
Massive airstrikes would constitute overkill. It would be far better to
23
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On Nixon's Character. Nixon's flaw, according to Ford,
was "pride." "A terribly proud man," writes Ford, "he
detested weakness in other people. I'd often heard him
speak disparagingly of those whom he felt to be soft and
expedient. (Curiously, he didn't feel that the press was
weak. Reporters, he sensed, were his adversaries. He
knew they didn't like him, and he responded with reciprocal disdain.)" 24
Nixon felt disdain for the Democratic leadership of the
House, whom he also regarded .as weak. According to Ford,
"His pride and personal contempt for weakness had overcome his ability to tell the difference between right and
wrong," 25 all of which leads Ford to wonder whether Nixon
had known in advance about Watergate.
On hearing Nixon's resignation speech, which Ford felt
lacked an adequate plea for forgiveness, he was persuaded
that "Nixon was out of touch with reality." 26
In February of last year, when The Washington Post obtained and printed advance excerpts from H. R. Haldeman's
memoir, The Ends of Power, on the eve of its publication by
Times Books, The New York Times called The Post's feat "a
second-rate burglary."
rhe Post disagreed, claiming that its coup represented
"first-rate enterprise" and arguing that it had burglarized
nothing, that publication of the Haldeman memoir came
have Navy jets from the Coral Sea make surgical strikes against specific
targets in the vicinity of Kompong Som. p. 416.
24
In Nixon's case, that flaw was pride. A terribly proud man, he detested weakness in other people. I'd often heard him speak disparagingly
of those whom he felt to be soft and expedient. (Curiously, he didn't feel
that the press was weak. Reporters, he sensed, were his adversaries.
He knew they didn't like him, and he responded with reciprocal disdain.)
p. 53.
25
His pride and personal contempt for weakness had overcome his ability
to tell the difference between right and wrong. p. 54.
26
The speech lasted fifteen minutes, and at the end I was convinced
Nixon was out of touch with reality. p. 57.
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under the Fair Comment doctrine long recognized by the
courts, and that "There is a fundamental journalistic principle
here-a First Amendment principle that was central to the
Pentagon Papers case."
In the issue of The Nation dated May 5, 1979, our special
Spring Books number, we will discuss some of the ethical
problems raised by the issue of disclosure.
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M'E~ORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Lynda

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Dec. 27, 1984

83-1632 Harper

&

Row

Sally will give you a copy of my dictated rough
draft of a letter to ,Justice O'Connor.

You have my author-

ity to make appropriate changes in my <lraft, and to have the
letter circulated to the Conference on Thursday.

T wou1a

like to get it in circulation before other Justices take a
position.

If you think my letter is too stronq in part, vou

have my a9proval of re-F.raming it.

We must keep in mind,

however, what I will write if Justlce o•ronnor leaves the
opinion in substantially its present form.

L .F.P., Jr .
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JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL. JR .

December 27, 1984
83-1632 Harper

&

Row v. Nation Enterprises

Dear Sandra:
I have read your opinion with special interest,
and think your disposition of the "fair use" issue is extremely well written. At least for me, it is totally convincing.
As I read the opinion, I understood that you were
assuming the validity of the copyright. In Part IV (pp. 2526), however, you expressly decline to address the "issues
of copyrightability".
I may have said at Conference that we could assume
CA2 was correct on the copyright issues and just decide the
fair use question. On further reflection, I think we should
reverse CA2's holding, as I understand it, that only the
300/400 words of President Ford were copyrightable. If only
selected quotes of a biographer's personal reflections on
events are protected, the writing of biography would be seriously chilled. Churchill's great autobiographies are
filled with the great facts of history. My understanding is
that they are no less protected by copyrights throughout the
western world, and by copyrights that are not limited to
Churchill's reflections. This is not to say, of course,
that the facts themselves - out of the context of the autobiography - are subject to copyright. Of course, they are
not.
In sum, Sandra, the copyright issues are presented
by this case, and I think we should decide them. The case
properly affords the Court an opportunity to establish as a
matter of copyright law that an effort like The Nation's in
this case simply to "steal" two years of work by a biographer is a gross violation of copyright laws and contrary to
the public interest.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference
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JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR .

December 27, 1984
83-1632 Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises
Dear Sandra:
I have read your opinion with special interest,
and think your disposition of the "fair use" issue is extremely well written. At least for me, it is totally convincing.
As I read the opinion, I understood that you were
assuming the validity of the copyright. In Part IV (pp. 2526), however, you expressly decline to address the "issues
of copyrightability".
I may have said at Conference that we could assume
CA2 was correct on the copyright issues and just decide the
fair use question. On further reflection, I think we should
reverse CA2's holding, as I understand it, that only the
300/400 words of President Ford were copyrightable. If only
selected quotes of a biographer's personal reflections on
events are protected, the writing of biography would be seriously chilled. Churchill's great autobiographies are
filled with the great facts of history. My understanding is
that they are no less protected by copyrights throughout the
western world, and by copyrights that are not limited to
Churchill's reflections. This is not to say, of course,
that the facts themselves - out of the context of the autobiography - are subject to copyright. Of course, they are
not.
In sum, Sandra, the copyright issues are presented
by this case, and I think we should decide them. The case
properly affords the Court an opportunity to establish as a
matter of copyright law that an effort like The Nation's in
this case simply to "steal" two years of work by a biographer is a gross violation of copyright laws and contrary to
the public interest.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference
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CHAMl!IERS Of"

JUSTICE

w.. . J .

BRENNAN, JR.

December 27, 1984

No. 83-1632
Harper & Row, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises, et al.

Dear Sandra,
I'll circulate a dissent in due
course.

I'm sorry, but it may take me a

while.
Sincerely,

f,~
Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference

V

.Supumt (!fourt of tlft ~ h i\bdts
'IIJasJringhtn. ~.
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CHAMBE:RS OF"

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

December 27, 1984

Re:

No. 83-1632-Harper

&

Row v. Nation Enterprises

Dear Sandra:
I await the dissent.
Sincerely,

r.,1,1.
T.M.

Justice O'Connor
cc:

The Conference
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December 28, 1984

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 83-1632, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enter£rises

Dear Sandra:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

J:1-Justice O'Connor
cc: The Conference

"~~4--z,-:~.
~
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL

From:
Re:

Lynda
No. 83-1632 - Harper

&

Row v. Nation Enterprises

As you will see from the attached letter to the
Conference, I made some substantial changes to your draft letter.
After reviewing your Conference notesl the opinions below, and
the briefs, it seemed to me that th~

of the copyright
-lidity
---------c.:--

on

Ford's book--in the sense of proper registration, etc., was not
really at issue.

-------------

Therefore, I minimized the letter's focus on

that point and emphasized instead what seemed to me to be the
more crucial question, to which you had alluded at Conference, of

Nb

whether to assume CA2 was correct in holding only the 300-400
~

words protected by copyright, or to reverse CA2 on that holding,
as well.
position.

I hope that my changes did not misrepresent your

01:,

I understood, however, that you wanted ~he letter to

circulate yesterday, so I did the best I could. -

M

I learned today that Justice O'Connor will not be in
until next week.

I spoke to her clerk about the opinion, who

told me that there were two primary reasons for not addressing
the copyright issues.

First, once she got into the record, it

appeared that the DC's factual findings were too skimpy for this
Court to do a proper job.

Second, she did not believe Justice

-

-

O'Connor had a Court to reverse CA2's holding on the copyright
issues, for several Justices who were in favor of reversing on
the fair use point were in favor of affirming on the copyright
holding.

In any event, I suggested that at least a

reorganization of the opinion, to explain more fully the
relationship between the copyright issues and the fair use
question, with something about the copyright issues up front,
might make the opinion a little more palatable, although of
course, I said I could not speak for what you would want done.
Hope this all meets with your approval.

Let me know if

you want me to do something further at this point.

J..bpe yatA-, ~
~

r-

~

F4

~ ~
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CHAMBERS OF
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January 2, 1985

Re:

83-1632

Harper

&

Row v. Nation Enterprises

Dear Lewis,
Thank you for your letter concerning this case.
I
share your view that the Court of Appeals erred not only as
to its treatment of fair use, but also in its treatment of
copyrightability. As you will recall, at Conference I
shared the Chief's view that more than merely the words
underlined in the Appendix to the draft were copyrightable
and were infringed.
I thought "long and hard" about how to
approach the opinion with respect to the copyrightability
issue. As I count the votes, I think there are an
insufficient number for a Court on my view of the
copyrightability aspect in this case.
It is likely to be
only a 5/4 decision even if we limit it to the fair use
question. The fair use issue is dispositive even if we
assume arguendo that only the minimum number of words
admittedly copied directly constituted the infringement.
If we were to address the copyrightability issue
in this case, because neither the District Court nor the
Court of Appeals made some of the necessary findings, a
remand would be necessary. The District Court adopted a
"totality" approach to copyrightability. Thus, neither the
trial nor the appellate court really addressed the question
whether an author's reconstruction of conversations is
copyrightable. A majority of courts and commentators adopt
the view that an author's reconstruction of dialogue
constitutes protected expression, although verbatim quotes
from a stenographic transcript are not. See 1 Nimmer
§2.ll[B] at 2-160, N.11. Much of the quoted material in The
Nation's article purports to be words spoken by persons
other than Ford. The trial court, however, "decline[d] to
enter the thicket of deciding which statements were exact
quotations - and therefore not protected by copyright - and
which were merely reconstructions of statements pieced
together by Ford - and therefore copyrightable." Petn B-11.
"The Court of Appeals apparently assumed that the quotations
were literal, although in most instances it would seem that
recollections of statements made by others in the past must
of necessity involve reconstruction rather than literal
repetition." 1 Nimmer §2.ll[B], at 2-161, n.11 (discussing
this case).

-

.•

-

-

2 -

Even assuming the Court of Appeals departed from
some well established principles in dealing with the
copyrightability issue, I think it is advisable to limit our
opinion in this case to the fair use issue which is
dispositive. In view of the lack of votes, as well as the
absence of adequate factfinding below, I think it best to
save the copyrightability issue for another day. I hope you
will feel comfortable with the present more limited
approach.
Sincerely,

~~

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

January 2, 1985

Re:

83-1632

Harper

&

Row v. Nation Enterprises

Dear Lewis,
Thank you for your letter concerning this case.
I
share your view that the Court of Appeals erred not only as
to its treatment of fair use, but also in its treatment of
copyrightability. As you will recall, at Conference I
shared the Chief's view that more than merely the words
underlined in the Appendix to the draft were copyrightable
and were infringed.
I thought "long and hard" about how to
approach the opinion with respect to the copyrightability
issue. As I count the votes, I think there are an
insufficient number for a Court on my view of the
copyrightability aspect in this case.
It is likely to be
only a 5/4 decision even if we limit it to the fair use
question. The fair use issue is dispositive even if we
assume arguendo that only the minimum number of words
admittedly copied directly constituted the infringement.
If we were to address the copyrightability issue
in this case, because neither the District Court nor the
Court of Appeals made some of the necessary findings, a
remand would be necessary. The District Court adopted a
"totality" approach to copyrightability. Thus, neither the
trial nor the appellate court really addressed the question
whether an author's reconstruction of conversations is
copyrightable. A majority of courts and commentators adopt
the view that an author's reconstruction of dialogue
constitutes protected expression, although verbatim quotes
from a stenographic transcript are not. See 1 Nimmer
§2.ll[B] at 2-160, N.11. Much of the quoted material in The
Nation's article purports to be words spoken by persons
other than Ford. The trial court, however, "decline[d] to
enter the thicket of deciding which statements were exact
quotations - and therefore not protected by copyright - and
which were merely reconstructions of statements pieced
together by Ford - and therefore copyrightable." Petn B-11.
"The Court of Appeals apparently assumed that the quotations
were literal, although in most instances it would seem that
recollections of statements made by others in the past must
of necessity involve reconstruction rather than literal
repetition." 1 Nimmer §2.ll[B], at 2-161, n.11 (discussing
this case).

-

.

-

-
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Even assuming the Court of Appeals departed from
some well established principles in dealing with the
copyrightability issue, I think it is advisable to limit our
opinion in this case to the fair use issue which is
dispositive. In view of the lack of votes, as well as the
absence of adequate factfinding below, I think it best to
save the copyrightability issue for another day. I hope you
will feel comfortable with the present more limited
approach.
Sincerely,

s~
Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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JUST ICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

January 2, 1985

Re:

83-1632 - Harper & Row v. Nation
Enterprises

Dear Sandra:
Your opinion is extremely persuasive. Since I
tentatively voted the other way at Conference,
however, I shall wait for other writing.
Respectfully,

j ll
Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

January 3, 1985

Re:

r

No. 83-1632 - Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enterprises

Dear Sandra,
I have some of the same problems that Lewis indicated
in his memo December 27.
I see no real problem about
ultimately joining you.

Justice O'Connor
cc:

Justice Powell

,

-
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

January 4, 1985

Re:

No. 83-1632

Harper & Row v. Reader's Digest

Dear Sandra,
Please join me.

Sincerely~

Justice O'Connor
cc:

The Conference

-

-

-

lgs January 22, 1985

MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL

From:
Re:

Lynda
No. 83-1632 -- Harper

&

Row v. Nation Enterprises

We have received a response from Justice O'Connor
concerning why she chose not to address in her opinion the issues
of copyrightability presented by this case.

As we surmised, her

reasons were that (i) the courts below had not made the

-

appropriate fact findings to enable a decision by this Court that
would not entail a remand, and (ii) by her count, she did not
have a Court for reversing CA2 on the copyrightability issues.
In view of the lack of votes and the need for more factfinding,
she concluded that it would be best to leave the copyrightability
issues for another day, especially since her resolution of the
fair use issue is dispositive of the case, no matter which way
the copyright issues are viewed.

Her letter is attached.

Although I originally thought that the copyright issues
should have been addressed, I am now not so sure.

I had not

previously focused on the fact that the fair use issue is
dispositive, no matter how the copyrightability issues are dealt
with.
-

Moreover, having reexamined the lower court opinions and

Nimmer On Copyright, I am persuaded that Justice O'Connor is

-

-

-

correct that the issues could not be decided finally without
additional fact finding.
First, as Justice O'Connor notes, the DC adopted a
broad "totality" approach to the issue of copyrightability under
which the court "decline[d] to enter the thicket of deciding
which statements [used by Ford and reproduced in the Nation
article] were exact quotations [of other people]--and therefore
not protected by copyright--and which were merely reconstructions
of statements pieced together by Ford--and therefore
copyrightable."

App. to Petn for Cert, B-10 to B-11.

As Justice

O'Connor notes in her letter, much of the material copied by the
Nation purports to be words spoken by persons other than Ford.

-

A

majority of courts have held that an author of a factual work may
not claim copyright protection for the conversation or statements
made by others, since the author may not claim originality as to
such statements, as required by §102(a) of the Act for copyright
protection to attach.
160 n.9.1.

See 1 Nimmer On Copyright §2.ll[BJ at 2-

On the other hand, most courts agree that an author's

reconstruction of such conversations is copyrightable, see id.,
at 2-160 n.11, a view that seems reasonable given that the
author's reconstruction contains the necessary element of
originality needed for copyright protection to attach.

CA2

assumed that the quotations were literal, and ruled they were not
protectible; logically, however, such recollections of statements
made by others in the past would seem to consist more of
-

reconstruction than of literal quotation.

See id., at 2-161 n.11

(discussing this case). Thus, although this Court could decide

-

-

-

the general question whether statements attributed to others
should be protected by copyright, it could not decide the final
question of whether the statements copied by the Nation were
copyrightable, because neither court below decided whether the
statements were reconstructions or literal quotations.
Likewise, CA2 ruled that only large-scale paraphrasing
of "virtually an entire work" would constitute a copyright
infringement, a view with which I disagree and to which there is
opposition in the case law.

E.g., Flick-Reedy Corp. v. Hydro-

Line Mfg. Co., 352 F.2d 546 (CA7 1965).

Nonetheless, the DC did

not embark on a detailed comparison of the two works in its factfindings, something that would be required to support a holding

-

that too much paraphrasing had occurred.

Thus, this Court could

rule generally that CA2 had erred in holding that large-scale
paraphrasing was required for copyright infringement, but it
would either have to remand or do its own fact-finding to analyse
how much paraphrasing occurred here.
Writing an opinion for remand, with the chance that it
would garner enough votes for a Court on the copyrightability
issue, would ordinarily not be so bad; under the particular
circumstances involved here, however, I am now persuaded it would
be of dubious utility.

In accepting CA2's concession that Ford's

300/400 words of verbatim quotes were copyrightable and in
reversing CA2's holding that the copying of these words was fair
use, Justice O'Connor effectively grants judgment for Harper
-

Row.

&

A remand on the other issues of copyrightability thereby

becomes completely unnecessary to the resolution of the case.

-

-

-

Given the difficulty of the issues involved, I can now appreciate
why Justice O'Connor believed it might be just as well to
sidestep them.
Under these circumstances, I thought you might want to
reconsider your decision to write in this case.

If you should

decide not to write separately on the copyrightability issues, I
would nonetheless recommend that you request Justice O'Connor to
make some minor stylistic changes geared to making plain early in
the opinion how she views the copyright issues.

I still believe

that it is structurally illogical to decide the fair use question
without first saying at least that the 300/400 words are
copyrightable and why this is so.

-

-

-
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C H AMBE RS OF

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL , JR .

February 8, 1985

Re:

No. 83-1632 - Harper & Row v . Nation Enterprises

Dear Sandra:
After further consideration of your op1n1on and
your letter of January 2, 1985, I have concluded that there
is considerable merit to leaving the copyright issues until
another day, especially since the fair use issue is disposi tive of the case. Therefore, I am pleased to join your fine
opinion.
I wonder, however, if you would consider making
some minor changes designed to make clear early in the opinion how you view the copyright issues.
It would help make
the opinion clearer if you were to state up front that the
copyright in the book as a whole was validly obtained, and
no question is raised as its validity. The opinion might
also be somewhat improved if it stated early on that the
300/400 words quoted from Ford are copyrightable and why
this is so. It seems more logical to me to establish first
that some of what the Nation used was protected by copyright, and then to proceed to discuss why their use was not
fair.
Sincerely

Justice O'Connor
cc:

The Conference
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL

From:
Re:

Lynda
No. 83-1632 - Harper

&

Row v. Nation Enterprises

There is one minor bit of unfinished business on this
case.

When I spoke to you while you were in the hospital, we

agreed, I think, that I would write a join note for you to
Justice O'Connor since you decided that you would not write.
After I hung up, I realized that I should recommend to you that
you ask Justice O'Connor to make some minor stylistic changes
designed to make plain early in the opinion how she views the
copyright issues.

I spoke to Justice O'Connor's clerk, who said

she agreed with me and that she believed Justice O'Connor would
be amenable to making such changes.

I have not sent a letter,

however, since I had not cleared all of this with you.
Attached is a proposed draft of a letter to Justice
O'Connor.
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL , JR .

February 9, 1985

Re:

No. 83-1632 - Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises

Dear Sandra:
After further consideration of your opinion and
your letter of January 2, 1985, I have concluded that there
is considerable merit to leaving the copyright issues until
another day, especially since the fair use issue is dispositive of the case. Therefore, I am pleased to join your fine
opinion.
I wonder, however, if you would consider making
some minor changes designed to make clear early in the opinion how you view the copyright issues •. It would help make
the opinion clearer if you were to state up front that the
copyright in the book as a whole was validly obtained, and
no question is raised as its validity. The opinion might
also be somewhat improved if it stated early on that the
300/400 words quoted from Ford are copyrightable and why
this is so. It seems more logical to me to establish first
that some of what the Nation used was protected by copyright, and then to proceed to discuss why their use was not
fair.
My join is not, however, conditioned upon your
accepting the foregoing suggestions.
Sincerely

L~
Justice O'Connor
cc:

The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'cONNOR

February 11, 1985

No. 83-1632

Harper

&

Row v. Nation Enterprises

Dear Lewis,
First, let me say how great it is to be receiving
your communications again.
Second, I am happy to have your joinder in this
case as well as your suggestions. I will try to incorporate
them in the next circulation.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference

'Stylistic Changes Throughout

ft

~ 71J
/

I

-

•

JO I ., .
~.,
-1,PJ/__
AA/.

.,

~

9

.

,

-CJ

"J

i ft1

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 83-1632

HARPER & ROW, PUBLISHERS, INC. AND THE READER'S DIGEST ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONERS
v. NATION ENTERPRISES AND THE NATION
ASSOCIATES, INC.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[March - , 1985)

JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to consider to what extent the "fair
use" provision of the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 17
U. S. C. § 107 (hereinafter the Copyright Act), sanctions the
unauthorized use of quotations from a public figure's unpublished manuscript. In April 1977, an undisclosed source provided The Nation magazine with the unpublished manuscript
of "A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford."
Working directly from the purloined manuscript, an editor of
The Nation produced a short piece entitled "The Ford Memoirs-Behind the Nixon Pardon." The piece was timed to
"scoop" an article scheduled shortly to appear in Time magazine. Time had agreed to purchase the exclusive right to
print prepublication excerpts from the copyright holders,
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. (hereinafter Harper & Row)
and Reader's Digest Association, Inc. (hereinafter Reader's
Digest). As a result of The Nation article, Time cancelled its
agreement. Petitioners brought a successful copyright
action against The Nation. On appeal, the Second Circuit
reversed the lower court's finding of infringement, holding
that The Nation's act was sanctioned as a "fair use" of the
copyrighted material. We anted certiorari, - -·· U. S.
- - (1984), and we now re erse.
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HARPER & ROW v. NATION ENTERPRISES

I
In February 1977, shortly after leaving the White House,
former President Gerald R. Ford contracted with petitioners
Harper & Row and The Reader's Digest, to publish his as yet
unwritten memoirs. The memoirs were to contain "significant hitherto unpublished material" concerning the Watergate crisis, Mr. Ford's pardon of former President Nixon and
"Mr. Ford's reflections on this period of history, and the
morality and personalities involved." App. to Petn for Cert.
C-14 - C-15. In addition to the right to publish the Ford
memoirs in book form, the agreement gave petitioners the
exclusive right to license prepublication excerpts, known in
the trade as "first serial rights." Two years later, as the
memoirs were nearing completion, petitioners negotiated a
prepublication licensing agreement with Time, a weekly
news magazine. Time agreed to pay $25,000, $12,500 in
advance and an additional $12,500 at publication, in exchange
for the right to excerpt 7,500 words from Mr. Ford's account
of the Nixon pardon. The issue featuring the excerpts was
timed to appear approximately one week before shipment of
the full length book version to bookstores. Exclusivity was
an important consideration; Harper & Row instituted procedures designed to maintain the confidentiality of the manuscript, and Time retained the right to renegotiate the second
payment should the material appear in print prior to its
release of the excerpts.
Two to three weeks before the Time article's scheduled
release, an unidentified person secretly brought a copy of the
Ford manuscript to Victor Navasky, editor of The Nation, a
political commentary magazine. Mr. Navasky knew that his
possession of the manuscript was not authorized and that the
manuscript must be returned quickly to his "source" to avoid
discovery. 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1069 (SDNY 1983). He hastily put together what he believed was "a real hot news story''
composed of quotes, paraphrases and facts drawn exclusively
from the manuscript. Ibid. Mr. Navasky attempted no

'

-

83-1632-0PINION

HARPER & ROW v. NATION ENTERPRISES

3

independent commentary, research or criticism, in part
because of the need for speed if he was to "make news" by
"publish[ing] in advance of the publication of the Ford book."
App. 416-417. The 2,250 word article, reprinted in the
Appendix to this opinion, appeared on April 3, 1979. As a
result of The Nation's article, Time cancelled its piece and
refused to pay the remaining $12,500.
Petitioners brought suit in the District Court for the
Southern District of New York, alleging conversion, tortious
interference with contract and violations of the Copyright
Act. After a six day bench trial, the District Judge found
that "A Time to Heal" was protected by copyright at the time
of The Nation publication and that respondent's use of the
copyrighted material constituted an infringement under the
Copyright Act, § 106 (1),(2), and (3), protecting respectively
the right to reproduce the work, the right to license preparation of derivative works, and the right of first distribution of
the copyrighted work to the public. App. to Petn for Cert.
C-29-C-30. The District Court rejected respondent's argument that The Nation's piece was a "fair use" sanctioned by
§ 107 of the Act. Though billed as "hot news," the article
contained no new facts. The magazine had "published its
article for profit," taking "the heart" of "a soon-to-bepublished" work. This unauthorized use "caused the agreement with Time to be aborted and thus diminished the value
of the copyright." 557 F. Supp., at 1072. Although certain
elements of the Ford memoir, such as historical facts and
memoranda, were not per se copyrightable, the District
Court held that it was "the totality of these facts and memoranda collected together with Ford's reflections that made
them of value to The Nation, [and] this totality . . . is protected by the copyright laws." Id., at 1072-1073. The
court awarded actual damages of $12,500.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. The majority recognized that Mr. Ford's verbatim "reflections" were original "expression" protected by

-

'
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copyright. But it held that the District Court had erred in
assuming "the coupling [of these reflections] with uncopyrightable fact transformed that information into a copyrighted 'totality."' 723 F. 2d 195, 205 (1983). The majority
noted that copyright attaches to expression, not facts or
ideas. It concluded that, to avoid granting a copyright
monopoly over the facts underlying history and news,
"'expression' [in such works must be confined] to its barest
elements-the ordering and choice of the words themselves."
Id., at 204. Thus similarities between the original and the
challenged work traceable to the copying or paraphrasing of
uncopyrightable material, such as historical facts, memoranda and other public documents, and quoted remarks of
third parties, must be disregarded in evaluating whether the
second author's use was fair or infringing.
"When the uncopyrighted material is stripped away, the
article in The Nation contains, at most, approximately
300 words that are copyrighted. These remaining paragraphs and scattered phrases are all verbatim quotations
from the memoirs which had not appeared previously in
other publications. They include a short segment of
Ford's conversations with Henry Kissinger and several
other individuals. Ford's impressionistic depictions of
Nixon, ill with phlebitis after the resignation and pardon
and of Nixon's character, constitute the major portion of
this material. It is these parts of the magazine piece on
which [the court] must focus in [its] examination of the
question whether there was a 'fair use' of the copyrighted matter." Id., at 206.
Examining the four factors enumerated in § 107, see infra, at
- - , the majority found the purpose of the article was "news
reporting," the original work was essentially factual in
nature, the 300 words appropriated were insubstantial in
relation to the 2,250 word piece, and the impact on the market for the original was minimal as "the evidence [did] not
support a finding that it was the very limited use of expres-

'
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sion per se which led to Time's decision not to print the excerpt." The Nation's borrowing of verbatim quotations
merely "len[t] authenticity to this politically significant material . . . complementing the reporting of the facts." Id., at
208. The Court of Appeals was especially influenced by the
"politically significant" nature of the subject matter and its
conviction that it is not "the purpose of the Copyright Act to
impede that harvest of knowledge so necessary to a democratic state" or "chill the activities of the press by forbidding
a circumscribed use of copyrighted words." Id., at 197, 208.

II
We agree with the Court of Appeals that copyright is
intended to increase and not to impede the harvest of knowledge. But we believe the Second Circuit gave insufficient
deference to the scheme established by the Copyright Act for
fostering the original works that provide the seed and substance of this harvest. The rights conferred by copyright
are designed to assure contributors to the store of knowledge
a fair return for their labors. Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 156 (1976).
Article I, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that:
"The Congress shall have the power ... to Promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
As we noted last Term, "[this] limited grant is a means by

which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and
inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow
the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired." Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., - - U. S. - - , - - (1984).
"The monopoly created by copyright thus rewards the individual author in order to benefit the public." Id., at - -

-
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(dissenting opinion). This principle applies equally to works
of fiction and non-fiction. The book at issue here, for example, was two years in the making, and began with a contract
giving the author's copyright to the publishers in exchange
for their services in producing and marketing the work. In
preparing the book, Mr. Ford drafted essays and word portraits of public figures and participated in hundreds of taped
interviews that were later distilled to chronicle his personal
viewpoint. It is evident that the monopoly granted by copyright actively served its intended purpose of inducing the creation of new material of potential historical value.
Section 106 of the Copyright Act confers a bundle of exclusive rights to the owner of the copyright. 1 Under the Copyright Act, these rights-to publish, copy, and distribute the
author's work-vest in the author of an original work from
the time of its creation. § 106. In practice, the author commonly sells his rights to publishers who offer royalties in
exchange for their services in producing and marketing the
author's work. The copyright owner's rights, however, are
§§ 107-118.
subject to certain statutory exceptions.
Among these is § 107 which codifies the traditional privilege
of other authors to make "fair use" of an earlier writer's
work. 2 In addition, no author may copyright facts or ideas.
Section 106 provides in pertinent part:
"Subject to section 107 through 118, the owner of copyright under this title
has the exclusive rights to do and authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies ... ;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies ... of the copyrighted work to the public .... "
2
Section 107 states:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work ... for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the
use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include1

I

-
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§ 102. The copyright is limited to those aspects of the
work-termed "expression"-that display the stamp of the
author's originality.
Creation of a nonfiction work, even a compilation of pure
fact, entails originality. See, e. g., Schroeder v. William
Morrow & Co., 566 F. 2d 3 (CA7 1977) (copyright in gardening directory); cf. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,
111 U. S. 53, 58 (1884) (originator of a photograph may claim
copyright in his work). The copyrightholders of A Time to
Heal complied with the relevant statutory procedure~ See
§§ 106, 401, 408; App. to Petn for Cert. C-20. Thus t ere is
no dispute that the unpublished manuscript of A Time to
Heal, as a whole, was protected by § 106 from unauthorized
reproduction. Nor do respondents dispute that verbatim
copying of excerpts of the manuscript's original form of
expression would constitute infringement unless excused as
fair use. See 1 Nimmer on Copyright §2.ll[B], at 2-159
(1984 ed.) (hereinafter Nimmer). Yet copyright does not
prevent subsequent users from copying from a prior author's
work those constituent elements that are not original-for
example, quotations borrowed under the rubric of fair use
from other copyrighted works, facts, or materials in the public domain-as long as such use does not unfairly appropriate
the author's original contributions. Id.; Latman, Fair Use of
Copyrighted Works (1958), reprinted as Study No. 14 in
Copyright Law Revision Studies Nos. 1-19, Prepared for the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.,
p. 7 (1960) (hereinafter Latman). Perhaps the controversy
between the lower courts in this case over copyrightability is
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work."

_
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more aptly styled a dispute over whether the The Nation's
appropriation of unoriginal and uncopyrightable elements
encroached on the originality embodied in the work as a
whole. Especially in the realm of factual narrative, the law
is currently unsettled regarding the ways in which uncopyrightable elements combine with the author's original contributions to form protected expression. Compare Wainwright Securities , Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558
F. 2d 91 (CA2 1977) (protection accorded author's analysis,
structuring of material and marshalling of facts), with
Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F. 2d 972 (CA2
1980) (limiting protection to ordering ·and choice of words).
See, e.g., 1 Nimmer §2.ll[D], at 2-164-2-165.
We need not reach these issues, however, as the Nation
has admitted to lifting verbatim quotes of the author's original language totalling between 300 and 400 words and constituting some 13% of The Nation article. In using generous
verbatim excerpts of Mr. Ford's unpublished manuscript to
lend authenticity to its account of the forthcoming memoirs,
The Nation effectively arrogated to itself the right of first
publication, an important marketable subsidiary right.
Under the circumstances of this case, we find that this use of
the copyrighted manuscript, even stripped to the verbatim
quotes conceded by The Nation to be copyrightable expression, was not a fair use.

III
Fair use was traditionally defined as "a privilege in others
than the owner of the copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent." H. Ball,
\ The Law of Copyright 260 (1944) (hereinafter Ball). The
statutory formulation of the defense of fair use in the Copyright Act of 1976 reflects the intent of Congress to codify the
common law doctrine. 3 Nimmer § 13.05. Section 107 requires a case-by-case determination whether a particular use
is fair, and the statute notes four non-exclusive factors to be

-
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considered. This approach was "intended to restate the
[pre-existing] judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, p.
66 (1976) (hereinafter House Report).
"[T]he author's consent to a reasonable use of his copyrighted works ha[d] always been implied by the courts as a
necessary incident of the constitutional policy of promoting
sciences and the useful arts, since a prohibition of such use
would inhibit subsequent writers from attempting to improve
upon prior works and thus . . . frustrate the very ends
sought to be attained." Ball 260. Professor Latman, in a
study of the doctrine of fair use commissioned by Congress
for the revision effort, see Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., supra, at--, n. 9 (dissenting opinion), summarized prior law as turning on "the importance of the material
copied or performed from the point of view of the reasonable
copyright owner. In other words, would the reasonable
copyright owner have consented to the use?" Latman, 15. 3
As early as 1841, Justice Sto~, gave JU 1cial recogrution to
the doctrine in a case that cone rned the letters of another
former President, George Washington.
"[A] reviewer may fairly cite largely from the original
work, if his design be really and truly to use the passages
for the purposes of fair and reasonable criticism. On the
other hand, it is as clear, that if he thus cites the most
important parts of the work, with a view, not to criticise,
3
Professor Nimmer notes, "[perhaps] no more precise guide can be
stated than Joseph McDonald's clever paraphrase of the Golden Rule:
'Take not from others to such an extent and in such a manner that you
would be resentful if they so took from you.'" 3 Nimmer § 13.05[A], at
13-66, quoting McDonald, "Non-infringing Uses," 9 Bull. Cr. Soc'y 466,
467 No.355 (1962). This equitable "rule ofreason," Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., - - U. S., at--, "permits courts to avoid rigid
application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the
very creativity which that law is designed to foster." Iowa State University v. American Broadcasting Co., 621 F. 2d 57, 60 (CA21980). See generally, L. Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in Copyright 18-48 (1978).
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but to supersede the use of the original work, and substitute the review for it, such a use will be deemed in law a
piracy." Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 342, No. 4,901,
at 344-345 (C. C. D. Mass.)
As Justice Story's hypothetical illustrates, the fair use
doctrine has always precluded a use that "supersede[s] the
object of the original." Ibid. Accord S. Rep. No. 94-473,
p. 65 (1975) (hereinafter Senate Report).
Perhaps because the fair use doctrine was predicated on
the author's implied consent to "reasonable and customary''
use when he released his work for public consumption, fair
use traditionally was not recognized as a defense to charges
of copying from an author's as yet unpublished works. 4
Under common law copyright, "[t]he property of the author
... in his intellectual creation [was] absolute until he voluntarily part[ed] with the same." American Tobacco Co. v.
W erckmeister, 207 U. S. 284, 299 (1907); 2 Nimmer § 8.23, at
8-273. This absolute rule, however, was tempered in practice by the equitable nature of the fair use doctrine. In a
given case, factors such as implied consent through de facto
publication on performance or dissemination of a work may
tip the balance 6f equities in favor of prepublication use. See
4

See La~man, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works (1958), reprinted as
Study No. 14 in Copyright Law Revision Studies Nos. 1-19, Prepared for
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 7 (1960);
Strauss, Protection of Unpublished Works (1957), reprinted as Study No.
29 in Copyright Law Revision Studies Nos 20-35, Prepared for the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4, n. 32 (1960) (citing
cases); R. Shaw, Literary Property in the United States 67 (1950) ("there
can be no 'fair use' of unpublished material); H. Ball, Law of Copyright and
Literary Property§ 125, n. 5 (1944) ("the doctrine of fair use does not apply
to unpublished works"); A. Weil, American Copyright Law §276 (1917)
(the author of an unpublished work "has, probably, the right to prevent
even a 'fair use' of the work by others"). Cf., M. Flint, A User's Guide to
[United Kingdom] Copyright ,r 10.05 (1979) ("no fair dealing with unpublished works"); Beloff v. Pressman Ltd., [1973] All E. R. 241, 263 (ch.
1972) (same).
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Copyright Law Revision-Part 2: Discussion and Comments
on Report of the Registrar of Copyrights on General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law at 27 (H. R. Comm. Print,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. Feb. 1963) (discussion suggesting
works disseminated to the public in a form not constituting a
technical "publication" should nevertheless be subject to fair
use); 3 Nimmer§ 13.05, p. 13-62, n. 2. But it has never been
seriously disputed that "the fact that the plaintiff's work is
unpublished . . . is a factor tending to negate the defense of
fair use." Ibid. Publication of an author's expression
before he has authorized its dissemination seriously infringes
the author's right to decide when and whether it will be made
public, a factor not present in fair use of published works. 5
Respondents contend, however, that Congress, in including
first publication among the rights enumerated in § 106, which
are expressly subject to fair use under § 107, intended that
fair use would apply in pari materia to published and unpublished works. The Copyright Revision Act does not support
this proposition.
The Copyright Revision Act of 1976 represents the culmination of a major legislative reexamination of copyright
doctrine. See Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, ante, at - - ;
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., supra, at--,
n. 9 (dissenting opinion). Among its other innovations, it
5
See, e. g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U. S. (8 Pet.) 591, 657 (1834) (distinguishing the author's common law right "to obtain redress against anyone
who ... by improperly obtaining a copy [of his unpublished work] endeavors to realize a profit by its publication" from rights in a published work,
which are prescribed by statute); Press Pub. Co. v. Monroe, 73 Fed. 196,
199 (CA2), aff'd, 164 U. S. 105 (1896); Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, 221 P. 2d 73, 77-78 (Cal. 1950) (en bane); Golding v. RKO Radio
Pictures, Inc., 193 P. 2d 153, 162 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948), ("An unauthorized appropriation of [an unpublished work] is not to be neutralized on
the plea that 'it is such a little one.'"), aff'd 221 P. 2d 95 (Cal. 1950);
Fendler v. Morosco, 253 N. Y. 281, 171 N. E. 56, reh'g denied 254 N. Y.
563, 173 N. E. 867 (N. Y. 1930) ("Since plaintiff has not published or produced her play, perhaps any use that others made of it might be unfair").
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eliminated publication "as a dividing line between common
law and statutory protection," House Report, at 129, extending statutory protection to all works from the time of their
creation. It also recognized for the first time a distinct statutory right of first publication, which had previously been an
element of the common law protections afforded unpublished
works. The Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary confirms that "Clause (3) of section 106, establishes the
exclusive right of publication.... Under this provision the
copyright owner would have the right to control the first public distribution of an authorized copy . . . of his work."
House Report, at 62.
Though the right of first publication, like the other rights
enumerated in§ 106 is expressly made subject to the fair use
provision of§ 107, fair use analysis must always be tailored to
the individual case. House Report, at 65; 3 Nimmer
§ 13.05[A]. The nature of the interest at stake is highly relevant to whether a given use is fair. From the beginning,
those entrusted with the task of revision recognized the
"overbalancing reasons to preserve the common law protection of undisseminated works until the author or his successor chooses to disclose them." Register of Copyrights, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess., General Revision of the U. S. Copyright
Law 41 (Comm. Print 1961). The right of first publication
implicates a threshold decision by the author whether and in
what form to release his work. First publication is inherently different from other § 106 rights in that only one person
can be the first publisher; as the contract with Time illustrates, the commercial value of the right lies primarily in
exclusivity. Because the potential damage to the author
from judicially enforced "sharing" of the first publication
right with unauthorized users of his manuscript is substantial, the balance of equities in evaluating such a claim of fair
use inevitably shifts.
The Senate Report confirms that Congress intended the
unpublished nature of the work to figure prominently in fair

'
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use analysis. In discussing fair use of photocopied materials
in the classroom the Committee Report states:
"A key, though not necessarily determinative, factor in
fair use is whether or not the work is available to the
potential user. If the work is "out of print" and unavailable for purchase through normal channels, the user may
have more justification for reproducing it . . . . The
applicability of the fair use doctrine to unpublished
works is narrowly limited since, although the work is unavailable, this is the result of a deliberate choice on the
part of the copyright owner. Under ordinary circumstances, the copyright owner's 'right of first publication'
would outweigh any needs of reproduction for classroom
purposes." Senate Report, at 64.
Although the Committee selected photocopying of classroom
materials to illustrate fair use, it emphasized that "the same
general standards of fair use are applicable to all kinds of uses
of copyrighted material." Id., at 65. We find unconvincing
respondent's contention that the absence of the quoted passage from the House Report indicates an intent to abandon
the traditional distinction between fair use of published and
unpublished works. It appears instead that the the fair use
discussion of photocopying of classroom materials was omitted from the final report because educators and publishers in
the interim had negotiated a set of guidleines that rendered
the discussion obsolete. House Report, at 67. The House
Report nevertheless incorporates the discussion by reference, citing to the Senate Report and stating, "[T]he Committee has reviewed this discussion, and considers it still has
value as an analysis of various aspects of the [fair use] problem." Ibid.
Even if the legislative history were entirely silent, we
would be bound to conclude from Congress's characterization
of section 107 as a "restatement" that its effect was to preserve existing law concerning fair use of unpublished works
as of other types of protected works and not to "change, nar-
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row, or enlarge it." House Report, at 66. We conclude that
the unpublished nature of a work is "a key, though not necessarily determinative factor" tending to negate a defense of
( . ~-fair use. Senate Report, at 64. See 3 Nimmer § 13.05, n. 2; J
W. Patry, The Fair Use Privilege in Copyright Law 125 IJt.."'-' I
(1985) (hereinafter Patry).
We also find unpersuasive respondent's argument that fair
use may be made of a soon-to-be-published manuscript on the
ground that the author has demonstrated he has no interest
in nonpublication. This argument assumes that the unpublished nature of copyrighted material is only relevant to letters or other confidential writings not intended for dissemination. It is true that common law copyright was often enlisted in the service of personal privacy. See Brandeis and
Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 198-199
(1890). In its commercial guise, however, an author's right
to choose when he will publish is no less deserving of protection. The period encompassing the work's initiation, its
preparation, and its grooming for public dissemination is a
crucial one for any literary endeavor. The Copyright Act,
which accords the copyright owner the "right to control the
first public distribution" of his work, House Report, at 62,
echos the common law's concern that the author or copyright
owner retain control throughout this critical stage. See generally Comment, The Stage of Publication as a "Fair Use"
Factor: Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 58
St. John's L. Rev. 583 (1984). The obvious benefit to author
and public alike of assuring authors the leisure to develop
their ideas free from fear of expropriation outweighs any
short term "news value" to be gained from premature publication of the author's expression. See Goldstein, Copyright
and the First Amendment, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 983, 1004-1006
(1970) (The absolute protection the common law accorded to
soon-to-be published works "[was] justified by its brevity and
expedience"). The author's control of first public distribution implicates not only his personal interest in creative con-
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trol but his property interest in exploitation of prepublication
rights, which are valuable in themselves and serve as a valuable adjunct to publicity and marketing. See Belushi v.
Woodward, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1870 (D DC 1984) (successful marketing depends on coordination of serialization
and release to public); Marks, Subsidiary Rights and Permissions, from C. Grannis (ed.), What Happens in Book Publishing 230 (1967) (exploitation of subsidiary rights is necessary
to financial success of new books). Under ordinary circumstances, the author's right to control the first public appearance of his undisseminated expression will outweigh a claim
of fair use.
B
Respondent, however, contends that First Amendment
values require a different rule under the circumstances of
this case. The thrust of the decision below is that "the scope
of [fair use] is undoubtedly wider when the information conveyed relates to matters of high public concern." Consumers Union of the United States , Inc. v. General Signal Corp.,
724 F. 2d 1044, 1050 (CA2 1983) (construing Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 723 F. 2d 195 (1983),
as allowing advertiser to quote Consumer Reports), cert.
denied, - - U.S. - - (1984). Respondent advances the
substantial public import of the subject matter of the Ford
memoirs as grounds for excusing a use that would ordinarily
not pass muster as a fair use-the piracy of verbatim quotations for the purpose of "scooping" the authorized first serialization. Respondent explains its copying of Mr. Ford's expression as essential to reporting the news story it claims the
book itself represents. In respondent's view, not only the
facts contained in Mr. Ford's memoirs, but "the precise manner in which he expressed himself was as newsworthy as
what he had to say." Brief for Respondent 39. Respondent
argues that the public's interest in learning this news as fast
as possible outweighs the right of the author to control its
first publication.

-
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The Second Circuit noted, correctly, that copyright's
idea/expression dichotomy "strikes a definitional balance
between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by
permitting free communication of facts while still protecting
an author's expression." 723 F. 2d, at 203. No author may
copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates. 17 U. S. C.
§ 102 (b). See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States,
403 U. S. 713, 726, n. * (1971) (BRENNAN, J., concurring)
(Copyright laws are not restrictions on freedom of speech as
copyright protects only form of expression and not the ideas
expressed); 1 Nimmer§ 1.10[B][2]. As this Court long ago
observed, "[T]he news element-the information respecting
current events contained in the literary production-is not
the creation of the writer, but is a report of matters that ordinarily are 'J)'Ublici juris; it is the history of the day." International News Service v. Assocwted Press, 248 U. S. 215,
234 (1918). But copyright assures those who write and publish factual narratives such as "A Time to Heal" that that
they may at least enjoy the right to market the original
expression contained therein as just compensation for their .
investment. Cf. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting / N~uJ
Co., 433 U. S. 562, 575 (1977).
Respondent's theory, however, would expand fair use to
effectively destroy any expectation of copyright protection in
the work of a public figure. Absent such protection, there
would be little incentive to create or profit in financing such
memoirs and the public would be denied an important source
of significant historical information. The promise of copyright would be an empty one if it could be avoided merely by
dubbing the infringement a fair use "news report" of the
book. See Wainwright Securities Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F. 2d 91(CA21977), cert. denied, 434 U. S.
1014 (1978).
Nor does respondent assert any actual necessity for
circumventing the copyright scheme with respect to the

,
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types of works and users at issue here. 6 Where an author
and publisher have invested extensive resources in creating
an original work and are poised to release it to the public, no
legitimate aim is served by preempting the right of first
publication. The fact that the words the author has chosen
to clothe his narrative may of themselves be "newsworthy'' is
not an independent justification for unauthorized copying of
the author's expression prior to publication. To paraphrase
another recent Second Circuit decision:
"[Respondent] possessed an unfettered right to use any
factual information revealed in [the memoirs]. for the
purpose of enlightening its audience, but it can claim no
need to 'bodily appropriate' [Mr. Ford's] 'expression' of
that information by utilizing portions of the actual
[manuscript].... The public interest in the free flow of
information is assured by the law's refusal to recognize a
valid copyright in facts. The fair use doctrine is not a
license for corporate theft, empowering a court to ignore
a copyright whenever it determines the underlying work
contains material of possible public importance." Iowa
State University v. American Broadcasting Company,
Inc., 621 F . 2d 57, 61 (CA2 1980) (citations omitted).
Accord Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, 503 F. Supp. 1137 (SDNY 1980) ("newsworthiness" of material copied does not justify copying), aff'd
672 F. 2d 1095 (CA2), cert. denied 459 U. S. 826 (1982);
Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 554
(D DC 1981) (same).
In our haste to disseminate news, it should not be forgotten that the Framers intended copyright itself to be the
6

It bears noting that Congress in the Copyright Act recognized a public
interest warranting specific exemptions in a number of areas not within
traditional fair use, see, e. g. , 17 U. S. C. § 115 (compulsory license for
records); § 105 (no copyright in government works). No such exemption
limits copyright in personal narratives written by public servants after
they leave government service.
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engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable
right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas. This
Court stated in Mazer v. Stein:
"The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual efforts by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through
the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and the
useful Arts.'" 347 U. S. 201, 219 (1954).
And again in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken:
"The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a
fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate [the creation
of useful works] for the general public good." 422 U. S.
151, 156 (1976).
It is fundamentally at odds with the scheme of copyright to
accord lesser rights in those works that are of greatest
importance to the public. Such a notion ignores the major
premise of copyright and injures author and public alike.
"[T]o propose that fair use be imposed whenever the 'social
value [of dissemination] ... outweighs any detriment to the
artist,' would be to propose depriving copyright owners of
their right in their property precisely when they encounter
those users who could afford to pay for it." Gordon, Fair
Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis
of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L.
Rev. 1600, 1615 (1982). And as one commentator has noted,
"If every volume that was in the public interest could be
pirated away by a competing publisher, ... the public [soon]
would have nothing worth reading." Sobel, Copyright and
the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm?, 19 AS CAP
Copyright Law Symp. 43, at 78 (1971). See generally Comment, Copyright and the First Amendment; Where Lies the
Public Interest?, 59 Tul. L. Rev. 133 (1985).
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Moreover, freedom of thought and expression "includes
both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from
speaking at all." Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 714
(1977) (BURGER, C. J.). We do not suggest this right not to
speak would sanction abuse of the copyright owner's monopoly as an instrument to suppress facts. But in the words of
New York's Chief Judge Fuld:
"The essential thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints on the voluntary public expression of ideas; it shields the man who wants to speak or
publish when others wish him to be quiet. There is necessarily, and within suitably defined areas, a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the
same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative
aspect." Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, 23
N. Y. 2d 341, 348 (1968).
Courts and commentators have recognized that copyright,
and the right of first publication in particular, serve this
countervailing First Amendment value. See Schnapper v.
Foley, 667 F . 2d 102 (CADC 1981), cert. denied U.S.
- - (1982); 1 Nimmer § 1.lO[B], p. 1-70, n. 24; Patry
140-142.
In view of the First Amendment protections already
embodied in the Copyright Act's distinction between
copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and
ideas, and the latitide for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use, we see no warrant for expanding the
doctrine of fair use to create what amounts to a public figure
exception to copyright. Whether verbatim copying from a
public figure's manuscript in a given case is or is not fair must
be judged according to the traditional equities of fair use.
IV
Fair use is a mixed question of law and fact. Pacific
Southern Co., Inc. v. Duncan, 744 F. 2d 1490, 1495, n. 8
(CAll 1984). Where the District Court has found facts suffi-
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cient to evaluate each of the statutory factors, an appellate
court "need not remand for further factfinding . . . [but] may
conclude as a matter of law that [the challenged use] do[es]
not qualify as a fair use of the copyrighted work." Id., at
1495. Thus whether The Nation article constitutes fair use
under § 107 must be reviewed in light of the principles discussed above. The factors enumerated in the section are not
meant to be exclusive: "[S]ince the doctrine is an equitable
rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible,
and each case raising the question must be decided on its own
facts." House Report, at 65. The four factors identified by
Congress as especially relevant in determining whether the
use was fair are: (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2)
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; (4) the effect on the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work. We address each one separately.
Purpose of the Use. The Second Circuit correctly identified news reporting as the general purpose of The Nation's
use. News reporting is one of the enumerated purposes
sanctioned by § 107 as presumptively advancing the public
interest in dissemination of information through fair use.
We agree with the Second Circuit that the trial court erred in
fixing on whether the information contained in the memoir
was actually new to the public. As Judge Meskill wisely
noted, "[c]ourts should be chary of deciding what is and what
is not news." 723 F. 2d, at 215 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
Cf., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 345-346
(1974). The fact that an article arguably is "news" and
therefore is presumed to be a productive use is simply one
factor in a fair use analysis.
The fact that a publication was commercial as opposed to
non-profit is a separate factor that tends to weigh against a
finding of fair use. "[E]very commercial use of copyrighted
material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the
monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copy-
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right." Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., supra,
at - - . In arguing that the purpose of news reporting is
not purely commercial, The Nation misses the point entirely.
The crux of the profit/non-profit distinction is not whether
the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the
user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted
material without paying the customary price. See Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems,
503 F. Supp. 1137, 1144 (SDNY 1980), aff'd 672 F. 2d 1095
(CA2 1980), cert. denied 459 U. S. 826 (1982); 3 Nimmer
§ 13.05[A][l], n. 25.3.
In evaluating character and purpose we cannot ignore The
Nation's stated purpose of scooping the forthcoming hardcover and Time abstracts, thereby "mak[ing] news" or creating a "news event." App. to Petn for Cert. C-27. The
Nation's use had not merely the incidental effect but the
intended purpose of supplanting the copyright holder's commercially valuable right of first publication. See Meredith
Corp. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686,
690 (SDNY), (purpose of text was to compete with original),
aff'd 500 F. 2d 1221 (CA2 1974). Also relevant to the "character" of the use is "the propriety of the defendant's conduct." 3 Nimmer § 13.05[A], at 63-72. "Fair use preaupposes 'good faith' and 'fair dealing.'" Time, Inc. v. Bernard
Geis Associates, 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (SDNY 1968), quoting
Schulman, Fair Use and the Revision of the Copyright Act,
53 Iowa L. Rev. 832 (1968). The Nation knowingly exploited a purloined manuscript. Unlike the typical claim of
fair use, The Nation cannot offer up even the fiction of consent as justification. Like its competitor newsweekly, it was
free to bid for the right of abstracting excerpts from "A Time
to Heal." Fair use "distinguishes between 'a true scholar
and a chiseler who infringes a work for personal profit.' "
Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp.,
558 F. 2d, at 97, quoting from Hearings on Bills for the General Revision of the Copyright Law Before House Comm. on
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Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 8, pt. 3, at 1706 (1966)
(Statement of John Schulman).
Nature of the Copyrighted Work. Second, the Act directs
attention to the nature of the copyrighted work. "A Time to
Heal" may be characterized as an unpublished historical narrative or autobiography. The law generally recognizes a
greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy. See Gorman, Fact or Fancy: Implications
for Copyright, 29 J. Cop. Soc. 560, 561 (1981-1982).
"[E]ven within the field of fact works, there are gradations as to the relative proportion of fact and fancy.
One may move from sparsely embellished maps and
directories to elegantly written biography. The extent
to which one must permit expressive language to be copied, in order to assure dissemination of the underlying
facts, will thus vary from case to case." Id., at 563.
Some of the briefer quotes from the memoir are arguably
necessary adequately to convey the facts; for example, Mr.
Ford's characterization of the White House tapes as the
"smoking gun" is perhaps so integral to the idea expressed as
to be inseparable from it. Cf. 1 Nimmer§ 1.lO[C]. But The
Nation did not stop at isolated phrases and instead excerpted
subjective descriptions and portraits of public figures whose
power lies in the author's individualized expression. Such
use, focusing on the most expressive elements of the work,
exceeds that necessary to disseminate the facts.
The fact that a work is unpublished is a critical element of
its "nature." 3 Nimmer§ 13.05[A]; Comment, 58 St. John's
L. Rev., at 613. Our prior discussion establishes that the
scope of fair use is narrower with respect to unpublished
works. While even substantial quotations might qualify as
fair use in a review of a published work or a news account of a
speech that had been delivered to the public or disseminated
to the press, see House Report, at 65, the author's right to
choose when and how he will first make public his expression
weighs against such use of the work before its release.
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Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used. Next,
the Act directs us to examine the amount and substantiality
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole. In absolute terms, the words actually quoted were
an insubstantial portion of "A Time to Heal." The district
court, however, found that "[T]he Nation took what was
essentially the heart of the book." 557 F. Supp., at 1072.
We believe the Court of Appeals erred in overruling the district judge's evaluation of the qualitative nature of the taking. See, e. g., Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1145 (taking of 55
seconds out of one hour and twenty-nine minute film deemed
qualitatively substantial). A Time editor described the
chapters on the pardon as "the most interesting and moving
parts of the whole manuscript." Petrs' Reply Br. 16, n. 8.
The portions actually quoted were selected by Mr. Navasky
as among the most powerful passages in those chapters.
Stripped to the verbatim quotes, 7 the direct takings from the
unpublished manuscript constitute at least 13% of the infringing article. See Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F . 2d 1061, 1071
(CA2 1977) (copyrighted letters constituted less than 1% of
infringing work but were prominently featured). The
Nation article is structured around the quoted excerpts
which serve as its dramatic ·focal points. See Appendix,
See Appendix, infra, at - -. The Court of Appeals found that only
"approximately 300 words" were copyrightable but did not specify which
words. The court's discussion, however, indicates it excluded from consideration those portions of The Nation's piece that, although copied verbatim from Ford's manuscript, were quotes attributed by Ford to third persons and quotations from government documents. At oral argument,
counsel for The Nation did not dispute that verbatim quotes and very close
paraphrase could constitute infringement. Tr. 24-25. Thus the Appendix identifies as potentially infringing only verbatim quotes or very close
paraphrase and excludes from consideration government documents and
words attributed to third persons. The Appendix is not intended to
endorse any particular rule of copyrightability but is intended merely as an
aid to facilitate our discussion.
·
7
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infra. In view of the expressive value of the excerpts and
their key role in the infringing work, we cannot agree with
the Second Circuit that the "magazine took a meager, indeed
an infinitesimal amount of Ford's original language." 723 F.
2d, at 209.
Effect on the Market. Finally, the Act focuses on "the
effect of the use on the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work." This last factor is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use. 8 See 3 Nimmer
§ 13.05[A] p. 13-76, and cases cited therein.
"Fair use,
when properly applied, is limited to copying by others which
does not materially impair the marketability of the work
which is copied." 1 Nimmer § 1,lO[D], p. 1-87. The trial
court found not merely a potential but an actual effect on the
.market. Time's cancellation of its projected serialization and
its refusal to pay the $12,500 were the direct effect of the
infringement. The Court of Appeals rejected this fact finding as clearly erroneous, noting that the record did not establish a causal relation between Time's nonperformance and
respondent's unauthorized publication of Mr. Ford's expression as opposed to the facts taken from the memoirs. We
disagree. Rarely will a case of copyright infringement
present such clear cut evidence of actual damage. Petitioners assured Time that there would be no other authorized
publication of any portion of the unpublished manuscript
8
Economists who have addressed the issue believe the fair use exception should come into play only in those situations in which the market fails
or the price the copyright holder would ask is near zero. See, e.g., Brennan, Harper & Row v. The Nation, Copyrightability and Fair Use, Dept.
of Justice Economic Policy Office Discussion Paper, 13-17 (1984); Gordon,
Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1615 (1982).
As the facts here demonstrate, there is a fully functioning market that
encourages the creation and dissemination of memoirs of public figures.
In the economists' view, permitting "fair use" to displace normal copyright
channels disrupts the copyright market without a commensurate public
benefit.
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prior to April 23, 1979. Any publication of material from
chapters 1 and 3 would permit Time to renegotiate its final
payment. Time cited The Nation's article, which contained
verbatim quotes from the unpublished manuscript, as a reason for its nonperformance. Petitioners established a prima
facie case of actual damage that respondent failed to rebut.
See Stevens Linen Association, Inc. v. Mastercraft Corp.,
656 F. 2d 11, 15 (CA2 1981). The trial court properly
awarded actual damages and accounting of profits. See 17
U. S. C. § 504(b).
More important, to negate fair use one need only show that
if the challenged use "should become widespread, it would
adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted
work." Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios , Inc., supra,
at - - (emphasis added); id. , at--, and n. 36 (collecting
cases) (dissenting opinion). This inquiry must take account
not only of harm to the original but also of harm to the market for derivative works. See Iowa State University
Research Foundation v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621
F . 2d 57 (CA2 1980); Meeropol v. Nizer, supra, at 1070; Roy
Export v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 503 F. Supp.
1137, 1146. "If the defendant's work adversely affects the
value of any of the rights in the copyrighted work (in this
case the adaptation [and serialization] right) the use is not
fair.". 3 Nimmer§ 13.05[B], pp. 13-77-13-78.
It is undisputed that the factual material in the balance of
The Nation's article, besides the verbatim quotes at issue
here, was drawn exclusively from the chapters on the pardon. The excerpts were employed as featured episodes in a
story about the Nixon pardon-precisely the use petitoners
had licensed to_Time. The borrowing of these verbatim
quotes from the unpublished manuscript lent The Nation's
piece a special air of authenticity-as Navasky expressed it,
the reader would know it was Ford speaking and not The
Nation. App. 300c. Thus it directly competed for a share
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of the market for prepublication excerpts.
Report states:

The Senate

"With certain special exceptions . . . a use that supplants
any part of the normal market for a copyrighted work
would ordinarily be considered an infringement." Id.,
at 65.
Placed in a broader perspective, a fair use doctrine that permits extensive prepublication quotations from an unreleased
manuscript without the copyright owner's consent poses substantial potential for damage to the marketability of first
serialization rights in general. "Isolated instances of minor
infringements, when multiplied many times, become in the
aggregate a major inroad on copyright that must be prevented." Senate Report, at 65.
The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that The Nation's
use of the copyrighted material was excused by the public's
interest in the subject matter. It erred, as well, in overlooking the unpublished nature of the work and the resulting
impact on the potential market for first serial rights of
permitting unauthorized prepublication excerpts under the
rubric of fair use. Finally, in finding the taking "infinitesimal," the Court of Appeals accorded too little weight to the
qualitative importance of the quoted passages of original expression. In sum, the traditional doctrine of fair use, as embodied in the Copyright Act, does not sanction the use made
by The Nation of these copyrighted materials. Any copyright infringer may claim to benefit the public by increasing
public access to the copyrighted work. See Pacific and
Southern Co. v. Duncan, 744 F. 2d 1490, 1499-1500 (CAll
1984). But Congress has not designed, and we see no warrant for judicially imposing, a "compulsory license" permitting unfettered access to the unpublished copyrighted expression of public figures.

-
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V
The Nation conceded that its verbatim copying of some 300
words of direct quotation from the Ford manuscript would
constitute an infringement unless excused as a fair use.
Because we find that The Nation's use of these verbatim
excerpts from the unpublished manuscript was not a fair use,
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
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APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT
The portions of The Nation article which were copied verbatim from "A
Time to Heal," excepting quotes from government documents and quotes
attributed by Ford to third persons, are identified in bold face in the text.
Seen. 7, ante, at--. The corresponding passages in the Ford manuscript are footnoted.

THE FORD MEMOIRS
BEHIND THE NIXON PARDON
In his memoirs, A Time To Heal, which Harper & Row will
publish in late May or early June, former President Gerald R.
Ford says that the idea of giving a blanket pardon to Richard
M. Nixon was raised before Nixon resigned from the Presidency by Gen. Alexander Haig, who was then the White
House chief of staff.
Ford also writes that, but for a misunderstanding, he
might have selected Ronald Reagan as his 1976 running
mate, that Washington lawyer Edward Bennett Williams, a
Democrat, was his choice for head of the Central Intelligence
Agency, that Nixon was the one who first proposed Rockefeller for Vice President, and that he regretted his "cowardice" 1 in allowing Rockefeller to remove himself from Vice
Presidential contention. Ford also describes his often
prickly relations with Henry Kissinger.
The Nation obtained the 655-page typescript before publication. Advance excerpts from the book will appear in Time
in mid-April and in The Reader's Digest thereafter. Although the initial print order has not been decided, the figure
is tentatively set at 50,000; it could change, depending upon
the public reaction to the serialization.
Ford's account of the Nixon pardon contains significant
new detail on the negotiations and considerations that surrounded it. According to Ford's version, the subject was
1

I was angry at myself for showing cowardice in not saying to the ultraconservatives, "It's going to be Ford and Rockefeller, whatever the consequences." p. 496.
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first broached to him by General Haig on August 1, 1974, a
week before Nixon resigned. General Haig revealed that
the newly transcribed White House tapes were the equivalent of the "smoking gun" 2 and that Ford should prepare
himself to become President.
Ford was deeply hurt by Haig's revelation: "Over the past
several months Nixon had repeatedly assured me that he
was not involved in Watergate, that the evidence would
prove his innocence, that the matter would fade from
view." 3 Ford had believed him, but he let Haig explain the
President's alternatives.
He could "ride it out" 4 or he could resign, Haig said. He
then listed the different ways Nixon might resign and concluded by pointing out that Nixon could agree to leave in return for an agreement that the new President, Ford,
would pardon him. 5 Although Ford said it would be improper for him to make any recommendation, he basically
agreed with Haig's assessment and adds, "Because of his
references to the pardon authority, I did ask Haig about
the extent of a President's pardon power." 6
"It's my understanding from a White House lawyer," Haig
replied, "That a President does have authority to grant a pardon even before criminal action has been taken against an
individual."
[I]t contained the so-called smoking gun. p. 3.
Over the past several months Nixon had repeatedly assured me that he
was not involved in Watergate, that the evidence would prove his innocence, that the matter would fade from view. p. 7.
' The first [option] was that he could try to "ride it out" by letting impeachment take its natural course through the House and the Senate trial}
fighting against conviction all the way. p. 4.
6
Finally, Haig said that according to some on Nixon's White House
staff, Nixon could agree to leave in return for an agreement that the new
President-Gerald Ford-would pardon him. p. 5.
6
Because of his references to pardon authority, I did ask Haig about the
extent of a President's pardon power. pp. 5-6.
2

3
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But because Ford had neglected to tell Haig he thought the
idea of a resignation conditioned on a pardon was improper,
his press aide, Bob Hartmann, suggested that Haig might
well have returned to the White House and told President
Nixon that he had mentioned the idea and Ford seemed comfortable with it. "Silence implies assent."
Ford then consulted with White House special counsel
James St. Clair, who had no advice one way or the other on
the matter more than pointing out that he was not the lawyer
who had given Haig the opinion on the pardon. Ford also
discussed the matter with Jack Marsh, who felt that the mention of a pardon in this context was a ''time bomb," and with
Bryce Harlow, who had served six Presidents and who
agreed that the mere mention of a pardon "could cause a
lot of trouble." 7
As a result of these various conversations, Vice President
Ford called Haig and read him a written statement: "I want
you to understand that I have no intention of recommending
what the President should do about resigning or not resigning and that nothing we talked about yesterday afternoon
should be given any consideration in whatever decision the
President may wish to make."
Despite what Haig had told him about the "smoking gun"
tapes, Ford told a Jackson, Mich., luncheon audience later
in the day that the President was not guilty of an impeachable offense. "Had I said otherwise at the moment," he writes, "the whole house of cards might have
collapsed." 8
In justifying the pardon, Ford goes out of his way to assure
the reader that "compassion for Nixon as an individual
7

Only after I had finished did [Bryce Harlow] let me know in no uncer-

tain terms that he agreed with Bob and Jack, that the mere mention of the

pardon option could cause a lot of trouble in the days ahead. p. 18.
8
During the luncheon I repeated my assertion that the President was
not guilty of an impeachable offense. Had I said otherwise at that moment, the whole house of cards might have collapsed. p. 21.
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hadn't prompted my decision at all." 9 Rather, he did it
because he had "to get the monkey off my back one way or
the other." 10
The precipitating factor in his decision was a series of
secret meetings his general counsel, Phil Buchen, held with
Watergate Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski in the Jefferson
Hotel, where they were both staying at the time. Ford attributes Jaworski with providing some "crucial" information 11-i. e., that Nixon was under investigation in ten
separate areas, and that the court process could "take
years." 12 Ford cites a memorandum from Jaworski's assistant, Henry S. Ruth Jr., as being especially persuasive.
Ruth had written:
"If you decide to recommend indictment I think it is fair
and proper to notify Jack Miller and the White House sufficiently in advance so that pardon action could be taken before
the indictment." He went on to say: "One can make a strong
argument for leniency and if President Ford is so inclined, I
think he ought to do it early rather than late."
Ford decided that court proceedings against Nixon might
take six years, that Nixon "would not spend time quietly in
San Clemente," 13 and "it would be virtually impossible
for me to direct public attention on anything else." 14
Buchen, Haig and Henry Kissinger agreed with him.
Hartmann was not so sure.
9
But compassion for Nixon as an individual hadn't prompted my decision
at all. p. 266.
10
I had to get the monkey off my back one way or another. p. 236.
"Jaworski gave Phil several crucial pieces of information. p. 246.
12
And if the verdict was Guilty, one had to assume that Nixon would appeal. That process would take years. p. 248.
13
The entire process would no doubt require years: a minimum of two, a
maximum of six. And Nixon would not spend time quietly in San Clemente. p. 238.
1
• It would be virtually impossible for me to direct public attention on
anything else. p. 239.
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Buchen wanted to condition the pardon on Nixon agreeing
to settle the question of who would retain custody and control
over the tapes and Presidential papers that might be relevant
to various Watergate proceedings, but Ford was reluctant to
do that.
At one point a plan was considered whereby the Presidential materials would be kept in a vault at a Federal facility
near San Clemente, but the vault would require two keys to
open it. One would be retained by the General Services Administration, the other by Richard Nixon.
The White House did, however, want Nixon to make a full
confession on the occasion of his pardon or, at a minimum, express true contrition. Ford tells of the negotiation with Jack
Miller, Nixon's lawyer, over the wording of Nixon's statement. But as Ford reports Miller's response. Nixon was
not likely to yield. "His few meetings with his client had
shown him that the former President's ability to discuss
Watergate objectively was almost nonexistent." 15
The statement they really wanted was never forthcoming.
As soon as Ford's emissary arrived in San Clemente, he was
confronted with an ultimatum by Ron Zeigler, Nixon's former press secretary. "Lets get one thing straight immediately," Zeigler said. "President Nixon is not issuing any
statement whatsoever regarding Watergate, whether Jerry
Ford pardons him or not." Zeigler proposed a draft, which
was turned down on the ground that "no statement would
be better than that." 16 They went through three more
drafts before they agreed on the statement Nixon finally
made, which stopped far short of a full confession.
When Ford aide Benton Becker tried to explain to Nixon
that acceptance of a pardon was an admission of guilt, he felt
But [Miller] wasn't optimistic about getting such a statement. His few
meetings with his client had shown him that the former President's ability
to discuss Watergate objectively was almost nonexistent. p. 246.
16
When Zeigler asked Becker what he thought of it, Becker replied that
rw statement would be better than that. p. 251.
16
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the President wasn't really listening.
Instead, Nixon
wanted to talk about the Washington Redskins. And when
Becker left, Nixon pressed on him some cuff links and a tie pin
"out of my own jewelry box."
Ultimately, Ford sums up the philosophy underlying his
decision as one he picked up as a student at Yale Law School
many years before. "I learned that public policy often
took precedence over a rule of law. Although I respected
the tenet that no man should be above the law, public policy demanded that I put Nixon-and Watergate-behind
us as quickly as possible." 17
Later, when Ford learned that Nixon's phlebitis had acted
up and his health was seriously impaired, he debated
whether to pay the ailing former President a visit. "If I
made the trip it would remind everybody of Watergate and
the pardon. If I didn't, people would say I lacked compassion." 18 Ford went:
He was stretched out flat on his back. There were
tubes in his nose and mouth, and wires led from his arms,
chest and legs to machines with orange lights that blinked
on and off. His face was ashen, and I thought I had never
seen anyone closer to death. 1'
The manuscript made available to The Nation includes
many references to Henry Kissinger and other personalities
who played a major role during the Ford years.
11

Years before, at Yale Law School, I'd learned that public policy often
took precedence over a rule of law. Although I respected the tenet that
no man should be above the law, public policy demanded that I put Nixonand Watergate-behind us as quickly as possible. p. 256.
18
My staff debated whether or not I ought to visit Nixon at the Long
Beach Hospital, only half an hour away. If I made the trip, it would remind everyone of Watergate and the pardon. If I didn't, people would say
I lacked compassion. I ended their debate as soon as I found out it had
begun. Of course I would go. p. 298.
19
He was stretched out flat on his back. There were tubes in his nose
and mouth, and wires led from his arms, chest and legs to machines with

•
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On Kissinger. Immediately after being informed by
Nixon of his intention to resign, Ford returned to the Executive Office Building and phoned Henry Kissinger to let him
know how he felt. "Henry," he said, "I need you. The
country needs you. I want you to stay. I'll do everything I can to work with you." 20
"Sir," Kissinger replied, "it is my job to get along with you
and not yours to get along with me."
"We'll get along," Ford said. "I know we'll get along."
Referring to Kissinger's joint jobs as Secretary of State and
National Security Adviser to the President, Ford said, "I
don't want to make any change. I think it's worked out
well, so let's keep it that way." 21
Later Ford did make the change and relieved Kissinger of
his responsibilities as National Security Adviser at the same
time that he fired James Schlesinger as Secretary of Defense.
Shortly thereafter, he reports, Kissinger presented him with
a "draft" letter of resignation, which he said Ford could call
upon at will if he felt he needed it to quiet dissent from conservatives who objected to Kissinger's role in the firing of
Schlesinger.
On John Connally. When Ford was informed that Nixon
wanted him to replace Agnew, he told the President he had
"no ambition to hold office after January 1977." 22 Nixon
replied that that was good since his own choice for his runorange lights that blinked on and off. His face was ashen, and I thought I
had never seen anyone cloer to death. p. 299.
''"'Henry," I said when he came on the line, "I need you. The country
needs you. I want you to stay. I'll do everything I can to work with
you." p. 46.
21
We'll get along," I said. "I know we can get along." We talked about
the two hats he wore, as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor
to the President. "I don't want to make any change," I said. "I think it's
worked out well, so let's keep it that way." p. 46.
22
I told him about my promise to Betty and said that I had no ambitions
to hold office after January 1977. p. 155.
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ning mate in 1976 was John Connally. "He'd be excellent,"
observed Nixon. Ford says he had "no problem with that."
On the Decision to Run Again. Ford was, he tells us, so
sincere in his intention not to run again that he thought he
would announce it and enhance his credibility in the country
and the Congress, as well as keep the promise he had made to
his wife, Betty.
Kissinger talked him out of it. "You can't do that. It
would be disastrous from a foreign policy point of view. For
the next two and a half years foreign governments would
know that they were dealing with a lame-duck President.
All our initiatives would be dead in the water, and I wouldn't
be able to implement your foreign policy. It would probably
have the same consequences in dealing with the Congress on
domestic issues. You can't reassert the authority of the
Presidency if you leave yourself hanging out on a dead limb.
You've got to be an affirmative President. "
On David Kennerly, the White House photographer.
Schlesinger was arguing with Kissinger and Ford over the
appropriate response to the seizure of the M ayaguez. At
issue was whether airstrikes against the Cambodians were
desirable; Schlesinger was opposed to bombings. Following
a lull in the conversation, Ford reports, up spoke the 30-yearold White House photographer, David Kennerly, who had
been taking pictures for the last hour.
"Has anyone considered," Kennerly asked, "that this might
be the act of a local Cambodian commander who has just
taken it into his own hands to stop any ship that comes by?"
Nobody, apparently, had considered it, but following several
seconds of silence, Ford tells us, the view carried the day.
"Massive airstrikes would constitute overkill," Ford
decided. "It would be far better to have Navy jets from
the Coral Sea make surgical strikes against specific
targets." 23
Subjectively, I felt that what Kennerly had said made a lot of sense.
Massive airstrikes would constitute overkill. It would be far better to
28

-

83-1632-Appendix to Opinion of the Court

36

HARPER & ROW v. NATION ENTERPRISES

On Nixon's Character. Nixon's flaw, according to Ford,
was "pride." "A terribly proud man," writes Ford, "he
detested weakness in other people. I'd often heard him
speak disparagingly of those whom he felt to be soft and
expedient. (Curiously, he didn't feel that the press was
weak. Reporters, he sensed, were his adversaries. He
knew they didn't like him, and he responded with reciprocal disdain.)" 24
Nixon felt disdain for the Democratic leadership of the
House, whom he also regarded as weak. According to Ford,
"His pride and personal contempt for weakness had overcome his ability to tell the difference between right and
wrong," 25 all of which leads Ford to wonder whether Nixon
had known in advance about Watergate.
On hearing Nixon's resignation speech, which Ford felt
lacked an adequate plea for forgiveness, he was persuaded
that "Nixon was out of touch with reality." 26
In February of last year, when The Washington Post obtained and printed advance excerpts from H. R. Haldeman's
memoir, The Ends of Power, on the eve of its publication by
Times Books, The New York Times called The Post's feat "a
second-rate burglary."
The Post disagreed, claiming that its coup represented
"first-rate enterprise" and arguing that it had burglarized
nothing, that publication of the Haldeman memoir came
have Navy jets from the Coral Sea make surgical strikes against specific
targets in the vicinity of Kompong Som. p. 416.
24
In Nixon's case, that flaw was pride. A terribly proud man, he detested weakness in other people. I'd often heard him speak disparagingly
of those whom he felt to be soft and expedient. (Curiously, he didn't feel
that the press was weak. Reporters, he sensed, were his adversaries.
He knew they didn't like him, and he responded with reciprocal disdain. )
p. 53.
25
His pride and personal contempt for weakness had overcome his ability
to tell the difference between right and wrong. p. 54.
211
The speech lasted fifteen minutes, and at the end I was convinced
Nixon was out of touch with reality. p. 57.
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under the Fair Comment doctrine long recognized by the
courts, and that "There is a fundamental journalistic principle
here-a First Amendment principle that was central to the
Pentagon Papers case."
In the issue of The Nation dated May 5, 1979, our special
Spring Books number, we will discuss some of the ethical
problems raised by the issue of disclosure.

•
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 83-1632

HARPER & ROW, PUBLISHERS, INC. AND THE READER'S DIGEST ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONERS
v. NATION ENTERPRISES AND THE NATION
ASSOCIATES, INC.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[May-, 1985]

dissenting.
The Court holds that The Nation's quotation of 300 words
from the unpublished 200,000-word manuscript of President
Gerald R. Ford infringed the copyright in that manuscript,
even though the quotations related to a historical event of undoubted significance-the resignation and pardon of President Richard M. Nixon. Although the Court pursues the
laudable goal of protecting "the economic incentive to create
and disseminate ideas," ante, at 18, this zealous defense of
the copyright owner's prerogative will, I fear, stifle the
broad dissemination of ideas and information copyright is intended to nurture. Protection of the copyright owner's economic interest is achieved in this case through an exceedingly
narrow definition of the scope of fair use. The progress of
arts and sciences and the robust public debate essential to an
enlightened citizenry are ill served by this constricted reading of the fair use doctrine. See 17 U. S. C. § 107. I therefore respectfully dissent.
I
JUSTICE BRENNAN,

A

This case presents two issues. First, did The Nation's use
of material from the Ford manuscript in forms other than di-

-

83-1632-DISSENT

2

HARPER & ROW v. NATION ENTERPRISES

rect quotation from that manuscript infringe Harper & Row's
copyright. Second, did the quotation of approximately 300
words from the manuscript infringe the copyright because
this quotation did not constitute "fair use" within the meaning of§ 107 of the Copyright Act. 17 U. S. C. § 107. The
Court finds no need to resolve the threshold copyrightability
issue. The use of 300 words of quotation was, the Court
finds, beyond the scope of fair use and thus a copyright
infringement. 1 Because I disagree with the Court's fair
use holding, it is necessary for me to decide the threshold
copyrightability question.
B
"The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under
the terms of the Constitution is not based upon any natural
right the author has in his writings . . . but upon the ground
that the welfare of the public will be served and progress of
science and useful arts will be promoted by securing to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings." H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909).
Congress thus seeks to define the rights included in copyright so as to serve the public welfare and not necessarily so
as to maximize an author's control over his or her product.
The challenge of copyright is to strike the "difficult balance
between the interests of the authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the
one hand, and society's competing interest in the free flow of
ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand." Sony
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., - - U. S. - - , - (1984).
1

In bypassing the threshold issue, the Court certainly does not intimate
that The Nation's use of ideas and information other than the quoted material would constitute a violation of the copyright laws. At one point in its
opinion the Court correctly states the governing principles with respect to
the copyrightability question. See ante, at 16 ("No author may copyright
his ideas or the facts he narrates").
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The "originality'' requirement now embodied in § 102 of the
Copyright Act is crucial to maintenance of the appropriate
balance between these competing interests. 2 Properly interpreted in the light of the legislative history, this section
extends copyright protection to an author's literary form but
permits free use by others of the ideas and information the
author communicates. See S. Rep. No. 983, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 107-108 (1974) ("Copyright does not preclude others
from using the ideas or information revealed by the author's
work. It pertains to the literary ... form in which the author has expressed the intellectual concepts"); H. R. Rep.
No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 56-57 (1976) (same); New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726, n.*
(1971) (BRENNAN, J., concurring) ("the copyright laws, of
course, protect only the form of expression and not the ideas
expressed"). This limitation of protection to literary form
precludes any claim of copyright in facts, including historical
narration.
"It is not to be supposed that the framers of the Constitution, when they empowered Congress 'to promote
the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing
for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries'
(Const., Art I, § 8, par. 8), intended to confer upon one
who might happen to be the first to report a historic
event the exclusive right for any period to spr~ad the
knowledge of it." International News Service, Inc. v.
Associated Press , 248 U. S. 215, 234 (1918).
Section 102(b) states: "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the
form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work." 17 U. S. C. § 102(b). The doctrines of fair use, see 17 U. S. C.
§ 107, and substantial similarity, see 3M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright
§ 13.05 (1984), also function to accomodate these competing considerations.
See generally Gorman, Fact or Fancy: Implications for Copyright, 29 J.
Copyr. Soc. 560 (1982).
2
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Accord Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc.,
366 F. 2d 303, 309 (CA2 1966), cert. denied, 385 U. S. 1009
(1967). See 1 Nimmer on Copyright §2.ll[A], at 2-158. 3
The "promotion of science and the useful arts" requires this
limit on the scope of an author's control. Were an author
able to prevent subsequent authors from using concepts,
ideas, or facts contained in his or her work, the creative process would wither and scholars would be forced into unproductive replication of the research of their predecessors. See
Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F. 2d 972, 979
(CA2 1980). This limitation on copyright also ensures consonance with our most important First Amendment values.
Cf. Zacchini v. Scripps Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U. S.
562, 577 n. 13 (1977). Our "profound national commitment
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964), leaves no room for a statutory
monopoly over information and ideas. "The arena of public
debate would be quiet, indeed, if a politician could copyright
his speeches or a philosopher his treatise and thus obtain a
monopoly on the ideas contained." Lee v. Runge, 404 U. S.
887, 893 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). A broad dissemination of principles, ideas, and factual
information is crucial to the robust public debate and informed citizenry that are "the essence of self-government."
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 74-75 (1964).. · And
every citizen must be permitted freely to marshall ideas and
facts in the advocacy of particular political choices. 4
By the same token, an author may not claim copyright in statements
made by others and reported verbatim in the author's work. See Suid v.
Newsweek Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146, 148 (D. DC 1980); Rokeach v. Avco
Embassy Pictures Corp. , 197 U. S. P. Q. 155, 161 (SDNY 1978).
• It would be perverse to prohibit government from limiting the financial resources upon which a political speaker may draw, see FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee, - - U. S. - - (1985),
but to permit government to limit the intellectual resources upon which
that speaker may draw.
3
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It follows that infringement of copyright must be based on
a taking of literary form, as opposed to the ideas or information contained in a copyrighted work. Deciding whether an
infringing appropriation of literary form has occurred is difficult for at least two reasons. First, the distinction between
literary form and information or ideas is often elusive in practice. Second, infringement must be based on a substantial
appropriation of literary form. This determination is equally
challenging. Not surprisingly, the test for infringement has
defied precise formulation. 5 In general, though, the inquiry
proceeds along two axes: how closely has the second author
tracked the first author's particular language and structure of
presentation; and how much of the first author's language
and structure has the second author appropriated. 6
In the present case the infringement analysis must be applied to a historical biography in which the author has chronicled the events of his White House tenure and commented on
those events from his unique perspective. Apart from the
quotations, virtually all of the material in The Nation's article
5

The protection of literary form must proscribe more than merely wordfor-word appropriation of substantial portions of an author's work. Otherwise a plagiarist could avoid infringement by immaterial variations. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F. 2d 119, 121 (CA2 1930). The step
beyond the narrow and clear prohibition of wholesale copying is, however,
a venture onto somewhat uncertain terrain. Compare Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F. 2d 972, 974 (CA2 1980), with Wainwright
Securities, Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F. 2d 91 (CA2 1977).
See also 1 Nimmer on Copyright§ 1.10B, at 1-73-1-74 (''it is the particular
selection and arrangement of ideas, as well as a given specificity in the
form of their expression, which warrants protection"); Chafee, Reflections
on the Law of Copyright, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 119, 121 (''the line lies somewhere between the author's idea and the precise form in which he wrote it
down. . . . [T]he protection covers the 'pattern' of the work"). Gorman,
Fact or Fancy: Implications for the Law of Copyright, 29 J. Copyr. Soc.
560, 593 (1983) ("too literal and substantial copying and paraphrasing of
. . . language").
8
The inquiry into the substantiality of appropriation has a quantitative
and a qualitative aspect.
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indirectly recounted Mr. Ford's factual narrative of the
Nixon resignation and pardon, his latter-day reflections on
some events of his presidency, and his perceptions of the
personalities at the center of those events. See ante, at
28-37. No copyright can be claimed in this information qua
information. Infringement would thus have to be based on
too close and substantial a tracking of Mr. Ford's expression
of this information. 7
The Language. Much of the information The Nation conveyed was not in the form of paraphrase at all, but took the
form of synopsis of lengthy discussions in the Ford manuscript. 8 In the course of this summary presentation, The
Neither the District Court nor the dissent in the court of appeals approached the question in this way. Despite recognizing that this material
was not ''per se copyrightable," the district court held that the ''totality of
these facts and memoranda collected together with Mr. Ford's reflections
... is protected by the copyright laws." 557 F. Supp. , at 1072-1073.
The dissent in the court of appeals signalled approval of this approach.
723 F. 2d, at 213-214 (Meskill, J., dissenting). Such an approach must be
rejected. Copyright protection cannot be extended to factual information
whenever that information is interwoven with protected expression (purportedly in this case Mr. Ford's reflections) into an expressive ''totality."
Most works of history or biography blend factual narrative and reflective
or speculative commentary in this way. Precluding subsequent use of
facts so presented cannot be· squared with the specific legislative intent,
expressed in both House and Senate reports, that "[c]opyright does not
preclude others from using the ... information revealed by th~ author's
work." See S. Rep. No. 983, supra, at 107-108; H. R. Rep. No. 1476,
supra, at 56-57. The core purposes of copyright would be thwarted and
serious First Amendment concerns would arise. An author could obtain a
monopoly on narration of historical events simply by being the first to discuss them in a reflective or analytical manner.
8
For example, the Ford manuscript expends several hundred words
discussing relations between Mr. Ford and Ronald Reagan in the weeks
before the Republican Convention of 1976:
"About a month before the convention, my aides had met with Reagan's
representatives to discuss the need for party unity. And they had reached
an agreement. At the end of the Presidential ballotting, the winner would
go to the loser's hotel suite and congratulate his opponent for waging a fine
7
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Nation did use occasional sentences that closely resembled
language in the original Ford manuscript. 9 But these linguistic similarities are insufficient to constitute an infringecampaign. Together, they would appear at a press conference and urge all
Republicans to put aside their differences and rally behind the ticket.
That was the only way we could leave Kansas City with a hope of victory.
When it appeared I was going to win, Sears conteacted Cheney and refined
the scenario. He insisted on two conditions. The first was that I had to
see Reagan alone; there could be no aides from either camp in the room.
Secondly, under no circumstances should I offer him the nomination to be
Vice President. Reagan had said all along that he wasn't interested in the
job. He had meant what he said. If I tried to talk him out of it, he would
have to turn me down, and that would be embarrassing because it would
appear that he was refusing to help the GOP. When Cheney relayed those
conditions to me, I agreed to go along with them. I would need Reagan's
assistance in the fall campaign. It would be stupid to anger him or his
followers at this moment.
Later I was told that just before my arrival at the Californian's hotel,
one of his closest advisors, businessman Justin Dart, had urged him to say
yes if I asked him to be my running mate, Regardless of anything he'd
said before, Dart had insisted, it was his patriotic duty to accept the number two post. Finally, according to Dart, Reagan had agreed. But at the
time, no one mentioned this new development to me. Had I been aware of
the Dart-Reagan conversation, would I have chosen him? I can't say for
sure-I thought his challenge had been divisive, and that it would probably
hurt the party in the fall campaign; additionally, l resented some of the
things that he'd been saying about me and my Administration's policiesbut I certainly would have considered him." App. 628-629.
The Nation encapsulated this discussion in the following sentence: "Ford
also writes that, but for a misunderstanding, he might have selected Ronald Reagan as his 1976 running mate." App. 627. In most other instances, a single sentence or brief paragraph in The Nation's article similarly conveys the gist of a discussion in the Ford manuscript that runs into
the hundreds of words. See generally Addendum B to Defendant's PostTrial Memorandum, App. 627-704.
9
For example, at one point The Nation's article reads: "Ford told a
Jackson, Mich. [sic], luncheon audience later in the day that the President
was not guilty of an impeachable offfense." Ante, at 30. The portion of
the Ford manuscript discussed stated: "Representative Thad Cochran ...
escorted me to a luncheon at the Jackson Hilton Hotel. During the luncheon I repeated my assertion that the President was not guilty of an im-
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ment for three reasons. First, some leeway must be given
to subsequent authors seeking to convey facts because those
"wishing to express the ideas contained in a factual work
often can choose from only a narrow range of expression."
Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736
F . 2d 485, 488 (CA9 1984). Second, much of what The Nation paraphrased was material in which Harper & Row could
claim no copyright. 10 Third, The Nation paraphrased nothing approximating the totality of a single paragraph, much
less a chapter or the work as a whole. At most the Nation
paraphrased disparate isolated sentences from the original.
A finding of infringement based on paraphrase generally
requires far more close and substantial a tracking of the original language than occurred in this case. See, e.g., Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558
F. 2d 91 (CA2 1977).
The Structure of Presentation. The article does not mimic
Mr. Ford's structure. The information The Nation presents
is drawn from scattered sections of the Ford work and does
not appear in the sequence in which Mr. Ford presented it. 11
peachable offense." App. 649. In several other places the language in
The Nation's article parallels Mr. Ford's original expression to a similar
degree. Compare ante, at 28-37, with App. 627-704.
10
Often the paraphrasing was of statements others had made to Mr.
Ford. E. g. , ante, at 29 ("He could 'ride it out' or he could resign, Haig
said"). See generally ante, at 28-37. No copyright can be asserted in the
verbatim representation of such statements of others. 17 U. S. 'C. § 102.
See Sui,d v. Newsweek Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146, 148 (DC 1980);
Rokeach v. Avco Embassy Pictures Corp., 197 U. S. P. Q. 155, 161
(SDNY 1978). Other paraphrased material came from government documents in which no copyright interest can be claimed. For example, the
article quotes from a memorandum prepared by Henry S. Ruth, Jr., in his
official capacity as assistant to Watergate Special Prosecutor Leon
Jaworski. See ante, at 31. This document is a work of the United States
government. See 17 U. S. C. § 105.
11
According to an exhibit Harper & Row introduced at trial the pages in
the Ford manuscript that correspond to consecutive sections of the article
are as follows: 607-608, 401, 44, 496, 1, 2-3, 4, 8, 7, 4-5, 5, 5-6, 8, 14, 15,
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Some of The Nation's discussion of the pardon does roughly
track the order in which the Ford manuscript presents information about the pardon. With respect to this similarity,
however, Mr. Ford has done no more than present the facts
chronologically and cannot claim infringement when a subsequent author similarly presents the facts of history in a
chronological manner. Also, it is difficult to suggest that a
2000-word article could bodily appropriate the structure of a
200,000-word book. Most of what Mr. Ford created, and
most of the history he recounted, was simply not represented
in The Nation's article. 12
When The Nation was not quoting Mr. Ford, therefore, its
efforts to convey the historical information in the Ford manuscript did not so closely and substantially track Mr. Ford's
language and structure as to constitute an appropriation of
literary form.
II
The Nation is thus liable in copyright only if the quotation
of 300 words infringed any of Harper & Row's exclusive
rights under § 106 of the Act. Section 106 explicitly makes
the grant of exclusive rights "[s]ubject to section 107 through
118." 17 U. S. C. § 106. Section 107 states: "[n]otwith16, 16, 18, 19, 21,266, 236, 246, 248,249,238-239,239,243,245, 246,250,
250-251, 251, 252, 253, 254, 256, 298, 299, 46, 494,537, 155-156, 216,415,
416, 416, 53-54, 57. See Appendix to Petition for Certiorari, E-lto E-41.
12
In one sense The Nation "copied" Mr. Ford's selection of facts because
it reported on only those facts Mr. Ford chose to select for presentation.
But this tracking of a historian's selection of facts generally should not supply the basis for a finding of infringement. See Myers v. Mail & Express
Co. , 36 Copyr. Off. Bull. 478 (SDNY 1919) (L. Hand, J. ). To hold otherwise would be to require a second author to duplicate the research of the
first author so as to avoid reliance on the first author's judgment as to what
facts are particularly pertinent. "It is just such wasted effort that the proscription against the copyright of ideas and facts . . . are designed to prevent." Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc. , 650 F . 2d 1365, 1371, quoting Roserrumt Enterprises , Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F. 2d 303,
310. See Gorman, 29 J. Copyr. Soc., at 594-595.

-

83-1632-DISSENT

10

HARPER & ROW v. NATION ENTERPRISES

standing the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work ... for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship or research, is not an infringement of
copyright." Id., § 107. The question here is whether The
Nation's quotation was a noninfringing fair use within the
meaning of § 107.
Congress "eschewed a rigid, bright line approach to fair
use." Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., supra, at
- - , n. 31. A court is to apply an "equitable rule of reason"
analysis, id., at - - , guided by four statutorily prescribed
factors:
"(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work." 17 U. S. C.. § 107.
These factors are not necessarily the exclusive determinants
of the fair use inquiry and do not mechanistically resolve fair
use issues; "no generally applicable definition is possible, and
each case raising the question must be decided on its facts."
H. R. Rep. No. 1476, supra, at 65. See also id., at 66 ("the
endless variety of situations and combinations that can arise
in particular cases precludes the formulation of exact rules in
the statute"); S. Rep. No. 473, supra, at 62. The statutory
factors do, however, provide substantial guidance to courts
undertaking the proper fact-specific inquiry.
With respect to a work of history, particularly the memoirs
of a public official, the statutorily-prescribed analysis cannot
properly be conducted without constant attention to copyright's crucial distinction between protected literary form
and unprotected information or ideas. The question must always be: was the subsequent author's use of literary form a
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fair use within the meaning of§ 107, in light of the purpose
for the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount
of literary form used, and the effect of this use of literary
form on the value of or market for the original.
Limiting the inquiry to the propriety of a subsequent author's use of the copyright owner's literary form is not easy
in the case of a work of history. Protection against only substantial appropriation of literary form does not ensure historians a return commensurate with the full value of their
labors. The literary form contained in works like "A Time to
Heal" reflects only a part of the labor that goes into the book.
It is the labor of collecting, sifting, organizing and reflecting
that predominates in the creation of works of history such as
this one. The value this labor produces lies primarily in the
information and ideas revealed, and not in the particular
collocation of words through which the information and ideas
are expressed. Copyright thus does not protect that which
is often of most value in a work of history and courts must
resist the tendency to reject the fair use defense on the basis
of their feeling that an author of history has been deprived of
the full value of his or her labor. A subsequent author's taking of information and ideas is in no sense piratical because
copyright law simply does not create any property interest in
information and ideas.
The urge to compensate for subsequent use of information
and ideas is perhaps understandable. An inequity ·seems to
lurk in the idea that much of the fruit of the historian's labor
may be used without compensation. This, however, is not
some unforeseen by-product of a statutory scheme intended
primarily to ensure a return for works of the imagination.
Congress made the affirmative choice that the copyright laws
should apply in this way: "Copyright does not preclude others
from using the ideas or information revealed by the author's
work. It pertains to the literary . . . form in which the
author expressed the intellectual concepts." H. R. Rep. No.
1473, supra, at 56-57. This distinction is at the essence of
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copyright. The copyright laws serve as the "engine of free
expression," ante, at 18, only when the statutory monopoly
does not choke off multifarious indirect uses and consequent
broad dissemination of information and ideas. To ensure the
progress of arts and sciences and the integrity of First
Amendment values, ideas and information must not be
freighted with claims of proprietary right. 13
In my judgment, the Court's fair use analysis has fallen to
the temptation to find copyright violation based on a minimal
use of literary form in order to provide compensation for the
appropriation of information from a work of history. The
failure to distinguish between information and literary form
permeates every aspect of the Court's fair use analysis and
leads the Court to the wrong result in this case. Application
of the statutorily prescribed analysis with attention to the
distinction between information and literary form leads to a
straightforward finding of fair use within the meaning of
§ 107.

The Purpose of the Use. The Nation's purpose in quoting
300 words of the Ford manuscript was, as the Court acknowledges, ·news reporting. See ante, at 20. The Ford work
contained information about important events of recent
history. Two principals, Mr. Ford and General Alexander
Haig, were at the time of the Nation's publication in 1979
widely thought to be candidates for the Presidency. That
The Nation objectively reported the information in the Ford
manuscript without independent commentary in no way diminishes the conclusion that it was reporting news. A typical news story differs from an editorial precisely in that it
13

This congressional limitation on the scope of copyright does not
threaten the production of history. That this limitation results in significant diminution of economic incentives is far from apparant. In any event
noneconomic incentives motivate much historical research and writing.
For example, former public officials often have great incentive to 'tell their
side of the story.' And much history is the product of academic scholarship. Perhaps most importantly, the urge to preserve the past is as old as
human kind.
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presents newsworthy information in a straightforward and
unelaborated manner. Nor does the source of the information render The Nation's article any less a news report.
Often books and manuscripts, solicited and unsolicited, are
the subject matter of news reports. E.g., New York Times
v. United States, 403 U. S. 713 (1971). Frequently the
manuscripts are unpublished at the time of the news report. 14
Section 107 lists news reporting as a prime example of fair
use of another's expression. Like criticism and all other purposes Congress explicitly approved in § 107, news reporting
informs the public; the language of § 107 makes clear that
Congress saw the spread of knowledge and information as
the strongest justification for a properly limited appropriation of expression. The court of appeals was therefore correct to conclude that the purpose of The Nation's use-dissemination of the information contained in the quotations of
Mr. Ford's work-furthered the public interest. 723 F. 2d,
at 207-208. In light of the explicit congressional endorsement in§ 107, the purpose for which Ford's literary form was
borrowed strongly favors a finding of fair use.
The Court concedes the validity of the news reporting purpose 15 but then quickly offsets it against three purportedly
"E.g. , The New York Times, August 2, 1984, p. C20, col. 5 (article
about revelations in forthcoming biography of Cardinal Spellman); The
New York Times, Dec. 10, 1981, p. A18, col. 1 (article about revelations in
forthcoming book by John Erlichman); The New York Times, Sept. 29,
1976, p. 1, col. 2 (article about revelations in forthcoming autobiography of
President Nixon); The New York Times, March 27, 1976, p. 9, col. 1 (article about revelations concerning President Nixon's resignation in forthcoming book The Final Days); The New York Times, Sept. 23, 1976, p. 36, col.
1 (article about revelations concerning President Ford in forthcoming book
Blind Ambition by John Dean).
15
The Court properly rejects the argument that this is not legitimate
news. Courts have no business making such evaluations of journalistic
quality. See ante, at 20. The Court also properly rejects the argument
that this use is nonproductive. See ante, at 20. News reporting, which
encompasses journalistic judgment with respect to selection, organization
and presentation of facts and ideas, is certainly a productive use. See
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countervailing considerations. First, the Court asserts that
because The Nation publishes for profit, its publication of the
Ford quotes is a presumptively unfair commercial use. Second, the Court claims that The Nation's stated desire to create a 'news event' signalled an illegitimate purpose of supplanting the copyright owner's right of first publication. Id.,
at 21. Third, The Nation acted in bad faith, the Court
claims, because its editor "knowingly exploited a purloined
manuscript." Ibid.
The Court's reliance on the commercial nature of The Nation's use as "a separate factor that tends to weigh against a
finding of fair use," ante, at 20, is inappropriate in the
present context. Many uses § 107 lists as paradigmatic examples of fair use, including criticism, comment and news reponing, are generally conducted for profit in this country, a
fact of which Congress was obviously aware when it enacted
§ 107. To negate any argument favoring fair use based on
news reporting or criticism because that reporting or criticism was published for profit is to render meaningless the
congressional imprimatur placed on such uses. 16
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., - - U.S. , at - - (BLACKJ., dissenting).
'"To support this claim the Court refers to some language in Sony Corp.
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., supa, to the effect that "every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation."
- - U. S. , at--. See ante, at 20. Properly understood, this language
does not support the Court's position in this case. The Court in Sony
Cm-p. dealt with a use-video recording of copyrighted television programs
for personal use-about which Congress had expressed no policy judgment. When a court evaluates uses that Congress has not specifically addressed, the presumption articulated in Sony Corp. is appropriate to effectuate the congressional instruction to consider "whether such use is of a
commercial nature." 17 U. S. C. § 107(1). Also, the Court made that
statement in the course of evaluating a use that appropriated the entirety
of the copyrighted work in a form identical to that of the original; the
presumption articulated may well have been intended to apply to takings
under these circumstances. But, in light of the specific language of§ 107,
this presumption is not appropriately employed to negate the weight ConMUN,
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Nor should The Nation's intent to create a 'news event'
weigh against a finding of fair use. Such a rule, like the
Court's automatic presumption against news reporting for
profit, would undermine the congressional validation of the
news reporting purpose. A news business earns its reputation, and therefore its readership, through consistent prompt
publication of news-and often through "scooping" rivals.
More importantly, the Court's failure to maintain the distinction between information and literary form colors the analysis of this point. Because Harper & Row had no legitimate
copyright interest in the information and ideas in the Ford
manuscript, The Nation had every right to seek to be the
first to disclose these facts and ideas to the public. The
record suggests only that The Nation sought to be the first to
reveal the information in the Ford manuscript. The Nation's
stated purpose of scooping the competition should under
those circumstances have no negative bearing on the claim of
fair use. Indeed the Court's reliance on this factor would
seem to amount to little more than distaste for standard
journalistic practice.
The Court's reliance on The Nation's putative bad faith is
equally unwarranted. No court has found that The Nation
possessed the Ford manuscript illegally or in violation of
any common law interest of Harper & Row; all common law
causes of action have been abandoned or dismissed in this
case. 723 F. 2d, at 199-201. Even if the manuscript had
been "purloined" by someone, nothing in this record imputes
culpability to The Nation. 17 On the basis of the record in this
gress explicitly gave to news reporting as a justification for limited use of
another's expression.
11
This case is a far cry from Time , Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, 293
F. Supp. 130, 146 (SDNY 1968), the only case the Court cites to support
consideration of The Nation's purported bad faith. In that case the publisher claiming fair use had personally stolen film negatives from the offices
of Time and then published graphic representations of the stolen photographic images. And the court found fair use despite these circumstances.
293 F. Supp., at 146.
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case, the most that can be said is that The Nation made use of
the contents of the manuscript knowing the copyright owner
would not sanction the use.
At several points the Court brands this conduct thievery.
See, e.g., ante, at 15, 21. This judgment is unsupportable,
and is perhaps influenced by the Court's unspoken tendency
in this case to find infringement based on the taking of information and ideas. With respect to the appropriation of
information and ideas other than the quoted words, The Nation's use was perfectly legitimate despite the copyright owner's objection because no copyright can be claimed in ideas or
information. Whether the quotation of 300 words was an infringement or a fair use within the meaning of § 107 is a close
question that has produced sharp division in both this Court
and the court of appeals. If the Copyright Act were held not
to prohibit the use, then the copyright owner would have had
no basis in law for objecting. The Nation's awareness of an
objection that has a significant chance of being adjudged unfounded cannot amount to bad faith. Imputing bad faith on
the basis of no more than knowledge of such an objection, the
Court impermissibly prejudices the inquiry and impedes arrival at the proper conclusion that the "purpose" factor of the
statutorily prescribed analysis strongly favors a finding of
fair use in this case.
The Nature of the Copyrighted Work. In Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., supra, we stated th:rt "not all
copyrights are fungible" and that "[c]opying a news broadcast
may have a stronger claim to fair use than copying a motion
picture." - - U. S., at - - n. 40. These statements reflect the principle, suggested in § 107(2) of the Act, that the
scope of fair use is generally broader when the source of borrowed expression is a factual or historical work. See 3
Nimmer on Copyright supra, § 13.05[A][2], at 13-73-13-74.
"Informational works," like the Ford manuscript, "that
readily lend themselves to productive use by others, are less
protected." Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
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supra, at - - (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). Thus the second
statutory factor also favors a finding of fair use in this case.
The Court acknowledges that "the law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual works than works
of fiction or fantasy," ante, at 22, and that "some of the
briefer quotations from the memoir are arguably necessary to
convey the facts," i bid. But the Court discounts the force of
this consideration, primarily on the ground that "the fact that
a work is unpublished is a crucial element of its 'nature.'"
Ante, at 22. 18 At this point the Court introduces into analysis of this case a categorical presumption against prepublication fair use. See ante, at 15 ("Under ordinary circumstances, the author's right to control the first public
appearance of his undisseminated expression will outweigh a
claim of fair use").
This categorical presumption is unwarranted on its own
terms and unfaithful to congressional intent. 19 Whether a
18
The Court also discounts this factor in part because the appropriation
of The Nation, "focusing on the most expressive elements of the work, exceeds that necessary to disseminate the facts." A nte, at 22. Whatever
the propriety of this view of The Nation's use, it is properly analyzed under
the third statutory fair use factor-the amount and substantiality of the
expression taken in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, 17
U. S. C. § 107(3}-and will be analyzed as such in this opinion.
19
The Court lays claim to specific congressional intent supporting the
presumption against prepublication fair use. See ante, at 13, quoting S.
Rep. No. 473, at 64; ante, at 10 n. 4, 13-14. The argument based on congressional intent is unpersuasive for three reasons.
First, the face of the statute clearly allows for prepublication fair use.
The right of first publication, like all other rights § 106 of the Act specifically grants copyright owners, is explicitly made "subject to section 107,"
the statutory fair use provision. See 17 U. S. C. § 106.
Second, the language from the Senate Report on which the Court relies
so heavily, see ante, at 13, simply will not bear the weight the Court places
on it. The Senate Report merely suggests that prepublication photocopying for classroom purposes will not generally constitute fair use when the
author has an interest in the confidentiality of the unpublished work, evidenced by the author's "deliberate choice" not to publish. Given that the
face of § 106 specifically allows for prepublication fair use, it would be un-
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particular prepublication use will impair any interest the
Court identifies as encompassed within the right of first
publication, see ante, at 12-14, 20 will depend on the nature of
the copyrighted work, the timing of prepublication use, the
amount of expression used and the medium in which the second author communicates. Also, certain uses might be tolerable for some purposes but not for others. See Sony Corp.
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., - - U. S., at--, n. 40.
Whereas Congress prescribed a specific inquiry into purpose,
nature, amount and effect in § 107 to account for such possibilities, the Court's analysis presumes intolerable injuryin particular the usurpation of the economic interest 21-based
faithful to the intent of Congress to draw from this circumscribed suggestion in the Senate Report a blanket presumption against any amount of
prepublication fair use for any purpose and irrespective of the effect of that
use on the copyright owner's privacy, editorial, or economic interests.
Third, the Court's reliance on congressional adoption of the common law
is also unpersuasive. The common law did not set up the monolithic barrier to prepublication fair use that the Court wishes it did. See, e. g. ,
Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 53 Misc. 2d 462 (S. Ct.
N. Y. Co.), aff'd, 25 App. Div. 2d 633 (1st Dept. 1967), aff'd on other
grounds, 23 N. Y. 2d 341 (1968). The statements of general principle the
Court cites to support its contrary representation of the common law, see
ante, at 10 n. 4, are themselves unsupported by reference to substantial
judicial authority. Congressional endorsement of the common law of fair
use should not be read as adoption of any rigid presumption against prepublication use. Ifread that way, the broad statement that the Copyright
Act was intended to incorporate the common law would in eff~ct be given
the force of nullifying Congress's repeated methodological prescription that
definite rules are inappropriate and fact-specific analysis is required. The
broad language adopting the common law approach to fair use is best understood as an endorsement of the essential fact-specificity and case-bycase methodology of the common law of fair use.
00
The Court finds the right of first publication particularly weighty because it encompasses three important interests: (i) a privacy interest in
whether to make expression public at all; (ii) an editorial interest in ensuring control over the work while it is being groomed for public dissemination; and (iii) an economic interest in capturing the full remunerative potential of initial release to the public. Ante, at 12-14.
21
Perhaps most inappropriate is the Court's apocalyptic prophesy that
permitting any prepublication use for news reporting will "effectively de-
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on no more than a quick litmus test for prepublication timing.
Because "Congress has instructed us that fair use analysis
calls for a sensitive balancing of interests," we held last Term
that the fair use inquiry could never be resolved on the basis
of such a "two dimensional" categorical approach. See Sony
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., supra, at--, n. 40
(rejecting categorical requirement of "productive use"). The
Court's path of analysis today departs significantly from that
holding.
Relying on the force of presumption, the Court at this
point makes no inquiry into the actual or potential effects of
The Nation's use on the interests the Court claims are encompassed within the right of first publication. Had the Court
looked into actual effects, it would have discovered those
effects to be minimal. The quotation of 300 words from the
manuscript infringed no privacy interest of Mr. Ford. This
author intended the words in the manuscript to be a public
statement about his presidency. Lacking, therefore, is the
"deliberate choice on the part of the copyright owner" to keep ·
expression confidential, a consideration that the Senate Report-in the passage on which the Court places great reliance, see ante, at 13--recognized as the impetus behind narrowing fair use for unpublished works. See S. Rep. No. 473,
supra, at 64. See also 3 Nimmer on Copyright§ 13.05[A], at
13-73 ("the scope of the fair use doctrine is considerably
narrower with respect to unpublished works which 'are held
confidential by their copyright owners") (emphasis added).
Lacking too is any suggestion that The Nation's use interfered with the copyright owner's interest in editorial control
stroy any expectation of copyright protection in the work of a public figure." Ante, at 16. The impact of a prepublication use for purposes of
news reporting will obviously vary with the circumstances. A claim of
news reporting should not be a fig leaf for substantial plagiarism, see
Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F. 2d 91,
but there is no warrant for concluding that prepublication quotation of a
few sentences will usually drain all value from a copyright owner's right of
first publication.
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of the manuscript. The Nation made use of the Ford quotes
on the eve of official publication.
Thus the only interest The Nation's prepublication use
might have infringed is the copyright owner's interest in
capturing the full economic value of initial release. By considering this interest as a component of the "nature" of the
copyrighted work, the Court's analysis deflates The Nation's
claim that the informational nature of the work supports fair
use without any inquiry into the actual or potential economic
harm of The Nation's particular prepublication use. For this
reason, the question of economic harm is properly considered
under the fourth statutory factor-the effect on the value of
or market for the copyrighted work, 17 U. S. C. § 107(4}and not as a presumed element of the "nature" of the
copyright.
The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used.
More difficult questions arise with respect to judgments
about the importance to this case of the amount and substantiality of the quotations used. The Nation quoted only approximately 300 words from a manuscript of more than
200,000 words, and the quotes are drawn from isolated passages in disparate sections of the work. The judgment that
this taking was quantitatively "infinitesimal," 723 F . 2d, at
209, does not dispose of the inquiry, however. An evaluation of substantiality in qualitative terms is also required.
Much of the quoted material was Mr. Ford's matter-of-fact
representation of the words of others in conversations with
him; such quotations are "arguably necessary adequately to
convey the facts," ante, at 22, and are not rich in expressive
content. Beyond these quotations a portion of the quoted
material was drawn from the most poignant expression in the
Ford manuscript; in particular The Nation made use of six
examples of Mr. Ford's expression of his reflections on
events or perceptions about President Nixon. 22 The fair use
22

These six quotes are:
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inquiry turns on the propriety of the use of these quotations
with admittedly strong expressive content.
The Court holds that "in view of the expressive value of the
excerpts and their key role in the infringing work," this third
statutory factor disfavors a finding of fair use. 23 To support
(1) "'[C]ompassion for Nixon as an individual hadn't prompted my decision
at all.' Rather, he did it because he had 'to get the monkey off my back
one way or the other.'" Ante, at 30-31.
(2) "Nixon 'would not spend the time quietly in San Clemente,' and 'it
would be virtually impossible for me to direct public attention on anything
else.'" Ante, at 31.
(3) "'I had learned that public policy often took precedence over a rule of
law. Although I respected the tenet that no man should be above the law,
public policy demanded that I put Nixon-and Watergate-behind us as
quickly as possible.'" Ante, at 33.
(4) "'If I made the trip it owuld remind everybody of Watergate and the
pardon. If I didn't people would say I lacked compassion.'" Ante, at 33.
(5) "'He was stretched out flat on his back. There were tubes in his nose
and mouth, and wires led from his arms, chest and legs to machines with
orange lights that blinked on and off. His face was ashen, and I thought I
·
had never seen anyone closer to death.'" Ante, at 33.
(6) "'A terribly proud man,' writes Ford, 'he detested weakness in other
people. I'd often heard him speak disparagingly of those whom he felt to
be soft and expedient. (Curiously, he didn't feel that the press was weak.
Reporters, he sensed, were his adversaries. He knew they didn't like
him, and he responded with reciprocal disdain.)'. . . . 'His pride and personal contempt for weakness had overcome his ability to tell the difference
between right and wrong.' .... 'Nixon was out of touch with reality.'"
Ante, at 36.
28
The Court places some emphasis on the fact that the quotations from
the Ford work constituted a substantial portion of The Nation's article.
Superficially, the Court would thus appear to be evaluating The Nation's
quotation of 300 words in relation to the amount and substantiality of expression used in relation to the second author's work as a whole. The statute directs the inquiry into "the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the capyri,ghted work as a whole,'' 17 U. S. C. § 107(3).
As the statutory directive implies, it matters little whether the second author's use is one or 100 percent appropriated expression if the taking of
that expression had no adverse effect on the copyrighted work. See Sony
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., supra (100% of expression taken).
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this conclusion, the Court purports to rely on on the district
court factual findings that The Nation had taken "the heart of
the book." 557 F. Supp., at 1072. This reliance is misplaced, and would appear to be another result of the Court's
failure to distinguish between information and litarary form.
When the District Court made this finding, it was evaluating
not the quoted words at issue here but the "totality" of the
information and reflective commentary in the Ford work.
Ibid. The vast majority of what the District Court considered the heart of the Ford work, therefore, consisted of ideas
and information The Nation was free to use. It may well be
that, as a qualitative matter, most of the value of the manuscript did lie in the information and ideas the Nation used.
But appropriation of the "heart" of the manuscript in this
sense is irrelevant to copyright analysis because copyright
does not preclude a second author's use of information and
ideas.
Perhaps tacitly recognizing that reliance on the District
Court finding is unjustifiable, the Court goes on to evaluate
independently the quality of the expression appearing in The
Nation's article. The Court states that "[t]he portions actually quoted were selected by Mr. Navasky as among the most
powerful passages." Ante, at 23. On the basis of no more
than this observation, and perhaps also inference from the
fact that the quotes were important to The Nation's article, 24
the Court adheres to its conclusion that The Nation appropriated the heart of the Ford manuscript.
'
At least with respect to the six particular quotes of Mr.
Ford's observations and reflections about President Nixon, I
agree with the Court's conclusion that The Nation appropriI presume, therefore, that the Court considered the role of the expression
''in the infringing work" only as indirect evidence of the qualitative value of
the expression taken in this case. If read this way, the point dovetails
with the Court's major argument that The Nation appropriated the most
valuable sentences of the work.
u See note 23.
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ated some literary form of substantial quality. I do not
agree, however, that the substantiality of the expression
taken was clearly excessive or inappropriate to The Nation's
news reporting purpose.
Had these quotations been used in the context of a critical
book review of the Ford work, there is little question that
such a use would be fair use within the meaning of § 107 of the
Act. The amount and substantiality of the use-in both
quantitative and qualitative terms-would have certainly
been appropriate to the purpose of such a use. It is difficult
to see how the use of these quoted words in a news report is
less appropriate. The Court acknowledges as much: "even
substantial quotations might qualify as a fair use in a review
of a published work or a news account of a speech that had
been delivered to the public." See ante, at 22. With respect to the motivation for the pardon and the insights into
the psyche of the fallen President, for example, Mr. Ford's
reflections and perceptions are so laden with emotion and
deeply. personal value judgments that full understanding is
immeasurably enhanced by reproducing a limited portion of
Mr. Ford's own words. The importance of the work, after
all, lies not only in revelation of previously unknown fact but
also in revelation of the thoughts, ideas, motivations, and
fears of two presidents at a critical moment in our national
history. Thus, while the question is not easily resolved, it is
difficult to say that the use of the six quotations was gratuitous in relation to the news reporting purpose.
Conceding that even substantial quotation is appropriate in
a news report of a '[YUblished work, the Court would seem to
agree that this quotation was not clearly inappropriate in
relation to The Nation's news reporting purpose. For the
Court, the determinative factor is again that the substantiality of the use was inappropriate in relation to the prepublication timing of that use. That is really an objection to
the effect of this use on the market for the copyrighted work,
and is properly evaluated as such.
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The Effect on the Market. The Court correctly notes that
the effect on the market "is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use." Ante, at 24, quoting 3 Nimmer
on Copyright§ 13.05[A], at 13-76, and the Court properly focuses on whether The Nation's use adversely affected Harper
& Row's serialization potential and not merely the market for
sales of the Ford work itself. Ante, at 25. Unfortunately,
the Court's failure to distinguish between the use of information and the appropriation of literary form badly skews its
analysis of this factor.
For purposes of fair use analysis, the Court holds, it is sufficient that the entire article containing the quotes eroded the
serialization market potential of Mr. Ford's work. Ante, at
25. On the basis of Time's cancellation of its serialization
agreement, the Court finds that "[r]arely will a case of copyright infringement present such a clear case of actual damage." Ante, at 24. In essence, the Court finds that by
using some quotes in a story about the Nixon pardon, The
Nation "competed for a share of the market of prepublication
excerpts" ante, at 26, because Time planned to excerpt from
the chapters about the pardon.
The Nation's publication indisputably precipitated Time's
eventual cancellation. But that does not mean that The
Nation's use of the 300 quoted words caused this injury to
Harper & Row. Wholly apart from these quoted words, The
Nation published significant information and ideas from the
Ford manuscript. If it was this publication of information,
and not the publication of the few quotations, that caused
Time to abrogate its serialization agreement, then whatever
the negative effect on the serialization market, that effect
was the product of wholly legitimate activity.
The Court of Appeals specifically held that "the evidence
does not support a finding that it was the very limited use of
expression per se which led to Time's decision not to print the
excerpts." 723 F. 2d, at 208. I fully agree with this holding. If The Nation competed with Time, the competition
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was not for a share of the market in excerpts of literary form
but for a share of the market in the new information in the
Ford work. That the information, and not the literary form,
represents most of the real value of the work in this case is
perhaps best revealed by the following provision in the contract between Harper & Row and Mr. Ford:
"Author acknowledges that the value of the rights
granted to publisher hereunder would be substantially
diminished by Author's public discussion of the unique
information not previously disclosed about Author's career and personal life which will be included in the Work,
and Author agrees that Author will endeavor not to disseminate any such information in any media, including
television, radio and newspaper and magazine interviews prior to the first publication of the work hereunder." App. 484.
The contract thus makes clear that Harper & Row sought to
benefit substantially from monopolizing the initial revelation
of information known only to Ford.
Because The Nation was the first to convey the information in this case, it did perhaps take from Harper & Row
some of the value that publisher sought to garner for itself
through the contractual arrangement with Ford and the license to Time. Harper & Row had every right to seek to
monopolize revenue from that potential market through contractual arrangements but it has no right to set up copyright
a shield from competition in that market because copyright
does not protect information. The Nation had every right to
seek to be the first to publish that information.
Balancing the Interests. Once the distinction between information and literary form is made clear, the statutorily prescribed process of weighing the four statutory fair use factors
discussed above leads naturally to a conclusion that The Nation's limited use of literary form was not an infringement.
Both the purpose of the use and the nature of the copyrighted
work strongly favor the fair use defense here. The Nation
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apppropriated Mr. Ford's expression for a purpose Congress
expressly authorized in § 107 and borrowed from a work
whose nature justifies some appropriation to facilitate the
spread of information. The factor that is perhaps least favorable to the claim of fair use is the amount and substantiality of the expression used. Without question, a portion of
the expression appropriated was among the most poignant in
the Ford manuscript. But it is difficult to conclude that this
taking was excessive in relation to the news reporting purpose. In any event, because the appropriation of literary
form-as opposed to the use of information-was not shown
to injure Harper & Row's economic interest, any uncertainty
with respect to the propriety of the amount of expression
borrowed should be resolved in favor of a finding of fair use. 25
In light of the circumscribed scope of the quotation in The
Nation's article and the undoubted validity of the purpose
motivating that quotation, I must conclude that the Court
has simply adopted an exceedingly narrrow view of fair use in
order to impose liability for what was in essence a taking of
unprotected information.
III
The Court's exceedingly narrow approach to fair use permits Harper & Row to monopolize information. This holding
"effects an important extension of property rights and a corresponding curtailment in the free use of knowledge and of
ideas." International Ne:ws Service v. Associated Press, 248
U. S., at 263 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The Court· has perhaps advanced the ability of the historian-or at least the
211
Had The Nation sought to justify a more substantial appropriation of
expression on a news reporting rationale, a different case might be presented. The substantiality of the taking would certainly dilute the claim of
need to use the first author's exact words to convey a particular thought or
sentiment. Even if the claim of need were plausible, the equities would
have to favor the copyright owner in order to prevent erosion of virtually
all copyright protection for works of former public officials. In this case,
however, the need is manifest and the integrity of copyright protection for
the works of public officials is not threatened.
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public official who has recently left office-to capture the full
economic value of information in his or her possession. But
the Court does so only by risking the robust debate of public
issues that is the "essence of self-government. " Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U. S., at 74-75. The Nation was providing
the grist for that robust debate. The Court imposes liability
upon The Nation for no other reason than that The Nation
succeeded in being the first to provide certain information to
the public. I dissent.
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